Drevaleva v. The Narayan Travelstead Prof'l Law Corp.

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TATYANA EVGENIEVNA DREVALEVA, Plaintiff, v. THE NARAYAN TRAVELSTEAD PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-cv-02068-EMC

United States District Court, N.D. California

March 10, 2023

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING Docket Nos. 25, 27, 34, 38, 40 41

EDWARD M. CHEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Tatyana Drevaleva (“Plaintiff”) sued Narayan Travelstead Professional Law Corporation (“NTPC”), Timothy Travelstead, Julie Cho (collectively, the “NTPC Defendants”), and the Alameda Health System (“AHS”) primarily for their conduct in defending AHS in a previous suit brought by Plaintiff. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See Civil L.R 7-1(b). For the reasons below the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to refrain from further filings on this or related cases involving AHS absent leave of the Court, as ordered in Drevaleva v. AHS, No. 22-cv-01585-EMC, slip. op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2022).

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

AHS hired Plaintiff as a part time employee in April 2013 and terminated her in September that year. (Docket No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 3, 4.) Soon afterwards, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance with the California Department of Industrial Relations, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (the “Agency”). (Id. at 3, 5.) She believes that AHS fired her for participating in legally protected activities. (Id. at 7.) The Agency dismissed her claim in 2016. (Id.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed suit in this court alleging wrongful termination against AHS and mishandling of her administrative claim against the Agency. (Id. at 10, 11 (citing Drevaleva v. Alameda Health Sys., No. 3:16-cv-07414-LB (N.D. Cal.) (“Drevaleva I”)).) Since then, Plaintiff has brought numerous lawsuits relating to her termination in federal and state courts against AHS, its employees, and counsel. See Drevaleva v. Alameda Health Sys., No. 22-cv-01585-EMC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121907, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2022) (summarizing relevant prior lawsuits).^[1] As to those lawsuits in state courts, Plaintiff was declared a vexatious litigant in September 2020 within the meaning of California Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(3). (See Drevaleva v. Alameda Health System et al., No. A158862 (Cal.Ct.App. Nov. 14, 2019)).) As for those lawsuits filed in federal courts, this Court declared Plaintiff a vexatious litigant in July 2022. See Drevaleva v. AHS, No. 22-cv-01585-EMC, slip. op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2022).

Plaintiff's over 200-page complaint here recounts the procedural history, the parties' briefings, and Judge Beeler's rulings in Drevaleva I, as well as the related appeals history. (Compl.). She brought this case against the defendants for their conduct in defending AHS in Drevaleva I. For example, Plaintiff alleges that AHS, in its motion to dismiss the initial complaint in that case, failed to cite a certain statute (id. at 16), contained hearsay (id. at 17), and characterized AHS's status as a state as opposed to a local public agency (id. at 44-45).

Plaintiff asserts 18 claims here. Specifically, she makes claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, Cal. Penal Code § 484 (fraud), Cal. Civ. Code § 1572 (civil conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (RICO) against all defendants for making certain arguments and “citing the irrelevant case laws” in AHS's motion briefs in Drevaleva I and related appeals. (Id. at 196-202.)

Regarding the defendants' litigation-related conduct in Drevaleva I, Plaintiff additionally asserts “[s]lavery and involuntary servitude” under the Thirteenth Amendment, “[c]ruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment, “[d]eprivation of Liberty and Property” under the Fourteenth Amendment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, loss of consortium, and harassment under Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 527.6. (Id. at 202-05.)

As relief, Plaintiff “demand[s] to be reinstated back to work” at AHS, lost salary, $250 million from each of AHS, NTPC, and Travelstead, as well as $10 million from Cho. (Id. at 20506.)

The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 25 (“Def's Mot”).) The Court granted Plaintiff three 30-day extensions to file her response brief. (Docket No. 30.) Plaintiff has filed motions for permission to file nine supplemental briefs, totaling a few thousand pages, in support of her opposition to the motion. (Docket Nos. 27, 34, 38, 40, 41.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “a party may move for judgment on the pleadings” after the pleadings are closed “but early enough not to delay trial.” A Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally identical” to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and therefore the same legal standard applies. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss after the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a plaintiff's “factual allegations [in the complaint] ‘must . . . suggest that the claim has at least a plausible chance of success.'” Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014). The court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But “allegations in a complaint . . . may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action [and] must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Levitt, 765 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff only alleges that the Court has jurisdiction “over [her] Complaint because multiple Federal statutes are involved.” (Compl. at 1.) In this case, she asserts the following federal claims: violations of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981,^[2] 1983 (Count No. 2), and 1985 (Count Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6-9, 13, 14), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (Count No. 10), and the Eighth (Count No. 12), Thirteenth (Count No. 11), and Fourteenth Amendments (Count No. 13) of the U.S. Constitution.^[3]As discussed below, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over any of these federal claims.

A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff's section 1983 claim fails. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant was acting under color of state law at the time the acts complained of were committed, and that (2) the defendant deprived plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff does not suggest that the defendants were acting under the color of any state law when defending AHS in Drevaleva I, so she cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff cannot plausibly state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1985 either. “The Supreme Court made it clear . . . that § 1985 was not ‘intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,' but only to those which were founded upon ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'” Briley, 564 F.2d at 859 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971)). Similarly, § 1981 “can be violated only by purposeful discrimination.” General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). Nowhere does Plaintiff suggest that the defendants, when defending for itself or for their client against the lawsuit she brought, litigated Drevaleva I with the purpose of discriminating on the basis of a protected class. Her §§ 1981 and 1985 claims must be dismissed.

The rest of Plaintiff's federal claims are equally frivolous. The defendants have a constitutional right of access to the Court, and, in any event, filing motions and making arguments are not racketeering activities within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The defendants did not coerce her to “work as a Caregiver” that Plaintiff frivolously claims to be slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment. (Compl at 202.) They also did not punish Plaintiff for any convicted crime in violation of the Eighth Amendment. And by merely defending AHS against Plaintiff's prior suit, the defendants did not deprive her of liberty or property.^[4] Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under...