Doyle v. Brew'N'Motion, LLC

1

RONAN DOYLE, Plaintiff, v. BREW'N'MOTION, LLC, Defendant.

No. 24-22639-CIV-ALTONAGA/Reid

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

November 21, 2024

ORDER

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Brew'N'Motion, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [ECF No. 26], filed on October 9, 2024. Plaintiff, Ronan Doyle filed a Response [ECF No. 36], to which Defendant filed a Reply [ECF No 37].^[1]

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a forty-two-year-old white male, born in Ireland, who was employed by Defendant as a “Team Leader” from November 1, 2021 to January 17, 2022. (Am. Compl. [ECF No 23] ¶ 16; see also id. ¶¶ 8, 10).^[2] During his brief employment, Plaintiff reported directly to his supervisor, Jorge Blanco. (See id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges his coworkers “singled him out and treated him with hostility due to his race (white).” (Id. ¶ 17).

Plaintiff states that his coworkers, including one named Alexis, would repeatedly refer to him as “gringo” (id. ¶ 18) and “snatch tools from [his] hands and laugh about it with the rest of the staff” (id. ¶ 19 (alteration added)). Plaintiff reported these incidents to Blanco, who took no action. (See id. ¶ 20). When Alexis found out Plaintiff reported him, Alexis “shoved [Plaintiff] into the bathroom, threw a soap dish with soap and a ragged shirt at [Plaintiff], told [Plaintiff] ‘Gringo no bueno,' and asked [Plaintiff] to wash himself because he ‘smelled.'” (Id. ¶ 22 (alterations added)). Another coworker, Martin, video-called his significant other in a company truck and waved the phone in front of Plaintiff while saying “hello, gringo[.]” (Id. ¶ 24 (alteration added)). Plaintiff contends “Alexis encouraged his peers to imitate his behavior and be hostile toward” Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 23).

Events like these caused Plaintiff anxiety, interfered with his job, and ultimately led to his resignation in January 2022. (See id. ¶ 25). Plaintiff now brings three claims against Defendant, each a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1981: a claim of disparate treatment (see id. ¶¶ 26-37); a claim of a hostile work environment (see id. ¶¶ 38-43); and a retaliation claim (see id. ¶¶ 44-48). Defendant moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing “Plaintiff fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted.” (Mot. 1).^[3]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration added; quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (alteration added; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration added; citation omitted). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To meet this “plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take its factual allegations as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's three claims. (See generally Mot.). First, Defendant argues all of Plaintiff's claims must fail because use of the word “gringo” is not actionable. (See id. 4-6). Defendant then contends Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim must be dismissed, arguing Plaintiff does not show intentional race discrimination. (See id. 6-11). Next, Defendant posits Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is deficient because the alleged harassment was not based on race, was not severe or pervasive, and Plaintiff fails to show Defendant created the hostile work environment. (See id. 12-15). Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiff does not state a retaliation claim because he fails to state a single required element of the (See id. 15-20). Plaintiff summarily responds that he has alleged sufficient facts to support his claims. (See, e.g., Resp. 3).

First, a threshold matter. Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot show any claim of race discrimination for two reasons: one, the use of the term gringo means his allegations are properly understood as discrimination on the basis of national origin, not race; and two, gringo is not a harassing term. (See Mot. 4-6). The Court is not so persuaded. True, the word gringo is certainly tied to national origin, but it can also be understood as referring to race. Gringo is a term meaning “a foreigner in Spain or Latin America especially when of English or American origin” that “broadly” means “a non-Hispanic person[.]” Gringo, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gringo (last visited Nov. 20, 2024) (alteration added). Further, the word is understood as “often disparaging” id., “usually derogatory” and “offensive[,]” Gringo, CollinsDictionary.com, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/gringo (last visited Nov. 20, 2024) (alteration added). Nor is use of the term gringo all Plaintiff alleges. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 21 (alleging “physical violence”)).

Given this, the Court declines to adopt Defendant's categorical view of the term in considering the sufficiency of the pleading, when it must draw inferences in Plaintiff's favor.^[4] Finding uniform dismissal of all counts inappropriate, the Court turns to Defendant's countspecific arguments, addressing each in turn.

Disparate Treatment. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. section 1981 by racially discriminating against him when it treated him differently than his non-white coworkers. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-37). Defendant argues that to state a disparate treatment claim, “Plaintiff must allege facts suggesting intentional discrimination with direct evidence or with circumstantial evidence by using the burden shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green,” 411 U.S. 792 (1973). (Mot. 6). True, “[w]hen proceeding under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination” which he can do “by showing (1) that [he] belongs to a protected class, (2) that [he] was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that [he] was qualified to perform the job in question, and (4) that [his] employer treated ‘similarly situated' employees outside [his] class more favorably.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2019) (alterations added; citations omitted); see also id. at 1220 (noting these requirements must be met “[i]n order to survive summary judgment” (alteration added)).

Defendant is not requesting summary judgment, but rather, dismissal of a pleading for the failure to state a plausible claim for relief. “Defendant has confused McDonnell Douglas's evidentiary requirements (which apply on a motion for summary judgment) with Rule 12(b)(6)'s requirements for a motion to dismiss.” Gregori v. Hometown Foods USA, LLC, No. 23-cv-23356, 2024 WL 474374, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2024). Defendant asks too much; and its arguments, relying on an evidentiary standard, are misplaced. Again, all Plaintiff must do at this stage is plausibly “suggest intentional race discrimination.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“To state a race-discrimination claim . . . a complaint need only provide enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional race discrimination.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (alteration and emphasis added; citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Davis v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 23-12480, 2024 WL 4051215, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2024) (strictly requiring a plaintiff to assert all four elements of a McDonnell-Douglas prima facie case is “the wrong legal standard to apply at the pleading stage” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). As Plaintiff's claim is brought under section 1981, however, he must “must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, [he] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege he was qualified for the position; there was no actionable adverse employment action; Plaintiff fails to include comparators in the Amended Complaint; and, finally, Plaintiff cannot establish discrimination occurred but for his race. (See Mot 8-11). Even analyzing each element of the prima facie test that Plaintiff does not yet have to prove, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state a disparate treatment claim. True, Plaintiff provides scant details as...