E.E.O.C. v. Preferred Management Corp.

216 F.Supp.2d 763

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. PREFERRED MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a, Preferred Home Health Care, Preferred Medical Care, Inc., Preferred Home Health Care-Vincennes, Inc., d/b/a Preferred Home Health Care-Lafayette, and Preferred Home Health Care-Vincennes, d/b/a Preferred Home Health Care-Vincennes, Defendants.

No. IP98-1697-C-B/S.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

March 1, 2002.

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Jo Ann Farnsworth, Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

Daniel C. Emerson, Bose, McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

ENTRY ON ALL PENDING MOTIONS

BARKER, District Judge.

I. Introduction and Outline.

This is an employment discrimination case involving alleged religious harassment and disparate treatment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The case consists of two categories of claims: "pattern or practice" claims and individual disparate treatment claims. Both categories include allegations of hostile work environment and allegations of job discrimination. More specifically, the complaint alleges that the defendants (collectively known here in the singular as "Preferred") engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct, in that it systematically created or condoned a hostile and abusive work environment based on religion, and systematically engaged in discriminatory employment actions on the basis of religion. It also alleges disparate treatment claims on behalf of seven individual complainants in that Preferred allegedly created or condoned a hostile and abusive work environment based on religion affecting six of the complainants, and unlawfully based specific employment decisions affecting all seven complainants on religious criteria.

The case is before us on defendant's motion for summary judgment as to all claims. We also address here three collateral but significant matters. Two of the collateral issues were raised in Preferred's "Establishment Objections" (which we construe as a motion to strike certain of the EEOC's statements of fact and the evidence upon which they rest) and in the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Preferred's affirmative defenses. The third preliminary issue was raised by Preferred on summary judgment. It alleges that some of the EEOC's claims do not rest on a timely charge of discrimination so that the EEOC's pattern or practice claim is time barred, as is the failure-to-hire claim on behalf of Teresa Raloff. We address these pending motions and related matters here because they are inextricably intertwined with the merits on summary judgment.

Because this case is complicated, we acknowledge that this Entry is long. Accordingly, we provide the following outline in order to facilitate access to its various parts and analyses.

II. Statement of Facts

A. Facts Generally Relevant to All Claims.

B. Facts Pertinent to Individual Claims.

1. Theresa Raloff.

2. Sondra Sievers

a. Facts Pertaining to Religion.

b. Events Leading to Ms. Sievers' Demotion and Discharge.

3. Ellen Blice.

a. Background.

b. Events Leading to Ms. Blice's Termination.

4. Suzanne Elder.

a. Background.

b. Ms. Elder Resigns from Employment.

5. Sherry Stute.

6. Diana DeWester.

7. Mary Mulder.

III. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

B. Preliminary Matters

1. Preferred's "Establishment Objections."

2. Charge Filing Statute of Limitations and Teresa Raloff's Claim

3. EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

C. Hostile Environment and Constructive Discharge.

1. The Law of Hostile Environment.

2. Pattern or Practice.

3. Individual Harassment Claims.

a. Sondra Sievers

b. Ellen Blice

c. Suzanne Elder

d. Sherry Stute

e. Diana DeWester

f. Mary Mulder

4. A Note on Coercion

5. Vicarious Liability versus Negligence

6. Constructive Discharge

D. Individual Disparate Treatment Claims.

1. Legal Analysis

2. Sondra Sievers: Demotion, Discharge, Retaliation.

a. Ms. Sievers' Demotion.

b. Ms. Sievers' Discharge

c. Retaliatory Discharge

3. Ellen Blice

a. Discriminatory Discipline

b. Discriminatory Discharge

i. The Decision Maker

ii. Ms. Blice's Discharge

4. Sherry Stute: Failure to Promote.

IV. Conclusion.

For the reasons explained here, We DENY Preferred's motion for summary judgment except with respect to the EEOC's claim that Ellen Blice was the victim of discriminatory discipline. We construe Preferred's "Establishment Objections" as a motion to strike and DENY that motion. We GRANT the EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment in all particulars, except for its request that we find as a matter of law that PMC is a proper defendant and except for its request that we find admissible all evidence of Preferred's conduct before June 18, 1995 and after July 26, 1996. To the extent that Preferred's arguments concerning statute of limitations may be viewed as a motion separate from its motion for summary judgment, we DENY that motion and conclude that none of the EEOC's claims is barred by any statute of limitations.

