Dujun v. Commissioner of Social Security

DUJUAN J., ^[1] Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-614-DWD

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

July 27, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID W. DUGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, seeks judicial review of the final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 423.

Procedural History

Plaintiff applied for DIB in February 2017, alleging disability beginning on October 17, 2016, due, in part, to his diabetes mellitus and peripheral neuropathy (Tr. 222). Plaintiff's date last insured was December 31, 2017 (Tr. 17). Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on April 24, 2017 (Tr. 123), and upon reconsideration on July 20, 2017 (Tr 125). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held on March 6, 2019 (Tr. 52). Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing but was not represented by counsel (Tr. 54-55). Vocational expert James E. Bordieri also appeared and gave testimony (Tr. 94-96). ALJ Michael S. Worrall denied the application for benefits in a decision dated April 26, 2019 (Tr. 15-26). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review on April 29, 2020, making the ALJ's decision the final agency decision subject to judicial review (Tr. 1). 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cullinan v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017); Villano v. Astrue 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies and filed a timely complaint with this Court.

Legal Standards

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry, asking whether: (1) the claimant has performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for which he claims disability; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) the claimant retains the RFC to perform her past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is able to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). "A finding of disability requires an affirmative answer at either step three or step five." Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345 352 (7th Cir. 2005). "The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, after which at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner." Id.; see also Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004).

The Court plays an "extremely limited" role in reviewing the ALJ's decision. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). While this review is deferential, "it is not intended to be S rubber-stamp" on the ALJ's decision. Stephens v Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018). Judicial review of the ALJ's decision is limited to determining whether the decision is "both supported by substantial evidence and based on the proper legal criteria." Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 351 (citing Scheck v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004); Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327 (The Court will reverse the ALJ's finding "if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is the result of an error of law.").

"Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). "To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court reviews the record as a whole but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ's by reweighing the evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility of witnesses." Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014). Even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the claimant is disabled, courts must defer to the ALJ's resolution if the opinion is adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence. Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 837; Elder, 529 F.3d at 413.

The ALJ also has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record, and to "build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful judicial review of the administrative findings." Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 837. This duty is enhanced when a claimant appears without counsel; then the ALJ must "scrupulously and conscientiously [ ] probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts." Thompson v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 581, 585-86 (7th Cir. 1991) (internal citations and markings omitted). Although the ALJ is not required to mention every piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ's analysis "must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits." Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001); accord Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ "must explain [the ALJ's] analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review." Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 351).

The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework described above. Plaintiff was insured for DIB through December 31, 2017 (Tr. 17, 25). Plaintiff was 37 years old on the date last insured (Tr. 24). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability (Tr. 17). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, diabetic peripheral neuropathy, morbid obesity, hypertension, and thrombophlebitis (Tr. 17). The ALJ concluded that these impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment (Tr. 18).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity ("RFC") to "lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently [, ] sit for six hours in an eighthour workday, . . . stand and walk for two hours in total in an eight-hour workday [and] push and pull as much as he can lift and carry." (Tr. 19). At step four, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to find that Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as an office assistant/office clerk as Plaintiff actually performed it (Tr. 24). As an alternative finding for step five, the ALJ found there were other jobs existing in the national economy that Plaintiff was able to perform (Tr. 24-25). Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged onset date, October 17, 2016, through the date last insured, December 31, 2017 (Tr. 25).

Discussion

Plaintiff raises one argument in favor of remand: that the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective statements about his need to elevate his lower extremities (Doc. 21).

At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work because of his neuropathy pain, swelling in his legs and because the pain medications he would take caused him to be drowsy (Tr. 76-78). Specifically, as to his legs, Plaintiff testified that his legs swell "every day all of the time that they're not reclined and put up" and that he elevated his legs six to six-and-a-half hours in an eight-hour period (Tr. 79-80). The ALJ discounted these statements, finding that Plaintiff's impairments were "not as severe as [Plaintiff] alleged." (Tr. 21). Plaintiff takes specific issue with the following statement:

[Plaintiff] is able to perform robust activities of daily living, including caring for his daughter, preparing simple meals, performing his personal care, doing household chores, driving, going to the store, controlling his finances, spending time with others, and getting along with authority figures. He also testified that he plays in the church band, and attends church regularly. This evidence leads the undersigned to believe that the claimant's impairments are not as severe as he alleged.

(Tr. 21). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff was not always compliant with his treatment, including medications and diet, and did not follow up with referrals to an orthopedist, endocrinology, or ophthalmology (Tr. 20-21). The ALJ further determined that Plaintiff "subsequently improved" from 2014 to 2016 because Plaintiff did not seek further treatment from his doctor after he was first instructed to elevate his legs in August 2014, and then "returned to substantial gainful activity in 2015 and 2016." (Tr. 21).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints by misstating Plaintiff's testimony about his daily living activities and by otherwise failing to provide a coherent explanation for discounting Plaintiff's statements. In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ's findings concerning Plaintiff's subjective complaints were substantially supported by the record. Specifically, Defendant presents that no medical opinion opined on Plaintiff's conditions and a need to elevate his legs. Defendant also argues that the ALJ's findings were supported by (a) Plaintiff's testimony that he could engage in social activities, (b) Plaintiff's successful completion of employment from 2014-2016, and (c) due to Plaintiff's noncompliance with medical treatment (Doc. 26, pp. 10-14).

An ALJ's subjective symptom evaluation will be upheld unless it is "patently wrong." Cullinan v Berryhill, 878 F.3d 598, 603 (7th...