Dudley v. State

George Dudley, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A22-0732

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

January 30, 2023

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-18-8527

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John J Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaitas, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Larson, Judge.

OPINION

LARSON, JUDGE

Appellant George Dudley argues the postconviction court erred when it denied his petition to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that the guilty plea was the product of the district court improperly forcing appellant to be represented by counsel. We affirm.

FACTS

In November 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (use of force or coercion) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2018), and one count of first-degree assault (great bodily harm) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2018).

In April 2019, appellant appeared before the district court for a pretrial hearing. After appearances were noted for the record, the district court judge stated, "[Appellant], I've been informed that you wish to fire [your attorney]?" Appellant affirmed that he wanted to discharge his attorney. The district court judge then inquired about appellant's request to represent himself. The district court asked appellant specific questions^[1] to gauge whether he understood the consequences of discharging his attorney. Throughout this colloquy, appellant continually stated that he wanted to discharge his attorney and that he wanted to proceed pro se.

The state then asked to place the current plea offer on the record before the district court made its decision on appellant's request to discharge his attorney. This began a lengthy discussion between the state and defense counsel. The state and defense counsel discussed the state's then-current offer of 220 months in prison, as well as the state's intention to add one count of attempted murder if appellant did not plead guilty. In response to this discussion, appellant said he felt "attacked." The district court responded that the purpose of the discussion was not to attack him, but to inform appellant of the potential consequences of his choice to represent himself. When asked if he understood, appellant said he understood "[e]verything but the consequences." The district court and appellant then had the following exchange:

THE COURT: Are there any questions surrounding the state's offer as we've all discussed this morning? It's important to this Court that you fully understand the state's offer, sir, before I move on. Do you understand the state's offer at this time? Yes or no?

APPELLANT: No.

THE COURT: Okay. And can you see how challenging a trial might be if -

APPELLANT: I have a learning disability so everything is a challenge for me.

THE COURT: All right. All the more reason I am not going to discharge [defense counsel] at this time. Okay. So you will have to work with [defense counsel]. He is by far one of the most experienced attorneys in the state. He has expressed an abundance of willingness and patience and competence to assist you. So the Court is not going to discharge [defense counsel] at this time. Whatever you have to say to the Court going forward, you should relay that to your attorney, and [h]e'll communicate back to the Court on your behalf. Do you understand that, sir?

APPELLANT: Yes, Your Honor.

The district court later explained:

[Appellant], this Court has not discharged the services of the public defender, okay. So [defense counsel] will continue to remain as your attorney. I am encouraging you to work closely with him. There is a lot at stake. There is a lot of legal jargon and procedural legal procedure you would not understand. You also told this Court that you have some learning disabilities. For all those reasons this Court has concerns, grave concerns, on your ability to represent yourself.

(Emphasis added.)

Shortly after the district court denied appellant's request to represent himself, defense counsel requested a competency evaluation under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01.^[2] Defense counsel stated he was "very concerned" and that he was "not sure [appellant was] competent." When asked about the request, the state deferred to the district court and defense counsel. But the state commented that appellant "ha[d] said some things [at the pretrial hearing] that call into question whether he has an understanding." The district court ordered a rule 20.01 and a rule 20.02^[3] evaluation.

In May 2019, appellant appeared with counsel for his rule 20 hearing. At the request of both parties, the district court adopted the psychological evaluator's findings and conclusion. The psychological evaluator found appellant competent to proceed despite some concerns around appellant's memory and learning disability.

In July 2019, appellant appeared with counsel before the district court to enter a guilty plea. Appellant entered a Norgaard plea^[4] to first-degree assault for an agreed-upon sentence of 180 months in prison.^[5] During the plea hearing, appellant affirmed he had enough time to talk with defense counsel about the case, that defense counsel answered all his questions, and that he was satisfied with defense counsel's representation. Appellant also indicated no one had coerced or forced him to plead guilty. In September 2019, the district court sentenced appellant to 180 months in prison in accordance with the plea agreement.

In September 2021, appellant, through counsel, filed a petition for postconviction relief. Appellant argued he was "entitled to withdraw his [guilty] plea because it was the product of the [district] court improperly forcing [him] to be represented by [counsel]." In March 2022, the postconviction court denied appellant's petition for postconviction relief.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellant challenges the postconviction court's decision to deny his postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea. We review a postconviction court's decision to deny postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). "We [will] not reverse the postconviction court unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

Appellant argues he is "entitled to withdraw his [guilty] plea because it was the product of the [district] court improperly forcing [him] to be represented by [counsel]." But a "valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea."^[6] Dikken v State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) ("[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant [pleads guilty] . . . he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."). And we have concluded in at least one nonprecedential decision that a pretrial denial of the right to self-representation is a non-jurisdictional defect. State v. Maddox, No. A14-1453, 2015 WL 1961147, at *5-6 (Minn.App. May 4, 2015).^[7] Thus, we interpret appellant's argument as a challenge to the validity of his guilty plea on the ground that it was involuntary because of improper pressure or inducement.

"A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it." State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a postconviction court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if it is constitutionally invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). Determining the validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A defendant bears the burden of showing his guilty plea was invalid. Weitzel v. State, 883 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Minn. 2016).

"To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent." Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). Whether a guilty plea is voluntary is determined by considering all relevant circumstances. Id. at 96. To determine whether a guilty plea is voluntary, we examine what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement. Id. "The voluntariness requirement helps [e]nsure that the defendant does not plead guilty because of any improper pressures or inducements." Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989).

Here there is nothing in the record indicating appellant's guilty plea stemmed from "improper pressures or inducements." Id. After the district court denied appellant's request to discharge defense counsel, appellant did not reraise the issue and never indicated he felt "forced" to be represented by counsel. At appellant's plea hearing, appellant affirmed he was satisfied with his defense counsel's representation, he affirmed he understood the terms of the plea agreement, and he indicated no one had coerced or forced him to plead guilty. Appellant has not presented evidence either in his postconviction petition or on appeal that he felt coerced into...