Duke v. Danfreight Sys.

1

LAURIE DUKE Jointly and as Natural Parents of Morgan Johnson, deceased, DALE JOHNSON Jointly and as Natural Parents of Morgan Johnson, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. DANFREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., PIERRE ST. JEAN, Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-00125-JPH-DLP

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Terre Haute Division

January 25, 2022

Edward A. DeVries

WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP (Chicago)

Dennis E. Harrold

STEPHENSON RIFE LLP (Shelbyville)

Michael S. Hult KELLER & KELLER

Brady J. Rife

STEPHENSON RIFE LLP (Shelbyville)

Sean Robert Roth

STEPHENSON RIFE LLP

M. Michael Stephenson

STEPHENSON RIFE LLP (Shelbyville)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. CAMILLE WORTMAN

James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge

Plaintiffs, Laurie Duke and Dale Johnson, brought this case after their son, Morgan Johnson, was involved in a fatal crash. Plaintiffs have disclosed Dr. Camille Wortman as an expert witness to testify at trial about their loss of Morgan's love and companionship. Defendants, the owner of the truck and driver of the truck, have filed a motion to exclude Dr. Wortman's testimony. Dkt. 56. For the reasons that follow, that motion is GRANTED. Dkt. [56].

I. Facts and Background

Plaintiffs brought this case under Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Statute (CWDS), Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1, after Morgan was involved in a fatal crash with a truck that was owned by Danfreight Systems, Inc. and driven by Pierre St. Jean, dkt. 60 at 2. Liability is undisputed, dkt. 23 ¶¶ 7; 14, so the only issue for trial is damages.

Plaintiffs have retained Dr. Camille Wortman as an expert witness to testify about "the loss of love and companionship [Plaintiffs] suffered as a result of Morgan's death" and how that loss will continue to affect them in the future. Dkt. 56-1 at 1. Dr. Wortman has a Ph.D. in psychology and is an Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Stony Brook University. Dkt. 60 at 4. Dr. Wortman's scholarly work and her opinions in this case focus on "the ramifications of the sudden, traumatic loss of a loved one . . . compared to deaths that occur under natural circumstances." Dkt. 56-1 at 12. Her work contrasts the psychological consequences of "sudden, traumatic deaths" to those of "normal, expected losses" and concludes that there are several major differences in the impact on surviving family members. Id. These consequences include intense feeling of "sadness, yearning or longing for the loved one" and symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder. Id. While family members typically recover from normal, expected loss within a year or two, the effects of sudden, traumatic loss often continue for many years. Id.

Dr. Wortman describes a study that she conducted in the mid-1980's designed to determine the "impact of the sudden, traumatic death of a spouse, child or sibling" which concluded that "traumatic death of one's child poses long-term difficulties." Id. at 9-10. The results of this study were published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Id. at 10. The findings of her study were later corroborated by several additional scientific studies "focused on how people cope with the sudden, traumatic death of a family member". Id. at 12.

In her report in this case, Dr. Wortman "describes the impact of Morgan's death on [Plaintiffs'] physical and mental health and their ability to function in important life roles," dkt. 56-1 at 2, including the development of "many symptoms of PTSD," id. at 14. To prepare this report, Dr. Wortman conducted in-depth interviews of Plaintiffs and interviewed five of Plaintiffs' closest friends and relatives to get a full picture of the relationship Plaintiffs had with their deceased son. Id. at 7. Dr. Wortman also administered a series of psychological tests/scales to Plaintiffs. Id. at 8. These tests are geared toward providing additional assessment of Plaintiffs' psychological symptoms and role functioning. Id. Dr. Wortman administered a total of at least six different tests, the methodology and findings of which are set forth in her report. Id. at 8-9.

