Duhon v. The Bd. of Supervisors of La. & Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll.

GREGORY DUHON, M.D. v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY & AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE, et al.

Civil Action No. 20-2022

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

August 20, 2021

ORDER AND REASONS

JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SECTION “H”

Before the Court is Professional Renewal Center, P.A.'s Motion to Sever and Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 or in the Alternative Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63). For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Gregory Duhon, M.D. (“Duhon”), brings this action against multiple defendants for damages and injunctive relief arising from his suspension and termination from the cardiology fellowship program at Louisiana State University (“LSU”) and the subsequent loss of his Louisiana medical license. Below are the facts relevant only to the instant Motion.

Plaintiff was enrolled in the 2018-2019 cardiology fellowship program at Louisiana State University. On May 23, 2019, Plaintiff was advised by its Program Director, Neeraj Jain, M.D. (“Dr. Jain”), that he was being suspended effective immediately on suspicion of being mentally impaired and that he must obtain a fit-for-duty clearance from LSU's Campus Assistance Program (“CAP”). After conducting an occupationally mandated psychological evaluation (“OMPE”), CAP directed Plaintiff to register with the Health Care Professionals Foundation of Louisiana (“HPFLA”), a “private not-for-profit corporation that offers assistance to health care professionals who may be suffering from mental health issues” by referring the professionals for evaluations and monitoring their treatment plans where appropriate.^[1]Plaintiff registered with HPFLA as instructed and HPFLA, in turn, directed Plaintiff to submit to a three-day comprehensive psychological exam at one of three HPFLA-approved facilities.

Plaintiff chose to undergo the required evaluation at Professional Renewal Center (“PRC”) in Lawrence, Kansas, which ultimately concluded that Plaintiff required 60-90 days of inpatient treatment. To counter PRC's findings, Plaintiff obtained evaluations from two independent psychiatrists who found that the PRC report was flawed and that Plaintiff was indeed fit for duty. Plaintiff alleges that HPFLA acknowledged that the PRC report was inaccurate but nevertheless required that Plaintiff comply with PRC's recommendation and seek additional, costly inpatient treatment. When Plaintiff refused, the HPFLA reported Plaintiff to the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners (“LSBME”) as noncompliant and otherwise impaired in his ability to practice medicine.

On October 4, 2019, Plaintiff received a notice from the LSBME informing him that his license was under investigation and directing him to cooperate with HPFLA and PRC's recommendations. Plaintiff, through his attorneys, petitioned HPFLA and the LSBME to allow him to forego the additional inpatient treatment but to no avail. Plaintiff ultimately allowed his license to lapse in July of 2020.

In this action, Plaintiff brings claims against a long list of defendants- including LSU, the LSBME, and the organizations and providers to which and to whom he was referred-for violations of procedural and substantive due process, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, ^[2] and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.^[3] Plaintiff also brings state tort claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. Plaintiff contends that, at each step of the way, he was discriminated against “on the basis of a perceived disability and denied any notice or hearing on the actions taken against him and their supposed justification.”^[4] Specifically Plaintiff alleges that the named defendants perceived him as having a substance abuse disorder.^[5] Plaintiff contends that the alleged discrimination cost him his fellowship position, his chance to transfer or become board-certified in cardiology his reputation, the good standing of his Louisiana medical license, and more than $50, 000 in unnecessary treatment.

Now before the Court is Defendant PRC's Motion to Sever and Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, or in the alternative Motion to Dismiss. In the Motion, PRC first asks the Court to enforce the forum selection clause found in PRC's Participation Agreement, to sever Plaintiff's claims against it, and to transfer Plaintiff's action against PRC to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Kansas. Alternatively, should this Court decline to transfer the PRC-related claims, PRC argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim against it and that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion to Transfer Venue

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”^[6] District courts possess broad discretion when deciding whether to order a transfer of venue.^[7] The Fifth Circuit has held that in the interest of respecting forum choices by plaintiffs, a party moving for transfer must show “good cause.”^[8] “When the movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient . . . it has shown good cause and the district court should therefore grant the transfer.”^[9]

II. Motion to Sever

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 provides that, “[o]n motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” “Severance under Rule 21 . . . occasionally is appropriate in action in which venue is improper to some but not all defendants. If the claims are separable, the court may cure the venue defect by severing the claims against those parties who raise valid venue defenses.”^[10] The court may refuse severance, however, where it “only will result in delay, inconvenience, or added expense.”^[11] In all cases, the court “has wide discretion to sever a claim.”^[12]

III. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”^[13] A claim is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”^[14]A court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must “draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.”^[15] The court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.^[16] To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claims are true.^[17] If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the court must dismiss the claim.^[18] The court's review is limited to the complaint and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.^[19]

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Sever and Transfer

In its Motion, PRC requests that this Court sever Plaintiff's claims against it and transfer the matter to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Kansas. PRC argues that such action is proper pursuant to a forum selection clause found within the Participation Agreement that Plaintiff signed prior to his evaluation with PRC on July 23, 2019.^[20] The relevant provision of the Participation Agreement states:

I agree that any dispute arising between Professional Renewal Center® and me shall be determined solely by the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas or the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, and shall be construed in accordance with the law of the State of Kansas.

Plaintiff signed the Participation Agreement and wrote his initials next to the forum selection clause.

In Atlantic Marine Cons. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Texas, the Supreme Court held that “the appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”^[21] As § 1404(a) “is merely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum is within the federal court system[, ]” § 1404(a) is the appropriate provision to enforce a clause like the one at issue directing transfer to a different federal district court.^[22] Ordinarily, a court weighing transfer considers a variety of private and public-interest factors and gives deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum.^[23] The Supreme Court in Atlantic Marine, however, held that the presence of a forum selection clause alters the balancing test in two ways. “‘First, the plaintiff's choice of forum merits no weight' because, by contracting for a specific forum, ‘the plaintiff has effectively exercised its ‘venue privilege' before a dispute arises.'”^[24] Second, because the parties to the forum selection clause have waived the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient, “the private-interest factors weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum.”^[25] Thus, the “district court may consider arguments about public-interest factors only.”^[26]

Under the Atlantic Marine balancing test, a valid forum selection clause will warrant transfer or dismissal “absent unusual circumstances.”^[27] In cases where not all parties are...