Duke v. Harvest Hospitalities, Inc.

TAYLOR DUKE, Plaintiff, v. HARVEST HOSPITALITIES, INC., SATTAR SHAIK, Defendants.

No. 2:20-CV-00865-CCW

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

September 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND United States District Judge

Before the Court is Plaintiff Taylor Duke's Motion (on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees) for Leave to Narrow the Complaint and Dismiss Certain Opt-Ins Without Prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion will be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants' IHOP restaurants in Robinson and Homestead, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harvest Hospitalities, Inc. (“Harvest”) is a restaurant chain operating over twenty IHOP restaurants in Pennsylvania and throughout the United States, and that Defendant Sattar Sheik owns and operates Harvest. ECF No. 47 ¶¶ 7-8. In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees of Defendants' restaurants certain wages, including minimum wage and overtime, that are required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”). Plaintiff also asserts a breach of contract claim under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”). The case includes both a collective action component under the FLSA, as well as a class action component.

On June 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed an “Individual and Collective and Class Action Complaint” on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees seeking damages under the FLSA, PMWA and WPCL due to Defendants' alleged failure to pay certain wages (including minimum wage and overtime). ECF No. 1.^[1] After Defendants answered the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint that expanded the scope of this action to include claims under the laws of Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia, which Defendants answered on October 30, 2020. See ECF Nos. 14, 47, 54.

On November 18, 2020, this Court granted the parties' Agreed Motion for Approval of Stipulation to Conditional Certification, and conditionally certified a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) that includes “[a]ll hourly paid workers employed by IHOP stores within the Harvest Hospitalities franchise at any time from October 23, 2017 to the present.” ECF No. 59. The opt-in period closed on February 26, 2021, and 293 individuals filed opt-in forms. ECF Nos. 89 at 2, 90 at 2. Fact discovery is ongoing and is scheduled to close on October 29, 2021. ECF No. 85.

In her current Motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to narrow the case by voluntarily dismissing certain opt-in Plaintiffs so that the remaining FLSA collective would be limited to restaurants in and around Pittsburgh and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. ECF No. 89 at 3. Plaintiff also seeks to file a Second Amended Complaint that would conform the pleadings to the voluntary dismissal by reducing the scope of claims to only those involving Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees in the Pittsburgh and Harrisburg regions. ECF No. 89 at 3; see ECF No. 88-1. Defendant opposes Plaintiff's Motion and requests that these opt-in plaintiffs be dismissed with prejudice or, in the alternative, with conditions sufficient to protect Defendants from legal prejudice. ECF No. 90 at 3-4.

II. Legal Standard

a. Voluntary Dismissals Under Rule 41(a)(2) in the Context of the FLSA

Collective actions under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA “enable plaintiffs to vindicate their rights … at lower cost to each individual and promote judicial economy by resolving common issues arising from the same activity in the same proceeding.” Fischer v. Fed. Express Corp., 509 F.Supp.3d 275, 282 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Participants in a § 216(b) collective action must be “similarly situated” and must file individual consent to opt-in.^[2] Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 788 F.Supp.2d 372, 377 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (Ambrose, J.). If the Court finds that the collective action members are not similarly situated, the Court “will decertify the group, dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice, and permit any remaining plaintiffs to move on to the trial stage of litigation.” Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, Civil Action No. 10-cv-1283, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43043 at *48 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014) (emphasis added) citing Andrako, 788 F.Supp.2d at 378; Lugo v. Farmer's Pride Inc., 737 F.Supp.2d 291, 299-300 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“The law makes clear that, upon decertification, the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice”).

Although the FLSA provides a mechanism to join the collective action, ^[3] it does not explicitly “provide a method whereby an opt-in plaintiff may unilaterally withdraw once they have joined the litigation.” Mancuso v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., Case No. 09-61984-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151565 at *3 (S.D. Fl. Sept. 17, 2010); see also Reyes v. Texas EZPawn, L.P., Civil Action No. V-03-128, 2006 WL 3513936 at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2006) (“[S]imply withdrawing the consent forms of opt-in plaintiffs does not automatically dismiss their claims without an order of this Court.”). When the voluntary dismissal of an opt-in plaintiff is contested, ^[4] courts have generally applied the Rule 41(a)(2) standard. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2); see Costanza v. Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc., Civil Action No. 10-cv-0320, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121568 at *5-7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011) (Lancaster, C.J.); Reyes, 2006 WL 3513936, at *1; In re Allstate Ins. Co. Fair Labor Standards Act Litig., MDL No. 1541, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111338 at *3-6 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).

Under Rule 41(a)(2), “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Zamias v. Fifth Third Bank, Civil Action No. 17-cv-153, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103803, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2018) (Gibson, J.). A “voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not a matter of right” and such motion “lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Zamias, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103803, at *5 (internal citations omitted); Marinkovic v. Mercer Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, Civil Action No. 16-cv-292, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44048, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2017) (Cercone, J.). “A court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice, ” Zamias, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103803, at *5 (internal citations omitted), other than the “mere prospect of a second lawsuit.” Shamrock Creek LLC v. Borough of Paramus, 683 Fed.Appx. 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175727, at *231 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“dismissal without prejudice is the norm under Rule 41(a)(2)”).

Courts in this District consider the following factors under Rule 41(a)(2): “(1) the excessive and duplicative expense of a second litigation; (2) the effort and expense incurred by the defendant in preparing for trial; (3) the extent to which the current suit has progressed; (4) the plaintiff's diligence in bringing the motion to dismiss and explanation thereof; and (5) the pendency of a dispositive motion by the nonmoving party in deciding the motion.” Zamias, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103803, at *5-6; Maxim Crane Works, LP v. Smith Transp. Servs., Civil Action No. 15-cv-59, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95598 at *7-8 (W.D. Pa. July 22, 2016) (Conti, C.J.); Marinkovic v. Mercer Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, Civil Action No. 16-cv-292, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44048, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2017) (Cercone, J.). In exercising its “broad equitable discretion” under Rule 41(a)(2), the District Court may impose costs and attach conditions to the dismissal as it deems appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (“on terms that the court considers proper”); see also Ellis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Civil Action Nos. 86-2865, 86-3375, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14720 at *13-14(E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1989).

b. Amending a Complaint under Rule 15(a)

When a party moves to amend a complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) after “the deadline in a district court's scheduling order has passed, ” the party must show “good cause” under Rule 16(b)(4).^[5] Premier Comp Sols., LLC v. UPMC, 970 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2020); DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc. v. Sheridan, 975 F.3d 358, 370 n. 53 (3d Cir. 2020).

If the party seeking to amend its complaint meets its burden to show good cause, the Court will consider whether the party also satisfies Rule 15(a)'s “more liberal standard.” Premier Comp Sols., LLC, 970 F.3d, at 319. “Generally, Rule 15 motions should be granted.” United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2016). In its discretion, a Court may “deny a Rule 15(a) motion for leave to amend: when ‘(1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.'” Id.; see also Schomburg v. Dow Jones & Co., 504 Fed.Appx. 100, 103 (3d. Cir. 2012); Johnston v. Titan Logistics & Res., LLC, Civil Action No. 17-cv-1617, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201486 at *12-13 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2020) (Fischer, J.). “As to prejudice, the Court of Appeals has considered whether allowing an amendment would result in additional discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or new theories.” Graham v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 112, 122 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (Fischer, J.) (internal citations omitted).

III. Analysis

a. Opt-in Plaintiffs are Entitled to Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice

In an exercise of its sound discretion, the Court finds that the opt-in plaintiffs in this action who did not work in the restaurants in the Pittsburgh and Harrisburg area should be dismissed without prejudice.

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