Drasovean v. Walts

1

MONICA DRASOVEAN v. STEVEN WALTS, ET AL.

Record No. 0259-23-4

Court of Appeals of Virginia

November 6, 2024

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY Carroll A. Weimer Jr., Judge.

Benjamin F. North (Binnall Law Group, PLLC, on briefs), for appellant.

John F. Cafferky (William B. Porter; Ian J. McElhaney Blankingship &Keith, P.C, on brief), for appellees.

Present: Athey, Causey and Callins, Judges Argued at Winchester, Virginia.

MEMORANDUM OPINION^[*]

DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY, JUDGE.

The Circuit Court of Prince William County granted appellees' plea in bar and determined, as a matter of law, that sovereign immunity bars gross negligence claims when a government official is sued in his official capacity. On appeal, Monica Drasovean argues that the circuit court erred in its decision. Precedent states that when a suit is brought against a government official under the theory of gross negligence, sovereign immunity does not block that claim. However, when a defendant is sued in his official capacity, the suit is effectively against the entity with which he is employed. Thus, the question in this case is whether the sovereign immunity to which school boards are entitled bars claims of gross negligence. This is a matter of first impression. We hold that the circuit court erred in granting the plea in bar, reverse, and remand the holding of the circuit court to determine whether the alleged actions taken by the appellees amounted to gross negligence.

BACKGROUND

The Prince William County School Board (School Board) operates the Prince William County Public Schools (PWCS). During the 2016-17 school year, Monica Drasovean was a student enrolled in the Special Education Program at C.D. Hylton High School (Hylton). During this time, Dr. Steven Walts served as PWCS's Superintendent, Dr. Michelle Roper served as the Director of Special Education for PWCS, and David Cassady served as the principal of Hylton (collectively School Board Employees).

Around November 2016, H.A.^[1] transferred from another high school into Hylton's Special Education Program. Drasovean alleges that H.A. had "a known troubled record involving harmful, sexual, and abusive behavior." According to Drasovean, before H.A. arrived at Hylton, a teacher at Hylton contacted the school's head of the Special Needs Education Department and relayed her opinion that "[H.A.] would not be a good fit for the special needs program at Hylton and would pose a danger to other students." The department head then relayed this concern to Cassady, who contacted Dr. Roper about the transfer. Dr. Roper ultimately allowed H.A. to transfer to Hylton.

Upon his arrival at Hylton, H.A. was placed in several classes with Drasovean that were supervised by teachers, and at least one class included both a teacher and a teacher's aide. Drasovean alleges that, from November 2016 to January 2017, H.A. sexually assaulted Ms. Drasovean by touching her breasts and legs, kissing her, and "trying to take her outside of the school building to perform other sexual acts on her." Drasovean alleges that many of these acts occurred in one of Ms. Drasovean's classes, which was attended by only four other students, and many of "the assaults occurred in open view of other people." Ms. Drasovean's teachers never saw these assaults. On January 23, 2017, Ms. Drasovean reported the assaults to her mother, who then reported them to Hylton.

On January 22, 2019, Drasovean filed her first action (first action) in the Circuit Court for Prince William County against the School Board Employees, the Virginia Board of Education, and directly against the School Board, alleging that, while Ms. Drasovean was a student at Hylton, H.A. assaulted her. The complaint in the first action alleged claims for "negligence/gross negligence" in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The first action was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, where Drasovean's federal claims were dismissed, and her state law negligence claims were remanded to circuit court. The circuit court sustained defendants' demurrers to Drasovean's simple negligence claim with prejudice but granted Drasovean leave to amend her claim for gross negligence.

Drasovean filed an amended complaint alleging a single count of gross negligence against the Virginia Board of Education and the School Board Employees, however, she nonsuited the first action on March 2, 2021. Subsequently, Drasovean filed this action, asserting a single count of gross negligence against the School Board Employees in their official capacities only.

The School Board Employees filed a plea in bar on the ground that Drasovean's complaint against them in their official capacities amounted to a suit against the School Board. They argued that the School Board is entitled to sovereign immunity in tort, and because a suit against them in their official capacities is effectively against the School Board, sovereign immunity should bar the complaint. On January 13, 2023, the circuit court heard oral argument. The court held that the manner which the defendants have been sued, that is their official capacity, this is tantamount or the same as a suit against the governmental entity and the governmental entity enjoys sovereign immunity as to . . . all negligence, and as such, these employees in their official capacity are immune pursuant to sovereign immunity.

Consequently, the circuit court granted the School Board Employees' plea in bar, dismissing the case with prejudice. This appeal timely follows.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

"The existence of sovereign immunity is a question of law that is reviewed de novo." Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 673 (2012) (quoting Lee v. City of Norfolk, 281 Va. 423, 439 (2011)). "A plea in bar asserts a single issue, which, if proved, creates a bar to a plaintiff's recovery." Hawthorne v. VanMarter, 279 Va. 566, 577 (2010). "The party asserting a plea in bar bears the burden of proof on the issue presented." Id. The circuit court held a hearing where the parties presented their arguments. However, "[w]here no evidence is taken in support of the plea, the trial court, and the appellate court upon review, must rely solely upon the pleadings in resolving the issue presented." Robinson v. Nordquist, 297 Va. 503, 513-14 (2019) (quoting Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 480 (1996)). Additionally, "[i]n doing so, the facts stated in the plaintiff's [complaint] are deemed true." Massenburg v. City of Petersburg, 298 Va. 212, 216 (2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Lostrangio v. Laingford, 261 Va. 495, 497 (2001)). "This approach results in functionally de novo review of the trial court's judgment." Id. Here, the issue of gross negligence and school boards is one of first impression for this Court.

Whether the School Board is entitled to sovereign immunity, the scope of that immunity, and whether that immunity bars a claim of gross negligence is the question of this appeal. Given the complexity of this inquiry, it is necessary to understand the history of sovereign immunity, its application under Virginia law, and the difference between the sovereign immunity available to various governmental entities and the sovereign immunity available to individuals employed by those entities.

II. History of Sovereign Immunity

We begin with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which is rooted in English common law and adhered to the notion that "no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over [the Crown]." Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 234-235 (1765)). "'Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional blueprint.' Upon ratification of the Constitution, the States entered the Union 'with their sovereignty intact."' Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 283 (2011) (citation omitted). Federalism presupposes that the States retain exclusive sovereignty in some aspects of governance, share sovereign power with the federal government in other aspects, and yield their sovereign power only in those aspects of governance exclusively assigned to the federal government by the United States Constitution." Clark v. Va. Dep't of State Police, 292 Va. 725, 728 (2016).

The application of this immunity, in practice, was unique in the United States because of the inherent qualities of federalism: though the nation itself was a sovereign, the states retained their sovereignty in relation to one another and the federal government. This principle led to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which codified state sovereign immunity at the federal level: "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The ratification of the Eleventh Amendment followed the 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), where the Court ruled that a citizen of South Carolina could sue the state of Georgia. In that case, Justice Iredell disagreed and reasoned that if the common law barred suit against the sovereign, then the states necessarily, absent express consent, must be similarly protected.

Following Justice Iredell's reasoning, the first congressional meeting following the Court's decision in Chisholm led to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which codified a state's immunity from suit in federal courts in actions brought against it by citizens of another...