Dreibelbis v. Cnty. of Berks

438 F.Supp.3d 304

Stacey DREIBELBIS, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF BERKS, Defendant.

No. 5:19-cv-4946

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed February 7, 2020

Mark J. Gottesfeld, Winebrake & Santillo, LLC, Dresher, PA, for Plaintiff.

Andrew B. Adair, Christine D. Steere, Deasey Mahoney Valentini North, Ltd., Media, PA,

OPINION

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim—DENIED

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr., United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this employment discrimination action, Plaintiff Stacey Dreibelbis sues her former employer, the County of Berks, Pennsylvania ("the County"), for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 951 et seq. ("PHRA"), and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"). Dreibelbis alleges that on June 13, 2018, she informed the County that, due to a disability, she would not be coming to work that day and would need to request FMLA leave. The County denied her request for leave, and on June 21, 2018, terminated her employment. Dreibelbis claims the County terminated her employment because of her disability and her request for FMLA leave.

Before the Court is the County's motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, the County's motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint¹

Dreibelbis was employed by the County for over twenty-five years. Plaintiff's Complaint ("Compl.") [ECF No. 1] ¶ 5. During the last two years of her employment, Dreibelbis suffered from anxiety, depression, chronic sinusitis, and bronchitis, which caused her substantial pain and significantly limited her major life activities. Id. ¶ 6. The Complaint alleges that, as such, she suffered from a disability, and the County perceived her as suffering from a disability. Id. According to the Complaint, notwithstanding her disability, Dreibelbis was able to, and did, competently and diligently perform her job duties. Id. ¶ 7.

Dreibelbis occasionally requested time off under the FMLA due to her disability. Compl. ¶ 8. In response to one of these requests, the County approved Dreibelbis for intermittent Family Medical Leave of Absence on May 2, 2018, granting her "[a]n absence of up to three (3) days per episode, one (1) time every four (4) weeks for occurrences of [her] medical condition from April 17, 2018 and expiring on April 16, 2019."² Id. Notwithstanding its approval of her FMLA leave request, the Complaint alleges that the County "often treated [Dreibelbis'] requests for intermittent FMLA leave with antagonism," stating that Dreibelbis' supervisor "once begrudgingly notated on one of [her] FMLA requests that he was granting the FMLA leave request ‘w/ no choice!’ "³ Id. ¶ 9.

On June 13, 2018, Dreibelbis was unable to work because of her depression and anxiety. Compl. ¶ 11.⁴ As a result, and, according to the Complaint, pursuant to the County's policy, Dreibelbis informed the County prior to the start of her shift that day that she would not be working and would need to request FMLA leave. Id. Dreibelbis returned to work on June 14, 2018, and filled out a request for FMLA leave, which she again claims was "pursuant to [the County's] policy." Id. ¶ 12. The County denied Dreibelbis' request for FMLA leave, and on June 21, 2018, terminated her employment. Id.

The Complaint avers that Dreibelbis' request for leave to account for her absence on June 13, 2018 was a request for a reasonable accommodation for her disability, which request was denied. Compl. ¶ 13. The Complaint states that, in addition, the County failed to communicate with Dreibelbis in good faith to determine whether there were any other reasonable accommodations it could provide her, as, Dreibelbis contends, was its obligation under the ADA.⁵ Id.

Based on the above allegations, the Complaint asserts claims for discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA⁶ and PHRA, as well as claims for retaliation and interference under the FMLA.

B. Procedural Background

Dreibelbis filed the Complaint in this action on October 23, 2019. See ECF No. 1. The County moved to dismiss the Complaint on November 22, 2019, see ECF No. 6, and, pursuant to stipulation, Dreibelbis filed her response in opposition to the motion to dismiss on December 20, 2019, see ECF No. 9. The County did not file a reply memorandum in further support of its motion to dismiss.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the appropriate pleading standard in federal civil actions and set forth a two-step approach to be used when deciding motions to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. First, district courts are to "identify [ ] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; see id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) )); Thourot v. Monroe Career & Tech. Inst. , No. CV 3:14-1779, 2016 WL 6082238, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2016) (explaining that "[a] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" alone will not survive a motion to dismiss). Though "legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, if a complaint contains "well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This standard, commonly referred as the "plausibility standard," "is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). It is only where the "[f]actual allegations ... raise a right to relief above the speculative level" that the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim.⁷ Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

The Court's task then, post- Iqbal , in deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, is to determine whether based upon the facts as alleged, which are taken as true, and disregarding legal contentions and conclusory assertions, the complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Ashford v. Francisco , No. 1:19-CV-1365, 2019 WL 4318818, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2019) ("To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out sufficient factual matter to show that its claims are facially plausible.").

Lastly, the Court notes that in adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the scope of what may be considered is necessarily constrained: a court may "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents."⁸ United States v. Gertsman , No. 15-8215, 2016 WL 4154916, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2016) (quoting Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C. , 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) ).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Whether a prima facie claim of discrimination is necessary

Before addressing the substance of her claims, the Court must address a threshold issue that is highly relevant to Dreibelbis' claims of discrimination: whether she needs to allege a prima facie claim of discrimination in order to survive the County's motion to dismiss.

Prior to deciding either Iqbal or Twombly , the Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A. clarified that "under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case" of employment discrimination.⁹ 534 U.S. 506, 508, 511, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). The Court's reasoning rested on the logic that if a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination "is able to produce direct evidence of discrimination, he may prevail without proving all the elements of a prima facie case."¹⁰ Id. at 511, 122 S.Ct. 992 (emphasis added). That the claims of a plaintiff who lacked direct evidence of discrimination at the time of pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss despite the fact that she might come across such evidence during discovery and be able to ultimately prevail on her claims struck the Court as incorrect: as the Court observed, "[i]t thus seems incongruous to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is discovered." Id. at 511-12, 122 S.Ct. 992.

With Swierkiewicz in mind, the questions the Court must resolve in the context of Dreibelbis' Complaint are twofold: (1) whether Swierkiewicz and its reasoning remains good law in a post- Iqbal and Twombly world; and (2) whether Swierkiewicz and its reasoning applies with equal force to claims of employment discrimination brought under the ADA (as brought by Dreibelbis) as employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII (as brought by the plaintiff in Swierkiewicz ).¹¹

The Court answers the first question confidently in the affirmative. Notwithstanding the doctrinal shift that took place in the movement from the "no-set-of-facts" pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) to the...