Duffey v. Beard

STEVEN DUFFEY, Petitioner,

v.JEFFREY BEARD, et al., Respondents.

3:94-cv-1947

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 12, 2011

Hon. John E. Jones III

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of Steven Duffey ("Duffey").¹ Duffey seeks relief from his convictions for first degree murder and related robbery charge and sentence to death, imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania ("trial court"). For the reasons set forth below, the petition shall be denied.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a jury trial in February of 1985, Duffey was convicted of first degree murder² and robbery³ in the death of Kathy Kurmchak. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized the relevant facts of the proseuction in Commonwealth v. Duffey, 548 A.2d 1178 (Pa. 1988) ("Duffey-I") and they shall not be repeated here save for when relevant to our analysis. Following deliberations, the jury found one aggravating circumstance; that Duffey committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.⁴ Four mitigating circumstances were proffered by the defense: (1) Duffey was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) Duffey's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired; (3) Duffey's age at the time of the crime; and (4) any other evidence of mitigation concerning his character, his record and the circumstances of his offense.⁵ The verdict slip did not indicate which mitigating circumstances were found, only that the aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances. State Court Record ("SCR") 83 (Verdict Form).

Following the trial and post trial motions, the trial court appointed new counselto Duffey for the appellate stage and the case proceeded to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for automatic review.⁶ The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Duffey's appeal in 1988. Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court conducted a proportionality review and determined that the jury found one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in this case; therefore, a death sentence was properly imposed.⁷ Judgment of the sentence of death entered by the trial court was affirmed. Duffey-I. No further activity occurred in any court on this case until late 1994.

On September 22, 1994, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania signed a death warrant scheduling Duffey's execution for the week of December 4, 1994. Duffey filed a pro se motion for stay of execution in order to permit counsel to be appointed for him and a Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition to be filed. After an arduous and convoluted process through the Pennsylvania and Federal Courts, the case was remanded back to the PCRA Court for a review of the PCRA petition on the merits.⁸

Duffey raised several issues concerning trial and sentencing errors in hisAmended PCRA petition. Ultimately, the PCRA Court denied his Amended PCRA petition. Duffey timely appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

In 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made several findings as to trial phase claims in Duffey's Amended PCRA appeal.⁹ However, the Court did not have enough information in the record to rule on the sentencing phase claims. While maintaining jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case back to the PCRA Court with specific instructions. Duffey-II. The PCRA Court made several findings and returned the case for disposition. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied relief on all claims. Duffey-III.

Duffey filed the instant Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in 2006. (Dkt 91). Respondents filed a motion for an order to dismiss Duffey's amended petition.¹⁰ (Dkt 96). Duffey then filed his memorandum of law. (Dkt 117).Respondents filed a response to the memorandum in 2007. (Dkt 122). Duffey filed a reply memorandum of law. (Dkt 123). This matter is now ripe for disposition.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). "[I]t is not the province of federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Rather, federal habeas review is restricted to claims based "on the ground that [petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104 (3d Cir. 1997).

It is also "well settled that the fact that constitutional error occurred in the proceedings that led to a state-court conviction may not alone be sufficient reason for concluding that a prisoner is entitled to the remedy of habeas." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000) (internal citations omitted). "On the other hand, errors that undermine the confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state adjudication certainly justify the issuance of a federal writ." Id.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), went into effect on April 24, 1996 and amended the standards for reviewing state court adjudications in federal habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Duffey filed his first petition in 1997. After filing this petition, Duffey asked for, and was subsequently granted, a stay of the federal proceedings while he pursued exhaustion of his state court remedies. After exhausting his state court remedies in 2006, Duffey returned to this court and filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Since Duffey's petition was filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, this Court is required to apply the amended standards to his claims for federal habeas corpus relief. See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 195 (3rd Cir. 2000) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997)).

A. Exhaustion

Under the AEDPA, a federal court cannot consider a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has first exhausted all state court remedies, there is an absence of available state corrective process, or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is not a mere formality. It serves the interests of comity between federal and state systems by allowing the state an initial opportunity to determine and correct any violation of a prisoner's federal rights. Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2004).

This statutory provision has been interpreted to require the federal habeas petitioner to present both the facts and legal theory associated with each claim through "one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-845 (1999); Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 2004). In addition, the state court must be put on notice that a federal claim is being asserted. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001). To satisfy this requirement, a petitioner must demonstrate that the claim raised was fairly presented to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a state post-conviction proceeding. In the matter sub judice, Duffey has exhausted all of his claims in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Duffey-II and Duffey-III.

B. Merits

Once it is established that the habeas claims have been exhausted and are not procedurally defaulted, a federal court may reach the merits of a habeas corpus petition. The AEDPA restricts a federal court's authority to grant relief when a state court has previously considered and rejected the petitioner's federal constitutional claims on the merits, unless the state adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the Untied States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We will more fully describe these alternative touchstones in turn.

(1) Contrary to / Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

The Supreme Court first interpreted the standard set forth in §2254(d)(1) in Williams v. Taylor, supra. The Court instructed that federal courts must first decide exactly what constitutes the applicable clearly established law determined by the Supreme Court. Id. at 389-91; see also Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2000). Next, the federal court must determine whether the state court's decision was "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" that law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

"[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" refers to the Court's holdings, as opposed to dicta, and applies as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The Third Circuit has held that a federal court's analysis of whether a state court's decision is "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court precedent under § 2254 (d) may be amplified by decisions of inferior federal courts evaluating that Supreme Court precedent. Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 256 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999).

The AEDPA "directs federal courts to attend to every state court judgment withutmost care, but it does not require them to defer to the opinion of every reasonable state court judge on the content of federal law. If, after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state court's judgment, a federal court is...