Drewnowski v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Suffield

220 Conn.App. 430

299 A.3d 259

Michael C. DREWNOWSKI et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF SUFFIELD et al.

AC 44982

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 7, 2023

Officially Released July 18, 2023

Timothy S. Hollister, with whom were Andrea L. Gomes and, on the brief, Ryan D. Hoyler, for the appellant (defendant Hamlet Homes, LLC).

Scott R. Lingenfelter, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Elgo, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

In this certified zoning appeal, the defendant Hamlet Homes, LLC, ¹ appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the administrative appeal of the plaintiffs, Michael C. Drewnowski and Kelly A. Drewnowski. The plaintiffs brought the underlying appeal from a decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the town of Suffield (commission) approving the defendant's special permit and subdivision applications for a proposed, sixteen lot flexible residential development in Suffield (town). The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) determined that the length of the proposed dead-end access road for the new development exceeded the maximum length prescribed in § 905 (c) of the Suffield Subdivision Regulations (subdivision regulations) regarding dead-end streets or dead-end street systems, thereby rejecting the defendant's contention that the street length limitation was inapplicable because § VI (B) of the Suffield Zoning Regulations (zoning regulations) pertaining to flexible residential developments explicitly provides that generally applicable "dimensional requirements" are "superseded" with respect to flexible residential developments; (2) concluded that the commission had failed to make a finding of hardship needed to approve the defendant's applications pursuant to § 902 of the subdivision regulations; and (3) determined that the proposed development was not " ‘surrounded by subdivided land’ " so as to justify approval of the applications pursuant to an exception found in § 905 (a) of the subdivision regulations. ² We are not persuaded and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The commission is a combined planning and zoning commission with both administrative authority and legislative functions. The town's regulatory scheme includes a set of zoning regulations, of which § VI governs flexible residential developments, and separate subdivision regulations. On September 16, 2019, the defendant filed with the commission a special permit application ³ and an application for subdivision approval. The defendant sought approval of the applications by the commission in order to build a sixteen lot flexible residential development on approximately ten acres of a forty-one acre parcel of land located in an R-25 residential development zone off Limric Lane. Limric Lane is an existing dead-end road off South Main Street that services a ten lot flexible residential development that the defendant built in 2013. South Main Street is one of the town's principal roadways and the nearest major "through" street to the proposed development. ⁴ In accordance with the town's zoning regulations, the construction of a flexible residential development requires the commission to approve both a special permit application and an application for subdivision. See Suffield Zoning Regs., § VI (A) ("[t]he special permit for [a flexible residential development] would be approved prior to the subdivision approval; however, both would have a common public hearing").

As defined in the town's zoning regulations, a "flexible residential development" is "[a] residential development consisting of at least ten (10) acres with five (5) or more lots that allows smaller lots than those normally required by the underlying zoning district regulations in order to permanently conserve natural, scenic, or historic resources; provide open spaces for active or passive use; and, reduce infrastructure costs and impervious surfaces." Suffield Zoning Regs., § II. The definition of "flexible residential development" in the zoning regulations also contains a cross-reference to the definition for "cluster development," which is defined as follows: "A development design technique that is encouraged under Sec. VI ... [of the zoning regulations] that permits a reduction in lot area, frontage, and setback, and a reduction in associated infrastructure needs , provided there is no increase in the overall density permitted for a conventional development, in return for the preservation of open space to be used for passive and/or active recreation or agricultural purposes, and the preservation of historically or environmentally sensitive features." (Emphasis added.) Id.

On October 21, 2019, the commission, at the defendant's request and in accordance with zoning regulations, held a "pre-application" conference with the defendant. At that time, the commission accepted the applications filed by the defendant and scheduled a public hearing for November 18, 2019.

The initial subdivision plans that the defendant filed with its applications proposed that the lots in the newly proposed flexible residential development would be accessed via a horseshoe shaped road that would begin on Limric Lane and then curve around to end near Limric Lane's existing cul-de-sac. Prior to the public hearing, however, the defendant, in response to informal input that it received from abutting property owners, commission members, and the town's conservation commission, revised its applications. One consequence of these revisions was a conversion of the proposed horseshoe shaped extension of Limric Lane into an irregularly shaped loop road, both ends of which, however, still began and ended on Limric Lane.

In response to inquiries about the defendant's applications made in advance of the public hearing, the town's director of planning and development, William Hawkins, asked the commission's land use attorney, Carl Landolina, to review § 905 of the town's subdivision regulations and to provide the commission with a legal opinion as to how it properly should interpret and apply § 905 with respect to the defendant's pending applications. At that time, § 905 of the subdivision regulations provided in relevant part: "Dead-End Streets or Dead-End Street Systems will only be allowed under the following conditions:

"(a) To provide access to undeveloped rear land surrounded by subdivided land, or to solve a topographical problem ....

"(c) A dead-end street or dead-end-street system(s) shall be limited to twelve-hundred (1,200) feet as measured from the edge of the connecting street to the center of the proposed cul-de-sac unless waived by the Commission for severe topographic reasons or for the purpose of fulfilling Subdivision Regulation Sec. 801 when said street has public water and has no more than a total of ... twenty (20) lots in the R-25 zone."

By letter dated November 14, 2019, Landolina opined that § 905 of the subdivision regulations permits subdivisions accessed by dead-end streets or dead-end street systems under certain conditions and that § 905 acts as an exception to the requirement, found in § 902 of the subdivision regulations, that a subdivision ordinarily must have two means of ingress and egress. ⁵ He explained that § 905 (c) limits the length of a dead-end street or dead-end street system to 1200 feet, which is measured from " ‘the edge of the connecting street to the center of the proposed cul-de-sac ....’ " Landolina provided his interpretation of the term "connecting" street, which is not otherwise defined in the town's regulations. He opined that "a reasonable reading of the word ‘connecting street’ means an ‘existing’ street into which the proposed dead-end street connects. ... In my view this would mean that once a dead-end street is proposed, constructed and accepted by the [t]own it could become the connecting street for another proposed dead-end street ." (Emphasis added.) In reaching this conclusion, Landolina relied on a Superior Court decision that interpreted a similar provision in Enfield's subdivision regulations. See Pappas v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4010049-S, 2006 WL 390472 (January 30, 2006) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 668, 669–70).

Finally, Landolina advised the commission that, because the proposed loop road connected to Limric Lane at two points it "does not appear to meet the definition of a dead-end street ...." The town's zoning regulations define the term "dead-end street or system " in relevant part as a "street or connected series of streets with its only means of entrance or exit through one common point. ..." (Emphasis added.) Suffield Zoning Regs., § II. Landolina's opinion letter did not address whether the commission properly should view the loop road and Limric Lane, which would share a single, common point of entrance and exit on South Main Street, as a "connected series of streets"; id.; that would constitute a dead-end street system.

At the November 18, 2019 public hearing, the commission's chairman, Mark Winne, indicated that Landolina's opinion regarding dead-end streets "pretty much shocked me. Because that certainly has not been our understanding of how our—how we interpret our regulations here forever." When Winne asked Hawkins during the hearing if, under Landolina's interpretation of the regulations, this could result in a chain of dead-end streets, Hawkins responded, "Potentially." Hawkins qualified that, with respect to the defendant's current project, there was "no room" to put in any additional roads at a later date, but that he also found Landolina's opinion regarding § 905 of the subdivision regulations "surprising ...." A commission member also suggested that the regulations needed to be "tighten[ed] up ...."

Michael Drewnowski, who owns a home ...