II. Statement of Facts

A. Facts Generally Relevant to All Claims.

It is a commonplace of summary judgment jurisprudence that we recite the facts in a light reasonably most favorable to the plaintiff as the party opposing summary judgment and that we resolve all disputes of fact in the plaintiff's favor. These principles are of more than ordinary importance here, because many of the facts, and even the facts' nuances, are hotly contested. Where, as here, the parties advance different theories of the case, they tend to question whether certain facts are even relevant, much less material.

We remind the parties—and particularly the defendant moving for summary judgment —that, since we do not weigh the evidence, we do not seek a "balanced" recitation of the facts. We recite the facts "uniformly favorable" to the non-moving party. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir.1997). Similarly, notwithstanding Preferred's objections to the EEOC's "selective editing" and other literary devices, the EEOC has no duty on summary judgment to be "fair" or "balanced" or "complete" in its presentation of the facts. Fairness is for trials. Summary judgment tests only whether the plaintiff has presented legally sufficient evidence to go to trial. Accordingly, the EEOC's only obligation on defendant's motion for summary judgment is to present admissible evidence tending to raise genuine issues of material fact.

1. The Company and its Management Personnel.

The Preferred companies consist of four operating companies,¹ a real estate company,² and a management company.³ Pl. Add. Facts, ¶ 661. All of the Preferred entities are owned equally by Jackie Steuerwald and Greg Steuerwald (husband and wife). Pl. Add. Facts, ¶ 663. All of the Preferred companies use the same personnel manual, financial policies, and employee benefits. Pl. Add. Facts, ¶ 664. With the exception of Preferred Properties, all of the Preferred entities have the same officers and board of directors. Pl. Add. Facts, ¶ 665. Preferred Management Corporation (hereafter "PMC") provides training for all of the operating companies; it also manages the operating companies' payrolls, finances, information systems, and human resources. Pl. Add. Facts, ¶¶ 667, 667. The defendants here are the Preferred entities that are engaged in operating home health care services. We refer to them collectively throughout as "Preferred."

Michael Pyatt was employed by PMC as Director of Human Resources from October 1994 through 1998. He was a member of the executive management team. He had authority to hire for any position within the company and oversight of all decisions to terminate. He was responsible for all training with respect to personnel. He also participated in creating and reviewing company policies. Pl. Add. Facts ¶¶ 678-683.

Denise Schrock is Preferred's Chief Financial Officer. As CFO, her primary responsibility is the company's fiscal condition and its overall management. She also helps make company policy. Pl. Add. Facts, ¶¶ 684-687.

Diane Christian started as a director of training and development in 1991; she later became the company's Northern Area Administrator. As the Northern Area Administrator, her job duties included visiting the northern branches and meeting with the branch managers to discuss issues in the office such as client load, patient problems, personnel issues and issues in the health care market. In 1995 or 1996, she became Preferred's Chief Nursing Officer, which made her a member of the executive management team. Pl. Add. Facts ¶¶ 688-690.

Ann Parker was Preferred's Southern Area Administrator from some time in 1990 through November 1995. As Southern Area Administrator, she supervised branch managers in the Vincennes, Jasper and Washington offices. Pl. Add. Facts ¶¶ 692, 693.

Teresa Jennings (later Hedges) was promoted to Southern Area Administrator in December 1995. As the Southern Area Administrator, she had authority to hire and fire employees. Pl. Add. Facts ¶¶ 694, 697.

Gregg Johnston was the Director of Program Development at Preferred and was responsible for marketing. Pl. Add. Facts ¶ 698.

Nellie Foster was initially hired as a consultant for Preferred; in January 1996, became a member of the corporate team as a training and development manager. Ms. Foster's previous work experience included working as a minister of Christian education at the Southwest Church of God.

Sue Klein became the interim branch manager for the Vincennes branch in mid-November 1995. After being interviewed by a panel, Darlene Wright sent a summary of the panel's evaluations to Jackie Steuerwald, who decided to promote Ms. Klein to the branch manager position. Ms. Klein had had no managerial experience prior to...