Doyle v. Merz N. Am., Inc.

405 F.Supp.3d 186

Kerrie DOYLE, Plaintiff,

v.MERZ NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-10591-PBS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed September 18, 2019

Suzanne L. Herold, Herold Law Group, P.C., Charlestown, MA, for Plaintiff.

Dana L. Rust, Pro Hac Vice, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Heidi E. Siegmund, Pro Hac Vice, McGuire Woods LLP, Richmond, VA, Kevin M. Duddlesten, McGuireWoods LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Patti B. Saris, Chief United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kerrie Doyle ("Doyle") brings this action against her former employer Defendant Merz North America, Inc. ("Merz") alleging gender discrimination and retaliation in violation Massachusetts law. Merz moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. In the alternative, Merz asks the Court to transfer the case to the Eastern District of North Carolina. Doyle opposes all relief sought by Merz. After hearing, the Court DENIES Merz's motion (Dkt. No. 7).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

When determining whether it can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant without an evidentiary hearing, the Court conducts a prima facie review of the jurisdictional facts. See Negrón–Torres v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2007). The Court will consider facts alleged in pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits. See Ealing Corp. v. Harrods Ltd., 790 F.2d 978, 979 (1st Cir. 1986). The Court "take[s] specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not disputed) and construe[s] them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff's jurisdictional claim." Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). The Court also will consider facts that the defendant proffers as long as they are uncontradicted. See id.

Accordingly, the following factual background comes from Doyle's Complaint and two declarations, two affidavits from Merz's Associate Director of Human Resources, Kim Lobell, and the exhibits to those documents. The facts are assumed to be true, either because they are affirmatively alleged by Doyle or they are affirmatively alleged by Merz and are otherwise uncontradicted.

I. Merz's Business

Merz sells various medical devices and products across the United States, including in Massachusetts. Merz is headquartered and incorporated in North Carolina.

It is registered to conduct business and has a registered agent in Massachusetts. Merz has six employees based in Massachusetts that work in its injectables division. Merz does not lease or own any office space in Massachusetts.

II. Doyle's Employment

Doyle worked for Merz as a saleswoman from September 2015 through May 2018. From September 2015 to September 2017, Doyle worked in Merz's injectables division and was based in Massachusetts. From September 2017 until May 2018, Doyle worked in Merz's device division as the Device Territory Manager with a sales area covering Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and part of Connecticut. Doyle alleges that she also was based in Massachusetts after her transfer to the device division.¹ Following her transfer, Doyle's direct manager was Jack Patten, whose supervisor was Mike Floegel. Patten resided in and worked from New Jersey. Floegel resided and worked in North Carolina.

While Doyle worked in the device division, she estimates that 80% of her customers were located in Massachusetts. Two of the three sales that she made when she worked on the device team were to customers in Massachusetts. In addition, Doyle was physically present in Massachusetts as she worked "on a daily or almost daily basis" in Massachusetts and "constantly" communicated with Patten by phone and email while she worked in Massachusetts. Dkt. No. 20-2 ¶ 9.

III. Discrimination and Retaliation

Doyle alleges that Patten treated Doyle differently than her male colleagues. He met with Doyle's male co-workers to help them succeed but did not and would not do the same for her. He continuously criticized Doyle and compared her to other men on the team. He offered one-on-one training to Doyle's male co-workers, but not to her. He co-traveled with male employees to client meetings but refused to co-travel with her. Doyle specifically alleges that Patten did not co-travel with her for meetings in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine even though she repeatedly requested that he co-travel with her in October 2017. In contrast, Doyle claims Patten co-traveled with male employees to Florida, Georgia, West Virginia, and Washington D.C. Because Patten would not co-travel with Doyle, she would have him participate in many of her sales calls via conference calls.

On November 3, 2017, Doyle received a phone call from Floegel after she had not sold a device in the prior month. Floegel told Doyle that she had to sell a device in November "or else," which she interpreted as a threat of termination. Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶ 21. However, male co-workers were not threatened with termination even though they did not sell a product during a month. And when Doyle requested a larger sales territory that was more comparable to those of her male co-workers, Merz refused.

