Duryea v. Finnegan

1

WANDA J. DURYEA, Plaintiff, v. TIMOTHY H. FINNEGAN, Formerly New York State Police, Badge #404; TIMOTHY P. GOULD, New York State Police; and JAMES WOLLMAN, New York State Police, each in their individual capacities, Defendants.

No. 22 CV 6300 (VB)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 5, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

Vincent L. Briccetti United States District Judge

Plaintiff Wanda J. Duryea, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this Section 1983 action against defendants, all of whom are active or former police officers for the State of New York, in their individual capacities,^[1]alleging they violated plaintiff's rights under New York state law and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they allegedly assaulted her son in her presence, illegally searched her vehicle and purse, seized her phone, and denied her access to a bathroom.

Now pending is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc #27).^[2] For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 and 1367.

BACKGROUND

For the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and plaintiff's opposition,^[3]and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, as summarized below.

Plaintiff, a New Hampshire resident, alleges that on July 26, 2019, she, her son (Joseph Brooks), and her niece (Cheyenne Harding) visited the police barracks in Somers, New York, to obtain a signature on Brooks's parolee travel form.

According to plaintiff, defendant Finnegan refused to sign the form and “hit” Brooks. (Doc. #2 (“Compl.”) at 5). She further claims Brooks was “falsely arrested” and later assaulted in the parking lot and the barracks. (Id.). Plaintiff claims she paid approximately $1,000 for a bond to secure Brooks's release and incurred “repeated travel expenses,” presumably in connection with Brooks's court proceedings. (Doc. #34 (“Pl. Opp.”) at 2). The charges against Brooks were allegedly dismissed in May 2022.

Also on July 26, 2019, plaintiff alleges defendant Wollman illegally searched her purse and vehicle, a Jeep, and illegally seized her phone.

When Wollman asked for the keys to the Jeep, plaintiff allegedly pressed Wollman for his legal authority to search it. Wollman cited exigent circumstances as grounds for the search, but plaintiff disagreed and denied consent for the search because “it was the middle of the day and a search warrant could be obtained.” (Pl. Opp. at 6).

Nonetheless, plaintiff released the keys to Wollman and asked to retrieve her purse and cigarettes. Wollman allegedly handed over plaintiff's cigarettes and lighter but did not provide plaintiff her purse. Plaintiff implies Finnegan searched her purse looking for her “son's alleged marijuana.” (Pl. Opp. at 5). In plaintiff's purse, Finnegan purportedly located a small wooden box of pills and told plaintiff she could be arrested for having a prescription not in the original container.

While searching the Jeep, Finnegan allegedly told plaintiff and Harding he would stop the search if they provided him with the marijuana. Accordingly, plaintiff contends she instructed Harding to give Brooks's “locked medical marijuana case” to Finnegan. (Pl. Opp. at 5). Plaintiff allegedly further explained that “there was no marijuana in the vehicle outside of the locked medical marijuana case.” (Id.)

Plaintiff, who has a “walking disability,” also allegedly asked Harding to film the vehicle search using plaintiff's phone. (Pl. Opp. at 4). Foreseeing Harding's arrest, plaintiff asked Harding to return the phone to her. Wollman allegedly said Harding could not return the phone, stating he was seizing the phone because he was arresting Harding.

Plaintiff contends she wanted the phone back because it contained “video evidence of police misconduct including the relocation of an antique pistol from a closed suitcase to the exterior pouch of a computer bag.” (Pl. Opp at 4). Accordingly, for the next three years, during two of which plaintiff claims she paid monthly charges for the phone, she alleges she repeatedly requested the return of her phone or production of a search warrant. Plaintiff also had to purchase a substitute phone, as the seized phone was her only means of communication. The phone was ultimately returned to plaintiff in June 2022 after the charges against Brooks were dismissed.

According to plaintiff, Finnegan also refused her access to a bathroom during the July 26 incident, stating “[y]ou can wait.” (Compl. at 5). She contends she could not wait and vacated her bowels into her clothing. Plaintiff alleges she suffers from irritable bowel syndrome and that this occurrence caused her “IBS pain and symptoms,” requiring a visit to her primary care physician and a CT scan in August 2019, an unsuccessful colonoscopy attempt in September 2019, and two colon surgeries in October 2019 and July 2020. (Id. at 5-6). However, all of her pain and colon issues allegedly “resolved” in 2022 once the charges against Brooks were dismissed. (Pl. Opp. at 2). Plaintiff also subsequently sought additional Meniere's disease^[4]medication from her physician.

In addition to these medical issues, plaintiff claims the events on July 26 required her to make “[r]epeated court appearances,” caused her “complications creat[ing] unwanted stress,” and engendered a permanent mistrust of “police, courts and authorities.” (Compl. at 5-6). She also purportedly suffers from “[p]ost-traumatic stress disorder exacerbation,” for which she received counseling. (Id. at 6).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

A district court must dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Conn. Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2021).

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion at the pleading stage, the court “must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor,” except for “argumentative inferences favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction.” Buday v. N.Y. Yankees P'ship, 486 Fed.Appx. 894, 895 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order). To the extent a Rule 12(b)(1) motion places jurisdictional facts in dispute, the district court may resolve the disputed jurisdictional fact issues by referring to evidence outside the pleadings. Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011).

In addition, when a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on other grounds, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first. Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative complaint under “the two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, a plaintiff's legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of “plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The Court must liberally construe submissions of pro se litigants and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Applying the pleading rules permissively is particularly appropriate when, as here, a pro se plaintiff alleges civil rights violations. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). “Even in a pro se case, however, . . . threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Nor may the Court “invent factual allegations” a plaintiff has not pleaded. Id.

II. Standing

Among other claims, plaintiff complains she suffered emotional distress watching defendants purportedly assault her son. Construing these allegations liberally, plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and a state law negligence claim. Defendants challenge plaintiff's standing to bring these claims.

In addition to the Article III “case or controversy” requirements, federal courts must often consider certain prudential limits on a plaintiff's standing to pursue the claims she asserts. One such “prudential principle is that a plaintiff may ordinarily assert only his own legal rights, not those of third parties.” Am. Psychiatric Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2016).

The Court...