E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Credit Co.

531 F.Supp.2d 930

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, and John Doe, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff and Counter-Plaintiff.

Case No. 3:06-0900.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

January 14, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Faye A. Williams, Deidre Smith, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Memphis, TN, Sally Ramsey, Steven W. Dills, Employment Opportunity Commission, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Kristen V. Dyer, Philip Norman Elbert, William David Bridgers, Neal & Harwell, Robert Wheeler Rutherford, Rutherford, DeMarco, White & Soloman, Nashville, TN, Lyndsay C. Smith, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Intervenor Plaintiff.

Keith D. Frazier, Jennifer S. Rusie, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, L.L.P., Nashville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

ALETA A. TRAUGER, District Judge.

The defendant has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 48), to which the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor have responded (Docket Nos. 58, 62), and the defendant has replied (Docket No. 68), For the reasons discussed herein, the defendant's motion will be denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff-intervenor John Doe began work for defendant Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMCC") in approximately June 2000, and became a full-time employee in March 2001.¹ In early 2002, Mr. Doe was diagnosed with HIV. Following this diagnosis, Mr. Doe's primary care physician enrolled him in a double-blind study at the Vanderbilt Comprehensive Care Center, requiring that Mr. Doe report to the Care Center for blood draws. The study required that Mr. Doe have his blood drawn once a week for a number of months, once every two weeks for an additional period of time, and then once every three weeks. Mr. Doe's participation in this study paid for his HIV medications.

In the early stages of the study, Mr. Doe was required to give blood at the Care Center once a week, between Tuesday and Thursday². Mr. Doe was wary of giving his direct supervisor, Chandra Chisom, the reason for his absence on those days, because he believed Ms. Chisom to be a gossip and feared that she would tell his coworkers that he was inflicted with HIV. Accordingly, in early 2002, Mr. Doe, approached manager Danny Dunson to ask for a schedule accommodation, so that he could participate in the clinical study without negative repercussions at work. Mr. Doe had been "written up" on February 14, 2002, for missing work in order to attend medical appointments and so was concerned that he might be fired for taking additional time off without explanation. Mr. Doe requested that he be able to work four extended-hour days rather than the regular five-day schedule followed by the other employees.

Mr. Doe alleges that he first told Mr. Dunson that he would need the accommodation because of a "medical condition," without going further into specifics. (Docket No. 61 at ¶ 4) Mr. Dunson demanded to know what the specific diagnosis was, stating, "I have to know why, actually, to accommodate you when other people are coming and asking for accommodations and I turn them down, why am I going to give you an accommodation?" (Id. at ¶ 6) Mr. Doe replied that it was confidential and that there was a stigma attached. Mr. Dunson said, "In order for me to accommodate your schedule, I need to know what's going on." (Id.) Mr. Doe told Mr. Dunson that he had been diagnosed with HIV.³

Only after Mr. Doe had disclosed this information did Mr. Dunson refer him to Sue Geisen, an occupational health nurse, to discuss his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Ms. Geisen is not an employee of FMCC, but is instead an independent contractor. Mr. Doe alleges that he did not even know that the FMLA existed, much less the parameters of his rights under that statute, until Mr. Dunson provided him with this information.⁴

Mr. Doe met with Ms. Geisen later that day. Ms. Geisen told him that he was not required to answer any questions about his medical condition or divulge his medical information to anyone but her. However, Mr. Doe alleges that Ms. Geisen did not, specifically, tell him what to do if a manager or supervisor asked him about his FMLA leave. Ms. Geisen did tell Mr. Doe that he was to give his medical records and FMLA requests directly to her and that she would keep the records confidential. Ms. Geisen did keep those forms confidential.

