Dunbar v. Berryhill

RONALD DUNBAR Plaintiff, v. NANCY BERRYHILL,Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Case No. 17 C 6278

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

August 28, 2018

Magistrate Judge Daniel G. Martin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Ronald Dunbar ("Plaintiff" or "Dunbar") seeks judicial review of a final decision of Defendant Nancy Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits in an August 31, 2016 written decision of an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Dunbar appealed the ruling to this Court and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that seeks to reverse the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion.

The Court has carefully reviewed the administrative record but omits a detailed description of it except as necessary to address the parties' primary concerns. The record consists largely of progress notes related to two conditions. Dunbar experienced encephalitis in 2008 and was successfully treated for his condition. Dunbar was also treated with medication and, later, with psychotherapy for diagnoses of depression and anxiety. Dunbar filed for Disability Widower's Benefits on April 8, 2014, alleging an onset date of April 15, 2008. At the administrative hearing, his attorney told the ALJ that the date should be amended to November 1, 2012, though the ALJ did not do so in his decision. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion is granted, and the Commissioner's motion is denied.

I. Legal Standard

A. The Social Security Administration Standard

In order to qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that he is disabled. An individual does so by showing that he cannot "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 4243(d)(1)(A). Gainful activity is defined as "the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b).

The Social Security Administration ("SSA") applies a five-step analysis to disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The SSA first considers whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity during the claimed period of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). It then determines at Step 2 whether the claimant's physical or mental impairment is severe and meets the twelve-month durational requirement noted above. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At Step 3, the SSA compares the impairment (or combination of impairments) found at Step 2 to a list of impairments identified in the regulations ("the Listings"). The specific criteria that must be met to satisfy a Listing are described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant's impairments meet or "medically equal" a Listing, the individual is considered to be disabled, and the analysis concludes; if a Listing is not met, the analysis proceeds to Step 4. 20C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).

Before addressing the fourth step, the SSA must assess a claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which defines his exertional and non-exertional capacity to work. The SSA then determines at the fourth step whether the claimant is able to engage in any of his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can do so, he is not disabled. Id. If the claimant cannot undertake past work, the SSA proceeds to Step 5 to determine whether a substantial number of jobs exist that the claimant can perform in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience. An individual is not disabled if he can do work that is available under this standard. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

B. Standard of Review

A claimant who is found to be "not disabled" may challenge the Commissioner's final decision in federal court. Judicial review of an ALJ's decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A court reviews the entire record, but it does not displace the ALJ's judgment by reweighing the facts or by making independent credibility determinations. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). Instead, the court looks at whether the ALJ articulated an "accurate and logical bridge" from the evidence to her conclusions. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). This requirement is designed to allow a reviewing court to "assess the validity of the agency's ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review."Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the claimant is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ's opinion is adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413 (citation omitted).

C. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ applied the familiar five-step analysis to find at Step One that Dunbar had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. His severe impairments at Step Two were herpes encephalitis/menngoencephalitis, right rotator cuff syndrom, anxiety disorder, and an affective disorder. None of these impairments met or equaled a listing at Step Three, either singly or in combination. Before moving to Step Four, the ALJ considered Dunbar's allegations concerning the severity and frequency of his impairments. The ALJ found that they were "not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record." (R. 24). The ALJ also formulated an RFC for Plaintiff. The ALJ found that Dunbar could carry out medium work with various exertional and non-exertional restrictions. Those restrictions addressed both Dunbar's physical and mental impairments. The ALJ accounted for the latter by stating that Plaintiff "can perform simple and routine tasks. He can have occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public." (R. 23). The ALJ then found at Step Four that Dunbar was not able to perform his past relevant work. Relying on the testimony of a Vocational Expert, the ALJ found at Step Five that jobs existed in the national economy that an individual with Dunbar's RFC could perform. He therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.

II. Discussion

Dunbar argues that the ALJ erred on two grounds. He first claims on multiple fronts that the ALJ's evaluation of his subjective symptoms was inadequate. Second, Dunbar claims that substantial evidence does not support the RFC finding. The Court addresses each issue in turn.

1. The Symptom Evaluation

A court gives significant deference to an ALJ's analysis of a claimant's statements concerning the severity and frequency of his symptoms. Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528 (7^th Cir. 2017) (noting that an ALJ's finding should be reversed only when it is "patently wrong"). Social Security Ruling 16-3p, which applies here, explains that in addition to the objective medical record, an ALJ must consider a claimant's daily activities, the frequency of his symptoms, precipitating factors, medications, non-medication treatment, attempts to relieve the symptoms, and any other factors that may be relevant. SSR 16-3p. An ALJ must articulate "specific reasons" for his or her findings. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7^th Cir. 2009). See also Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 478 (7^th Cir. 2009) (The ALJ "must justify the credibility finding with specific reasons supported by the record").

Dunbar first challenges the legal standard that the ALJ used in evaluating his symptoms. Using boilerplate language, the ALJ stated that Dunbar's "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision." (R. 23). Dunbar points out that the SSA's regulations state that when an ALJ determines if a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers whether "all your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably beaccepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence, and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 416.1529(a). A claimant's testimony is part of the "other evidence" in this guideline. The ALJ considers a claimant's statements, together with other evidence, to decide "the extent to which your alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence[.]" Id. Dunbar claims that the regulations' use of "reasonably" sets a lower legal bar than the one the ALJ used when he discounted Dunbar's statements because they were "not entirely consistent" with the record. Dunbar also claims that the ALJ's standard is insufficient because it fails to specify what evidence the ALJ thought was inconsistent with Dunbar's testimony. See Dejohnette v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 521589, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2018) ("'Not entirely consistent' is an opaque phrase that fails to specify what evidence the ALJ considered and what evidence she considered inconsistent with the record").

Dunbar's claim represents a new line of attack on the boilerplate language that ALJs now use to assess a claimant's statements about his or her symptoms. Shortly after Dunbar filed his motion in this case, his counsel persuaded Magistrate Judge Cole that when an ALJ finds that a claimant's testimony is "not...