On November 22, 2017, Doyle received a "Letter of Professional Concern" because of her quarterly sales performance. Doyle received the letter even though six weeks remained in the quarter. Doyle ultimately sold three devices in that quarter, and her sales goal was four devices. Two of those sales were to Massachusetts customers. No male co-workers with a similar sales history received Letters of Professional Concern. (The day before she received the letter, Doyle called Merz's Ethics Line to report Patten for gender discrimination.

On December 6, 2017, Patten gave credit to a male co-worker for a sale that Doyle fostered. When Doyle called Patten, he "screamed at her, told her that ‘she wasn't playing the game’ or words to that effect, and hung up on her." Id. ¶ 35.

On February 5, 2018, Doyle had a mediation call with Patten and Floegel in response to her Ethics Line complaint. During that call, Floegel "harassed, intimidated and cross-examined" Doyle and did not attempt to mediate the dispute. Id. ¶ 39.

On February 14, 2018, Doyle had another mediation call with Patten, Floegel, and a representative from Merz human resources. In that call, Floegel and the human resources representative belittled and bullied Doyle. On February 16th, Doyle visited her doctor because of various health conditions caused by work-related stress. At the doctor's recommendation, Doyle took a leave of absence from Merz from February 17 until May 14.

When Doyle returned to work in May, Patten continued his hostile and abusive behavior until Doyle resigned on May 25, 2018.

Personal Jurisdiction

I. Legal Standard

In a diversity case, the Court must "find sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum to satisfy both that state's long-arm statute and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause." Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1387 (1st Cir. 1995). "[I]n order to avoid unnecessary consideration of constitutional questions," the Court first determines whether it can exercise jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. Access Now, Inc. v. Otter Prods., LLC, 280 F. Supp. 3d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 478 Mass. 324, 85 N.E.3d 50, 52 (2017) ). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction over the defendant. Negrón–Torres, 478 F.3d at 23. And in a specific jurisdiction inquiry, as here, the Court "examine[s] each legal claim discretely." Matos v. Seton Hall Univ., 102 F. Supp. 3d 375, 380 n.2 (D. Mass. 2015).

II. Discussion

Doyle concedes that Merz, a North Carolina corporation with limited operations in Massachusetts, is not subject to general jurisdiction in Massachusetts. Instead, she argues that the Court can exercise specific jurisdiction over Merz.

A. Massachusetts' Long-Arm Statute

Massachusetts' long-arm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant when a claim arises from "transacting any business in this commonwealth." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(a). The test for this determination has two parts: (1) whether the defendant attempted to participate in the Commonwealth's economic life; and (2) whether the transacted business was a "but for" cause of the harm. Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 625 N.E.2d 549, 552-53 (1994).

In general, "the purposeful and successful solicitation of business from residents of the Commonwealth, by a defendant or its agent, will suffice to satisfy [the transacting business] requirement." Id. Moreover, the Court broadly construes "transacting." Access Now, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d at 291. Through Doyle, Merz sold and attempted to sell medical devices to buyers in Massachusetts. She held sales calls with the company's Massachusetts customers and traveled throughout the state to try sell its products. See Cossart v. United Excel Corp., 804 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding that unsuccessful solicitations of business qualify as business transactions under Massachusetts' long-arm statute). Therefore, Merz has transacted business in Massachusetts for purposes of the long-arm statute.

"[A] claim arises from a defendant's transaction of business in the forum State if the claim was made possible by, or lies in the wake of, the transaction of business in the forum State." Tatro, 625 N.E.2d at 553. This test "boils down to a ‘but for’ causation test which asks ‘did the defendant's contacts with the Commonwealth constitute the first step in a train of events that resulted in the [harm].’ " Access Now, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 291 (quoting United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1087 (1st Cir. 1992) (cleaned up)). For employment-related claims, this "but-for" test is satisfied where the claims arise from the employee's work performed in Massachusetts. See Cossart, ...