Dupigny v. Hannah

JOHNNY DUPIGNY, Plaintiff, v. AMONDA HANNAH et al., Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-00836 (JAM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

January 18, 2021

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

Plaintiff Johnny Dupigny is a sentenced inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction ("DOC").¹ He has filed a complaint pro se and in forma pauperis against numerous DOC officials alleging that they have violated his rights by preventing him from buying an electric hair dryer in order to dry the long dreadlocks of his hair. He claims in principal part that the DOC's policy which bars male inmates but not female inmates from having hair dryers violates his right of equal protection and that the denial of a hair dryer burdens the exercise of his religion which does not allow him to cut his hair. For the reasons set forth below, I will allow some of Dupigny's claims to proceed.

BACKGROUND

The complaint names the following six defendants: former DOC Commissioner Rollin Cook, District Administrator William Mulligan, Warden Amonda Hannah, Deputy Warden Egan, Captain Gordils, and Commissary Supervisor Fontano. These defendants are named intheir individual capacity for money damages and in their official capacity for injunctive relief. Doc. #1 at 1-3 (¶¶ 1-7).²

The following facts as alleged in the complaint are accepted as true only for purposes of this ruling. Dupigny is an African American male who is incarcerated at Garner Correctional Institution. Id. at 1 (¶1), 3 (¶ 9). The complaint alleges that "[a]s a part of Dupigny's religious and ethnic beliefs, he does not cut his hair and instead maintains his hair in dreadlocks that reach down to his lower back and buttocks (the locks)." Id. at 3 (¶ 10). The dreadlocks are thick strands or ropes of hair that are tightly wound together. Ibid. (¶ 11). He must wash his dreadlocks regularly to maintain health and hygiene. Ibid. (¶ 12). While incarcerated, he uses a towel to dry the exterior of his dreadlocks. Ibid. (¶ 13). He cannot adequately dry the interior of the dreadlocks using just a towel because the dreadlocks are tightly wound together. Ibid. (¶ 14).

After Dupigny dries the exterior of his hair with a towel, it can take five or six hours for the dreadlocks to completely dry, and this causes them to become moldy and smelly as well as to become brittle and to break off in large sections and strands. Ibid. (¶¶ 15-16). Excess moisture at the base of his scalp causes an itchy rash and inflammation that sometimes lasts for days or weeks. Id. at 4 (¶ 17). The moldy and musty smell from Dupigny's dreadlocks also causes serious conflicts with his cellmates Ibid. (¶ 18). This puts Dupigny "at great risk of severe bodily injury and death" as well as causing "great stress and severe migraine headaches." Ibid.

In early May 2020, Dupigny discovered that the DOC permits female inmates to purchase hair dryers from the commissary but does not permit male inmates to do so. Ibid. (¶19). According to the complaint, "[t]he policy is authorized by Cook and Mulligan, and is sanctioned and condoned by Hannah, Egan, Fontano and Gordils." Ibid. (¶ 21).

Dupigny wrote inmate requests in early May 2020 to Gordils (the housing unit manager at Garner) and Egan (the deputy warden at Garner), but he was advised by both of them that hair dryers are only allowed for female inmates. Ibid. (¶ 23). They advised him that if he had concerns then he should "write medical." Ibid. (¶ 24). The medical department does not issue inmates hair dryers or perform hair drying services. Ibid. (¶ 25).

Dupigny filed a grievance with Hannah (the warden at Garner) but was told that the response he received from Gordils was appropriate. Id. at 5 (¶ 29). He appealed the denial of this grievance to Mulligan (the DOC's district administrator) who responded that "electric hair dryers are not allowed within a facility housing the male population." Ibid. (¶ 31).

The complaint alleges violations of several of Dupigny's federal constitutional rights including his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and his right to free exercise of his religion under the First Amendment. The complaint also alleges violations of the Civil Rights Act under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986 as well as under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §2000cc. Id. at 6-9.³

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a prisoner's civil complaint against a governmental entity or governmental actors and "identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." If the prisoner is proceeding pro se, the allegations of the complaint must be read liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010).

In recent years, the Supreme Court has set forth a threshold "plausibility" pleading standard for courts to evaluate the adequacy of allegations in federal court complaints. A complaint must allege enough facts—as distinct from legal conclusions—that give rise to plausible grounds for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Notwithstanding the rule of liberal interpretation, a pro se complaint may not survive dismissal if its factual allegations do not meet the basic plausibility standard. See, e.g., Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).

Equal Protection

Dupigny claims that the DOC's alleged policy which bars him from having a hair dryer while allowing female inmates to have a hair dryer violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The Equal Protection Clause...commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of law,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). When thegovernment classifies on the basis of sex or gender, the classification is subject to heightened, intermediate scrutiny that requires the government to show that the classification serves an important governmental objective. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Dale v. Barr, 967 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2020).

Here, the complaint alleges a DOC policy that intentionally discriminates on the basis of gender and for reasons that do not serve an important governmental objective. Accordingly, the complaint alleges a plausible claim for relief under the Equal Protection clause.

Eighth Amendment

Dupigny claims that the denial of a hair dryer amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has long recognized that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the safety or serious medical needs of a sentenced prisoner. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).

A deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment has two requirements. First, the prisoner must allege that he was subject to an objectively serious risk of harm or serious medical need, as distinct from what a reasonable person would understand to be a minor risk of harm or minor medical need. The objective component requires no less than "'a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.'" Horace v. Gibbs, 802 F. App'x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 33, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)).

Second, the prisoner must allege that a defendant prison official acted with an actual awareness of a substantial risk that serious harm to the inmate will result. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013); Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120,127 (2d Cir. 2012). The official must have acted more than merely negligently but instead with a subjective state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness. See Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 150 (2d Cir. 2019).

As to his claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, Dupigny does not allege facts to show a medical condition that is severe enough to satisfy the objective medical need requirement for an Eighth Amendment claim. He alleges only that that the excess moisture left on his scalp after washing his dreadlocks and being unable to dry them without a hair dryer results in excess moisture in his hair for five to six hours and that this causes an itchy rash and inflammation that lasts for days and weeks. Doc. #1 at 3, 4 (¶¶ 15, 17). Nor does he allege subjective recklessness by any of the defendants as to his medical needs. To the extent that two of the defendants—Gordils and Egan—advised Dupigny to "write medical" about his "health and hygienic needs," Doc. #1 at 4 (¶ 24), this advice to seek medical assistance does not suggest that they were deliberately indifferent.

As to his claim for deliberate indifference to his safety, even if I assume that the complaint adequately alleges an objectively serious risk of harm from its conclusory description of "serious conflicts" with cellmates that causes Dupigny stress and severe migraine headaches, Doc. #1 at 4 (¶ 18), the complaint does not allege that any of the defendants knew of these serious conflicts with his cellmates. Accordingly, the complaint does not validly allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment because it does not allege facts to plausibly establish that any of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Dupigny's serious medical needs or to his safety.

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