Dun v. Transamerica Premier Life Ins. Co.

WILLIAM DUN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRANSAMERICA PREMIER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-40 (JEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 15, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Undeterred by the sound of the final buzzer, Plaintiffs seek to push these proceedings into a fifth quarter. Just like most sporting contests, however, this one merits no extra time. After seeing their case fall at summary judgment, Plaintiffs now desire to add a heretofore-unpled claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act. Yet before the Court may entertain Plaintiffs' request to once again amend their Complaint, it must determine whether they have satisfied the stringent criteria under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for vacating the Court's final judgment. They plainly have not. The Court, accordingly, will deny Plaintiffs' Motion.

I. Background

The background of this case is set forth in this Court's prior summary-judgment Opinion. See Dun v. Transamerica Premier Life Insurance Co., No. 19-40, 2020 WL 1065554 (D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2020). While the facts can be briefly encapsulated, the procedural history of the case is both more involved and more relevant to the instant Motion. In March 2013, Irmadel Dun, a 79-year-old resident of Montana, tripped on the sidewalk, struck her head, and died within a week from ensuing complications. Id. at *1. Following her death, Dun's five adult children — Plaintiffs in this action — sought to claim accidental-death benefits from Defendant Transamerica Premier Life Insurance Company, whose corporate predecessor sold Dun an insurance policy in November 2003. Id. at *3. Transamerica denied that claim, explaining that Dun's insurance only covered deaths resulting from a motor-vehicle or common-carrier accident, as opposed to any other sort of fatal mishap. Id. at 1.

On December 11, 2015, Plaintiffs filed suit in Montana state court, challenging Transamerica's interpretation of the policy and denial of Dun's claim. After Defendants removed the case to federal court in Montana, the parties proceeded to discovery. Id. at *3. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on June 30, 2017. See ECF No. 21. Two months later, they filed a Second Amended Complaint, which retained their counts against Transamerica but also raised claims, based on information learned in discovery, against new Defendants Financial Planning Services, Inc. and Aegon Direct Marketing Services, Inc., Trustee and Administrator respectively of a trust established to maintain insurance policies like Dun's. Dun, 2020 WL 1065554, at *3. The Second Amended Complaint, which is somewhat jumbled, appears to assert counts for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trustee duties, and breach of administrator duties, while also requesting an administrative accounting. See id.; ECF No. 28 (Second Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 92-125.

On August 29, 2018, Plaintiffs moved to transfer the case to the District of Columbia, emphasizing those latter Defendants' substantial connections to our city. See ECF No. 59 (Motion to Transfer) at 4-5, 9-10. The Montana court granted that motion in January 2019, and this Court assumed jurisdiction. See ECF Nos. 78, 79. Defendants sought permission to file Amended Answers at an initial status conference on February 14, 2019. The Court granted thatrequest, and the parties commenced a second round of discovery. See ECF No. 85 (Scheduling Order) at 1. At no point did Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint or raise any count under the CPPA.

Following summary-judgment briefing, the Court granted Defendants' motion on all counts on March 5, 2020. Dun, 2020 WL 1065554, at *8. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' position that Defendants' marketing materials and Insurance Certificate contained convoluted and contradictory language, the Court ruled that under the "plain terms of the contract, a reasonable person would have to conclude that the coverage is limited to motor-vehicle and common-carrier deaths." Id. at *7. The Court also explained that Defendants' marketing materials were neither "deceptive" nor "introduc[ed] ambiguity," but rather "served to further clarify the terms of the policy." Id. at *8. Finally, the Court made "quick work" of Plaintiffs' assertion, offered for the first time in their summary-judgment opposition, that Defendants had also violated the CPPA. Id. at *9. As the Court explained, that claim was "not properly pleaded (or pleaded at all)," and binding circuit precedent precluded Plaintiffs from amending their Complaint in summary-judgment briefing. Id.

Two weeks after entry of judgment, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, which explicitly alleged that Defendants' marketing materials contained deceptive and misleading representations in violation of the CPPA. See ECF No. 113 (Motion to Amend). The Court denied that motion without prejudice, observing that Plaintiffs must first obtain vacatur of the judgment before seeking to amend their Complaint. See Minute Order (3-18-2020). Plaintiffs then promptly filed Motions for Reconsideration and Vacatur. See ECF Nos. 115, 116. The Court denied the former and denied the latter without prejudice, in part because Plaintiffs never attached their proposed amended complaint or explained why amendment shouldbe permitted at this stage. See ECF No. 120 (Order). The Court nevertheless afforded Plaintiffs another opportunity to file a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Amend the Complaint. It warned, however, that any such motion "shall not rehash again the merits of the Court's summary-judgment ruling." Id. at 3. Plaintiffs now move once more to vacate the judgment and for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 121 (Pl. Mot.).

II. Legal Standard

Ordinarily, leave to amend under Rule 15(a) "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2004). "The entry of final judgment, however, is a game changer." Trudel v. SunTrust Bank, 325 F.R.D. 23, 25 (D.D.C. 2018). At that point, "a court cannot permit an amendment unless the plaintiff 'first satisf[ies] Rule 59(e)'s more stringent standard' for setting aside that judgment." Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 673 (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also DeGeorge v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2007). In other words, "[l]eave to amend a complaint after judgment may be granted only after the Court vacates that judgment" under Rule 59(e). Foster v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2015) (emphasis in original). If the plaintiff fails to prevail on her motion to vacate the judgment, that is the end of the matter, and the Court must deny the motion to amend under Rule 15(a) as moot. Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 673; Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 78-79 (D.D.C. 2013).

Rule 59(e) permits the filing of a motion to alter or amend a judgment when such motion is filed within 28 days after the judgment's entry. The Court must apply a "stringent" standard when evaluating Rule 59(e) motions. Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 673. "A Rule 59(e) motion is discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an interveningchange of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2810.1 at 158-62 (3d ed. 2012) (stating that "four basic grounds" for Rule 59(e) motion are "manifest errors of law or fact," "newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence," "prevent[ion of] manifest injustice," and "intervening change in controlling law"). Rule 59(e), moreover, "is not a vehicle to present a new legal theory that was available prior to judgment," Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012), or "to relitigate old matters." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted). "The strictness with which [Rule 59(e)] motions are viewed is justified by the need to protect both the integrity of the adversarial process in which parties are expected to bring all arguments before the court, and the ability of the parties and others to rely on the finality of judgments." Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (quoting CFTC v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 403 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36 (D.D.C. 2005)).

III. Analysis

The Court will first examine Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate before considering their Motion to Amend.

A. Motion to Vacate Judgment

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have not sought to vacate this Court's judgment in light of an "intervening change of controlling law" or the "availability of new evidence." Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 671. Instead, they assert solely that denying vacatur would result in "manifest injustice" and "manifest error." Pl. Mot. at 5; ECF No. 125 (Pl. Reply) at 2-4. This argument faces a decidedly uphill climb. "Manifest injustice" under Rule 59(e) is an "exceptionally narrow concept," which "'does not exist where . . . a party could have easilyavoided the outcome, but instead elected not to act until after a final order had been entered.'" Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 665). "Clear error," moreover, must likewise conform to a "very exacting standard." Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (quoting Bond v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 286 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2012)); see also id. (explaining that final judgment must be "dead wrong" to constitute clear error) (quoting Lardner v. FBI, 875 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2012)). The Court finds that Plaintiffs do not come close to satisfying these criteria.

Plaintiffs initially contend that they need not even seek leave to amend their Complaint because their desired CPPA claim — much to the surprise of the Court a...