Based on these interviews and tests, Dr. Wortman's report extensively reviews Plaintiffs' history as individuals and as a couple, the history of their family, the relationship each Plaintiff had with their son, the relationship between Morgan and their surviving son-who is not a plaintiff-and a family health history. Id. at 17-24. She describes the initial impact on Plaintiffs of learning about Morgan's death. Id. at 25. She identifies several behavioral and somatic symptoms that Plaintiffs have manifested, such as disturbed sleep, changes in appetite, lack of motivation to exercise, increased fatigue, crying spells, and memory issues/poor concentration. Id. at 27-28, 35-36. She describes their emotional response to the loss, id. at 28-30, 36-37, as well as their issues with work, their social lives, and their reluctance to seek help to cope with the loss, id. at 33-35, 40-41. Dr. Wortman describes the long-term effects that the loss of Morgan has had and likely will continue to have on Plaintiffs. Id. at 44.

Dr. Wortman's report explains that "[o]ne of the most important factors in arriving at a prognosis for [Plaintiffs] concerns the circumstances under which Morgan's death occurred. His death was untimely and happened suddenly and without warning." Id. at 43. While she provides numerous examples of the damage to Plaintiffs caused by the loss of Morgan's love and companionship, Dr. Wortman's opinions are tied to the violent, sudden nature of Morgan's death. Id. at 43-44 ("The fabric of their lives has been ripped apart by this crushing blow, particularly by the way it occurred.").

Defendants have filed a motion to exclude Dr. Wortman's expert testimony at trial. Dkt. 56.

II. Applicable Law

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "confides to the district court a gatekeeping responsibility" to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable. Kirk v. Clark Equip. Co., 991 F.3d 865, 872 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)). "In performing this role, the district court must engage in a three-step analysis, evaluating: (1) the proffered expert's qualifications; (2) the reliability of the expert's methodology; and (3) the relevance of the expert's testimony." Id. (quoting Gopalratnam v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 877 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2017)).

For the first step, a witness must be qualified "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Fed.R.Evid. 702; Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2016). General qualifications are not enough; a foundation for answering specific questions is required. Hall, 840 F.3d at 926. A witness qualified with respect to the specific question being asked may give opinion testimony if:

a) The expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702; Hall, 840 F.3d at 926.

For the second step, the Court therefore must make "a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid." Kirk, 991 F.3d at 872 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592- 93). Relevant factors may include "whether the expert's theory has been (1) tested, (2) subjected to peer review and publication, (3) analyzed for known or potential error rate, and/or is (4) generally accepted within the specific scientific field." Id. "[T]his list is neither exhaustive nor mandatory." Gopalratnam, 877 F.3d at 780. Instead, the test is "flexible" because "the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the facts of a particular case" and "the precise sort of testimony at issue." Id.

If step two is satisfied, the Court must then assess whether "the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact." Robinson v. Davol Inc., 913 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2019). For this step, the Court "evaluates whether the proposed scientific testimony fits the issue to which the expert is testifying." Id.

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that Dr. Wortman's testimony is not relevant or helpful-and is therefore inadmissible-because it relates only to damages that are not recoverable under Indiana law.^[1] Dkt. 56 at 4-7. In determining whether "the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact," the Court "evaluates whether the proposed scientific testimony fits the issue to which the expert is testifying." Robinson, 913 F.3d at 695. Expert testimony is subject to Rule 403, and because expert testimony "can be both powerful and quite misleading," judges must "exercise[] more control over experts than over lay witnesses" in "weighing possible prejudice against probative force." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.

Here, the issue is "damages . . . for the loss of [Morgan's] love and companionship." In determining the scope of damages that are available, the Court must apply Indiana substantive law by doing its "best to predict how the Indiana Supreme Court would decide" the issues. Webber v. Butner, 923 F.3d 479, 482 (7th Cir. 2019).

A. Damages available under Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Act

Defendants argue that Dr. Wortman's opinions are not relevant, and thus not helpful to the trier of fact, because they relate to damages that cannot be recovered under Indiana law. Plaintiffs respond that Dr. Wortman's testimony is admissible because it relates to "emotional damages" that may be recovered. The parties' arguments focus on what constitutes damages "for the loss of the...