Dunn v. Dunn, CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601–MHT

219 F.Supp.3d 1163

Joshua DUNN, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jefferson S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14cv601–MHT

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Signed November 25, 2016

Andrew Philip Walsh, Patricia Clotfelter, William Glassell Somerville, III, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, Birmingham, AL, Brent L. Rosen, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Brooke Menschel, Ebony Glenn Howard, Jack Richard Cohen, Latasha Lanette McCrary, Maria V. Morris, Rhonda C. Brownstein, Valentina Restrepo, Montgomery, AL, Eunice Cho, Atlanta, GA, James Patrick Hackney, William Van Der Pol, Jr., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP), Tuscaloosa, AL, Miriam Fahsl Haskell, Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Bryan Arthur Coleman, Evan Patrick Moltz, Luther Maxwell Dorr, Jr., Mitchell David Greggs, Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC, Michael Leon Edwards, Susan Nettles Han, Steven C. Corhern, Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, AL, Matthew Reeves, William Richard Lunsford, Christopher Stephen Kuffner, Melissa K. Marler, Michael Paul Huff, Stephen C. Rogers, Maynard Cooper and Gale PC, Huntsville, AL, Christopher Fred Heinss, David Randall Boyd, Jenelle Rae Evans, John Eric Getty, John W. Naramore, John Garland Smith, Balch & Bingham LLP, Anne Adams Hill, Elizabeth Anne Sees, Joseph Gordon Stewart, Jr., Alabama Dept. of Corrections, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

PHASE 2A ADAP SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION

Myron H. Thompson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The plaintiffs in this putative class-action lawsuit are dozens of state prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP). The defendants are officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC): the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner of Health Services.¹ They are sued in their official capacities only.

In Phase 2A of this case, with which this opinion is concerned, ADAP and a subset of individual plaintiffs assert the following mental-health claims: constitutionally inadequate mental-health treatment in Alabama prison facilities and involuntary medication without due process. They rely on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights).²

The issue before the court is whether ADAP has associational standing to bring the mental-health care claims at issue in Phase 2A of this case.³ The court concludes that it does.

I. Background

ADAP's claims are systemic and prospective in nature: It contends not that any particular prisoner's rights were violated in the past, but instead that defendants' policies and practices violate and will continue to violate the constitutional rights of prisoners who have serious mental illness, both by creating a substantial risk of serious harm to them and by denying them due process.

While defendants have sought summary judgment, their summary-judgment motion does not mention ADAP, but focuses exclusively on ADAP's co-plaintiffs, individual prisoners.⁴ The court issued an order informing the parties that it would, sua sponte, "raise for disposition on summary judgment the issue of whether plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program ... has associational standing with respect to any, some, or all of the claims to be litigated during Phase 2 of this case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (recognizing that district courts have the authority to raise issues for disposition on summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the parties are on notice that they must come forward with any and all pertinent evidence)." Phase 2 Briefing Order on Associational Standing (doc. no. 724) at 1–2.

The court further ordered ADAP to "file a brief affirmatively setting forth the basis for its asserted associational standing and explaining the scope of this standing"; the brief was "to discuss any relevant case law and any evidence [ADAP] believes is pertinent to its assertion of standing," and required defendants, "[i]f [they] wish to contest" ADAP's associational standing, to "do so in the context of their summary judgment motion." Id. at 2. See Wright & Miller, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2720.1 (4th ed.) ("[I]f the court determines to enter summary judgment on a ground not presented or argued by the parties, the failure to give the losing party an opportunity to defend against that ground provides a ground for reversal. Conversely, as now expressly recognized by Rule 56(f), if the parties are provided with an opportunity to address the court's alternative ground, then summary judgment may properly be entered.").

Having been placed on notice that the court would consider resolving the issue of associational standing on summary judgment, the parties filed briefs as directed, and the court has considered the arguments and evidence put forward. For the reasons explained below, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), the court will grant summary judgment to ADAP on the issue of associational standing, and, as ADAP requested, "uphold its associational standing to bring its claims" in Phase 2A of this case. Pl. ADAP's Br. on Associational Standing (doc. no. 754) at 25.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment, which can be granted not only as to a claim or defense but also as to any "part" of a claim or defense, is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and one party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Only record evidence--not assertions in pleadings--can create a dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against which summary judgment is being sought or considered. Coleman v. Smith , 828 F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. Associational Standing

ADAP, the State's protection and advocacy organization (P & A), contends that it has associational standing to litigate claims that are, in essence, identical to those the individual plaintiffs endeavor to bring on behalf of the plaintiff classes.⁵ The court agrees for the following reasons.

The Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI) authorizes P & As to bring litigation to address systemic problems in the treatment of people with mental illness.⁶ Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes P & As to "pursue administrative, legal, or other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of the rights of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in the State"; meanwhile, § 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes P & As to "pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on behalf of an individual ... with mental illness" under certain circumstances. As many courts have explained, and as many others have recognized in the course of finding that P & As have standing to bring claims on behalf of identifiable groups of similarly situated constituents, "PAIMI authorizes [P & As] to pursue claims for system-wide change" under subsection (a)(1)(B), in addition to claims on behalf of individuals pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(C). Univ. Legal Servs., Inc. v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. , 2005 WL 3275915, at *5 (D.D.C. July 22, 2005) (Hogan, J.); see also Brown v. Stone , 66 F.Supp.2d 412, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Block, J.) ("Essentially, subdivision B is apparently designed to address systemic issues affecting the rights of multiple individuals.... By contrast, subdivision C addresses the rights of particular individuals, and is significantly more restrictive...." (citations omitted)). As the court explained in Brown , "if Congress merely intended for state [P & A] systems to act as advocates on behalf of [specific] mentally [ill] individuals, it would not have included (a)(1)(B) in the statute in addition to (a)(1)(C)." Id . at 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Block, J.) (citation omitted). "Given ‘the broad remedial purposes of the Act,’ " the court in Brown concluded, the plaintiff P & A had standing to bring claims on behalf of "a particular group of individuals" it had "identified," not by name but by what amounted to a description of a class: "all those" indigent patients in state psychiatric hospitals being assessed full charges for their care based on the defendants' policy of charging for care any patients who sued for injuries arising out of their psychiatric treatment. Id . (quoting Rubenstein v. Benedictine Hosp. , 790 F.Supp. 396, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Cholakis, J.)).

Of course, in addition to this statutory authorization to bring actions on behalf of mentally ill individuals, ADAP must also have standing to sue under Article III. The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test for determining whether an organization has associational standing to sue on behalf of its members: "an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm'n , 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Although the first two prongs of the Hunt test are constitutional requirements, the third is merely prudential and may be eliminated by Congress. United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Brown Grp., Inc. , 517 U.S. 544, 555–58, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996).

The Eleventh Circuit has squarely held that P & As may sue on behalf of the constituents they serve just "like a more traditional association may sue on behalf of its members." Doe v. Stincer , 175 F.3d 879, 885–86 (11th Cir. 1999). In so doing, it explained that a P & A that meets PAIMI's...