Duke v. United States

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN A. ROSS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner William Duke's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1). The Government has responded (Doc. 7) and Petitioner has replied. (Doc. 8). For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2020, Petitioner William Duke signed a Guilty Plea Agreement admitting knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Duke, 4:19-CR-872-JAR (E.D. Mo.) (hereinafter “Duke Criminal Case”), Doc. 47. Petitioner pled guilty to one count of a three-count indictment, with the remaining counts dismissed at sentencing. Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 49. The same day Petitioner pled guilty, this Court sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment. Id. On June 21, 2021, Petitioner filed this § 2255 motion on the grounds that the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), invalidates his conviction.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A § 2255 petitioner is entitled to relief when his or her sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose

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such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255; see also Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011). Federal habeas relief is limited to rectifying “jurisdictional errors, constitutional errors, and errors of law.” Raymond v. United States, 933 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2019). Errors of law, moreover, only constitute grounds for relief under § 2255 when such error “constitute[s] a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). Petitioner bears the burden to prove he is entitled to relief. Golinveaux v. United States, 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019).

The Court must hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). “Accordingly, a claim may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing if the claim is inadequate on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based.” Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner's Procedural Default and Appeal Waiver

Habeas review “is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has “strictly limited the circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review, ” and recognized that concerns regarding finality of convictions have “special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.” Id. (citations omitted). As a general rule, claims not raised at trial or on direct appeal “may not be raised on collateral review.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); see also Silk v. United States, 955 F.3d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 2020).

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When a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, he can only raise the claim in habeas proceedings if he demonstrates (i) “cause” and “actual prejudice” or (ii) that he is “actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-496 (1986).

Petitioner pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by being a felon in possession of a firearm. Pursuant to the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner “waive[d] all rights to contest the conviction or sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, including one pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, except for claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel.” Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 47 at § 7(B) (emphasis added). At the plea and sentencing hearing, this Court emphasized that Petitioner's “right to appeal will be very limited as set forth in the plea agreement” and reminded Petitioner that he “agreed to waive [his] right to postconviction relief, or what's called habeas corpus relief.” Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 58 at 12, 21. The Court also offered Petitioner clear instructions regarding filing a Notice of Appeal with the Eighth Circuit, and advised Petitioner that if he requests, the “Clerk of Court will file that [N]otice of [A]ppeal for you.” Id. at 37.

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction with the Eighth Circuit. In this habeas petition, Petitioner does not bring claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel, ^[1] the only carve-outs to the Guilty Plea Agreement's appeal waiver. Petitioner has also not plausibly alleged that his guilty plea and appeal waiver were unknowing or involuntary. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889-894 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing enforceability of appeal waivers). This Court cannot grant habeas relief in these circumstances where Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim and accepted a Guilty Plea Agreement

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containing an enforceable waiver of his appeal rights. See Liggins v. United States, No. 4:21-CV-603-SRC, 2021 WL 4819572, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 14, 2021) (“[Petitioner] contractually waived his right to appeal his conviction in a post-conviction proceeding, knowingly and voluntarily, and the Court finds that [the petitioner] has not established a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred to circumvent his knowing and voluntary waiver.”).

Petitioner briefly suggests that he is “actually innocent” based on his Rehaif claim. (Doc. 1 at 6). In Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019), the Supreme Court held that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” See also United States v. Jawher, 950 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2020). To establish a “gateway claim” of actual innocence, a petitioner must (1) make allegations of constitutional error supported by new, reliable evidence not available at trial and (2) show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Nash v. Russell, 807 F.3d 892, 898-99 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995).

Here, Petitioner has not offered any new evidence, and the “record forecloses any plausible argument that [Petitioner] did not know he was a felon.” Clay v. United States, 833 Fed.Appx. 663, 664 (8th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). First, at the plea and sentencing hearing, Petitioner confirmed that he “knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 58 at 15. Second, the Final Presentence Investigation Report, which this Court adopted with no objection from Petitioner, indicates that Petitioner has multiple felony convictions and was previously found guilty of second-degree assault in Missouri state court and sentenced to one year in prison. Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 43 at ¶ 53. See Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090, 2095 (2021) (“[I]ndividuals who are convicted felons ordinarily

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know that they are convicted felons.”). Because Petitioner cannot demonstrate actual innocence, the Court finds that no excuse exists for his procedural default and the habeas petition can be denied on these grounds. The Court will, however, address Petitioner's substantive claim under Rehaif.

Petitioner's Rehaif Claim^[2]

The Rehaif decision came down on June 21, 2019. Petitioner was indicted after Rehaif, on October 17, 2019, and the indictment properly alleges that Petitioner possessed a firearm “knowing he had previously been convicted in a court of law of one or more crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 1 at 1. In the Guilty Plea Agreement, Petitioner admits that “at the time [he] knowingly possessed a firearm, he knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 47 at § 3. Finally, Petitioner affirmed at the plea and sentencing hearing that “at the time [he] knowingly possessed the firearm, [he] knew he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Duke Criminal Case, Doc. 58 at 15. Evidently, the Government and this Court consistently followed Rehaif's guidance, and Petitioner pled guilty to the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as established by Rehaif. See Scott v. United States, No. 1:20-CV-98 JAR, 2020 WL 2219759, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 2020) (holding Rehaif did not apply where defendant “signed a plea agreement that set forth the elements of the offense, and admitted to knowingly violating [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)]”); see also Taylor v. Huggins, No. 5:19-CV-291, 2019 WL 6481799, at *4 (N.D. W.Va....