Several weeks later, in March or April 2002, Mr. Dunson summoned Mr. Doe into his office. Mr. Dunson told Mr. Doe that Chandra Chisom was giving him "a hard time" because he would not tell her the specific reason for Mr. Doe's absence from work. Mr. Doe said that he did not want Ms. Chisom to know his diagnosis. Mr. Dunson told Mr. Doe that he had told Ms. Chisom to "let it be." (Docket No. 59 at p; 4) Nevertheless, after several more weeks passed, Mr. Dunson called Mr. Doe into his office again and told Mr. Doe that they needed to tell Ms. Chisom the reason why Mr. Doe was missing work. Mr. Doe said, once again, that he did not want her to know. Mr. Dunson said that he did not trust Ms. Chisom with the information because she "told other people everything she knows." (Id.) Mr. Doe said that, according to Ms. Geisen, he did not have to tell anyone his medical information.

Nevertheless, Mr. Dunson picked up the. phone and called Ms. Chisom, requesting that she come to his office. After she arrived, Mr. Dunson told Ms. Chisom that the information she was about to receive was confidential and that she could lose her job if she disclosed it to anyone else. Ms. Chisom said that she understood. Then Mr. Dunson told Ms. Chisom that Mr. Doe had HIV. Mr. Doe remained present in the room throughout this conversation.

At a later time, Ms. Chisom told Mr. Doe that, going forward, she would maintain a file containing his medical excuses at her desk. Mr. Doe complied, giving Ms. Chisom the excuses, although Ms. Geisen had told him that he was not required to give her the excuses. According to the plaintiff, as a practical matter, it is very difficult for an hourly employee to resist a demand for medical excuses from his immediate supervisor on the directive of an independent contractor industrial nurse. (Docket No. 60 at ¶ 28) Ms. Chisom kept this file until she was informed by superiors at FMCC that she was not permitted to maintain it, at which time she returned it to Mr. Doe.

Chandra Chisom told Monica Chisom and Tracie Johnson about Mr. Doe's medical condition at some time between February 2002 and April 2005. (See M. Chisom Dep., Docket No. 73, Ex. 7 at p. 2; T. Johnson Dep., Docket No. 73, Ex. 6 at p. 2) Tracie Johnson herself told one other person.⁵ The fact that Chandra Chisom informed Mr. Doe's coworkers about his medical condition was subsequently confirmed by the defendant's own internal investigation. Mr. Doe suffered shame, embarrassment, and depression as a result of this disclosure. He took a leave of absence shortly after finding out about it, during which he sought medical treatment. When he returned from the leave of absence, the defendant laid him off, but he was subsequently rehired.

Mr. Doe contacted the defendant's human resources department shortly after he discovered that Ms. Chisom had divulged his medical information to his coworkers, informing them of the disclosures. FMCC conducted an investigation and initially determined that Ms. Chisom had not violated the non-disclosure rule. However, after Mr. Doe protested, FMCC reinvestigated the matter, confirmed that Chandra Chisom had, in fact, violated company policy, and terminated her.

More than thirty days prior to the institution of this action, Mr. Doe filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") against FMCC. On September 20, 2006, the EEOC filed this action on behalf of Mr. Doe, alleging that FMCC had engaged in unlawful employment actions in violation of §§ 102(d)(3)(B), (d)(3)(C), and (d)(4)(C) of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B), (d)(3)(C), and (d)(4)(C). (Docket No, 1) On December 20, 2006, Mr. Doe filed a Motion to Intervene (Docket No. 15), which the court granted on January 16, 2007. (Docket No. 19). Mr. Doe, in his Complaint in Intervention, alleged violation of the same provisions of the ADA as were alleged in the Complaint filed by the EEOC, as well as several state law claims that were subsequently dismissed by agreed order on October 29, 2007. (Docket No. 56) On October 26, 2007, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the remaining claim under the ADA. (Docket No. 48)

ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To prevail, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the opposing party's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Logan v. Denny's, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir.2001).

In determining whether the moving party has met its burden, the court must view the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); McLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). Our function "is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matters asserted, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. OPPCO, LLC, 219 F.3d 547, 551 (6th...