Dynak v. Bd. of Educ. of Wood Dale Sch. Dist. 7

2020 IL 125062

164 N.E.3d 1226

444 Ill.Dec. 651

Margaret DYNAK, Appellant,

v.The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WOOD DALE SCHOOL DISTRICT 7, Appellee.

Docket No. 125062

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed April 16, 2020

CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.

¶ 1 At issue is whether section 24-6 of the Illinois School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/24-6 (West 2016) ) allows a teacher who gives birth at the end of the school year to use her accumulated paid sick leave at the start of the next school year. The school district in this case denied plaintiff's request to use paid sick leave at the beginning of the school year following the birth of her child. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Du Page County. The circuit court held in favor of the school district, and the appellate court affirmed. 2019 IL App (2d) 180551, 434 Ill.Dec. 203, 135 N.E.3d 87. We now affirm the lower courts' judgments.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Section 24-6 of the School Code provides, in relevant part:

" § 24-6. Sick leave. The school boards of all school districts, including special charter districts, but not including school districts in municipalities of 500,000 or more, shall grant their full-time teachers * * * sick leave provisions not less in amount than 10 days at full pay in each school year. If any such teacher or employee does not use the full amount of annual leave thus allowed, the unused amount shall be allowed to accumulate to a minimum available leave of 180 days at full pay, including the leave of the current year. Sick leave shall be interpreted to mean personal illness, quarantine at home, serious illness or death in the immediate family or household, or birth, adoption, or placement for adoption. The school board may require a certificate from a physician * * * as a basis for pay during leave after an absence of 3 days for personal illness or 30 days for birth or as the school board may deem necessary in other cases. * * * For paid leave for adoption or placement for adoption, the school board may require that the teacher or other employee provide evidence that the formal adoption process is underway, and such leave is limited to 30 days unless a longer leave has been negotiated with the exclusive bargaining representative." 105 ILCS 5/24-6 (West 2016).

¶ 4 Plaintiff, Margaret Dynak, is a full-time teacher employed by Wood Dale School District 7 (District) since 2008. On March 15, 2016, plaintiff notified the District in writing that she was due to give birth to her second child through a scheduled caesarian section on June 6, 2016. She requested to use 1.5 days of her accumulated paid sick leave on June 6 and 7. June 7 was the last day of the 2015-16 school year and was scheduled as a half-day of work.

¶ 5 Plaintiff also requested to use 12 weeks of leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) ( 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2012) ), beginning on August 18, 2016, the first day of the 2016-17 school year. Under the FMLA, an eligible employee may take 12 workweeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period for the birth of a child. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (2012) ; 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(a)(1) (2013). Finally, plaintiff requested to use paid sick leave for the first 28.5 days of her FMLA leave, pursuant to section 24-6 of the School Code. Thus, plaintiff requested that the first 28.5 workdays of her 12-week leave would be paid, while the remaining days would be unpaid. It is undisputed that plaintiff had accumulated at least 30 days of paid sick leave as of the date of her request.

¶ 6 The District allowed plaintiff to use 1.5 days of her accumulated paid sick leave on June 6 and 7, 2016, but it denied her request to use paid sick leave beginning on August 18, 2016. In a letter dated April 21, 2016, John Corbett, the District's superintendent, informed plaintiff that her 12 weeks of unpaid FMLA leave had been approved by the school board. The letter stated, however, that since the FMLA leave would begin 10 weeks after the birth, plaintiff was not "eligible to use sick days for the leave unless additional circumstances exist that would normally allow for the use of paid sick leave."

¶ 7 On May 5, 2016, Sylvia Rios, associate general counsel for the Illinois Education Association, sent a letter to the District on plaintiff's behalf. Rios contended in her letter that section 24-6 of the School Code mandates a minimum 30-day period of paid sick leave following the birth of a child and "does not provide for a specific 30[-]day period during which a teacher must take the days off." After further correspondence between the parties, the District did not change its position on the matter. Plaintiff gave birth on June 6, 2016. She began her 12-week FMLA leave on August 18, 2016. Plaintiff did not submit a physician's certificate to substantiate a medical need for additional paid sick leave. On October 6, 2016, plaintiff's attorney sent the District a written demand for reimbursement of lost wages for 28.5 days of sick leave. The record does not contain the District's response, if any, to this demand.

¶ 8 On October 13, 2016, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court. Count I prayed for a declaratory judgment to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties under section 24-6 and to restore to plaintiff her lost wages and benefits for the period during which she was denied the use of paid sick leave. Count II alleged plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the Attorneys Fees in Wage Actions Act (Wage Act) ( 705 ILCS 225/1 (West 2016) ). Count III alleged plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees, costs, and damages pursuant to the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act ( 820 ILCS 115/14 (West 2016) ).

¶ 9 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following arguments, the trial court granted the District's motion and denied plaintiff's motion. In ruling for the District, the trial judge stated:

"In order to adopt the interpretation of the statute urged by the plaintiff, the Court would have to find that the conditions set forth in the definition of sick leave create a vested right in the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons regardless of when those conditions occurred.

The accident of giving birth in the summertime, I don't believe creates any kind of a right in the plaintiff to sick leave at a future period in time that is not covered by the Act.

For instance, if there were a death in the plaintiff's immediate family that took place on June 15th, after the school year ended, she could not reasonably expect to have three days of sick leave for that occurrence, but the sick leave taking place after the school year started.

And the same could be said for any of the other occurrences that are set forth in the definition of sick leave."

¶ 10 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the dismissal of counts I and II of her complaint.¹ A divided appellate court panel affirmed the trial court's judgment. 2019 IL App (2d) 180551, 434 Ill.Dec. 203, 135 N.E.3d 87. The majority held, inter alia , that sick leave for birth must be interpreted in the same manner as sick leave for other events listed in section 24-6, such as personal illness. Id. ¶ 36. The majority further held that plaintiff's interpretation of the statute, which would allow her to use paid sick leave beginning approximately 10 weeks after the birth, would lead to an absurd result when applied to the other triggering events in the statute. Id.

¶ 11 The majority also noted that plaintiff's interpretation would "confer upon teachers and teachers alone a sort of sub rosa paid parental leave based on the fortuity of the timing of birth," for which there was no textual support. Id. ¶ 56. The majority surmised, "[i]f the legislature had intended to confer paid parental leave, it would not have hijacked a sick-leave provision to do so." Id. Accordingly, the majority rejected plaintiff's statutory interpretation and affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the District. Since plaintiff did not prevail on the section 24-6 issue, the majority also rejected plaintiff's Wage Act claim for attorney fees. Id. ¶ 58.

¶ 12 In his dissent, Justice Hudson characterized the majority's interpretation of section 24-6 as an impermissible rewriting of the statute. Id. ¶¶ 63, 65 (Hudson, J. dissenting). He argued that the statute allows a teacher to use accumulated paid sick days "for birth" for the next 30 workdays following the birth, with no limitations or exceptions. Id. ¶ 64. Since the statute contains no exception for when a teacher's next 30 workdays following the birth are interrupted by the summer break, he argued the District had no right to refuse plaintiff's request. Id.

¶ 13 This court allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). In addition, we allowed the Illinois Federation of Teachers to file an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff's position and the Illinois Association of School Boards and Illinois Association of School Administrators to file jointly an amicus curiae brief in support of the District's position. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345(a) (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 The trial court decided this case on cross-motions for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016). When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that the case involves only legal questions and ask the court to decide the issues on the existing record. Pielet v. Pielet , 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28, 365 Ill.Dec. 497, 978 N.E.2d 1000. Upon review of the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id. ¶ 30. De novo review is also appropriate in this case because...