Eam v. State

303 So.3d 962

Melanie EAM, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D19-1035

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[September 16, 2020]

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPhernin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

MAY, J.

The defendant appeals her conviction for second-degree murder with a weapon and sentence of 50 years. She argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We disagree and affirm.

The defendant and victim were involved in a romantic relationship. When the victim told the defendant that he did not love her, she killed him using a butcher knife from his kitchen. The State charged her with second-degree murder with a weapon.

A neighbor's video surveillance showed the defendant's vehicle coming and going from the victim's house on the evening of the stabbing. Afterwards, law enforcement was unable to locate her. The next day, the defendant's cousin contacted a Florida detective ("FL detective") and told him the defendant fled to her aunt's house in Maryland.

The Florida detective and Maryland police confirmed the defendant's location in Maryland and impounded her car. The Maryland police surveilled the aunt's house in unmarked units. Around eleven hours later, the same cousin permitted the detective and a Maryland law enforcement officer to enter the house. The following conversation ensued when the detective encountered the defendant:

FL Detective: I'm not here to arrest you ... I'm here to take your statement. That's it, just to talk to you. And you can just come with me ... to the police station. I promise, my word, we'll bring you back here tonight.

Defendant: Am I gonna be provided a lawyer before I say anything?

FL Detective: Are you gonna be -- we're not gonna provide you one. You're just gonna come to the station and talk with me ... that's voluntary ... you're not under arrest.

FL Detective: This is your opportunity to give your side of the story or explanation of what happened ... you wanna talk here. We can talk here.

Defendant: I am allowed to be provided with a lawyer.

FL Detective: You could have retained an attorney – all the time, you could have retained ... of course you could have ... why would you need an attorney? Don't you need to explain what happened?

FL Detective: This is your opportunity cause you're not gonna get another opportunity most likely ... you know what an attorney would tell you to do. He won't let you explain yourself. This is your opportunity right now.

Because the defendant did not want to leave the house, the Florida detective conducted the interview at the kitchen table—in the presence of the defendant's two cousins. He recorded the 34-minute interview on his iPhone. During the recorded interview, the defendant confessed to stabbing the victim and gave the FL detective a t-shirt she wore the night of the stabbing.

After the interview, the Florida detective asked if the defendant felt "like [she] was under arrest and wasn't free to leave?" She stated she "was not sure what to expect," and continued to converse with the detective. The defendant expressed she felt "very comfortable ... more comfortable than I had expected."

The defendant moved to suppress the confession and evidence derived from it, arguing the statements occurred during a custodial interrogation without Miranda¹ warnings. The defendant argued the Florida detective also denied her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he continued to interview her after she unequivocally requested an attorney.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the defendant argued for the first time that the Florida detective "misstated the law to coerce [her] into speaking." The State responded it was a non-custodial interrogation because the Florida detective:

• did not place the defendant under arrest;

• expressly told her multiple times she was not under arrest;

• interviewed her in the presence of her two cousins;

• accepted her refusal to go to the police station;

• conducted the voluntary interview in a polite and short manner; and

• did not aggressively confront her.

The State further reasoned that the surveillance officers did not stop other cars entering and exiting the area or the defendant's family members, including the cousin, who entered and exited the house during the surveillance.

The Florida detective testified that he did not read the defendant Miranda warnings because they were unnecessary. He did not believe the defendant had a right to have an attorney present because this was a non-custodial interview. He testified that no one asked him to stop the interview or leave. Had anyone done so, he would have left.

The defendant and cousin testified they did not feel free to leave the house before the Florida detective arrived because the Maryland police seized the defendant's car and sat outside of the house in unmarked cars all day. But the defendant acknowledged she could have found other modes of transportation.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court found the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were not implicated because she was not subject to a custodial interrogation under Ramirez v. State , 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999). The court found the Florida detective's statement—that an attorney would advise the defendant not to speak or that she "most likely" would not have the opportunity to explain the story again—did not rise to a material misstatement of law.

At trial, the court admitted and played the recorded interview. Among other evidence was the recording of the defendant's car at the victim's home on the evening of the murder, the victim's blood found in the defendant's car, and the defendant's cell phone found at the victim's home. The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree murder with a weapon. The trial court adjudicated her guilty and sentenced her to 50 years in prison. From her conviction and sentence, the defendant now appeals.

The defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because she was: 1) subjected to a custodial interrogation; 2) not advised of her Miranda rights; and 3) denied her Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The State responds the defendant was not in custody when interviewed by the Florida detective and therefore not entitled to Miranda rights or counsel. Even if the trial court erred, the State argues any error was harmless. The threshold inquiry is whether the defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation.

"A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of fact and law." Bannister v. State , 132 So. 3d 267, 274–75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting State v. R.R. , 90 So. 3d 919, 921 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ). "When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress an incriminating statement, an appellate court accords a presumption of correctness to the trial court's factual findings, but independently reviews mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues." Id. at 275 (quoting State v. Jackson , 120 So. 3d 88, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ). We have de novo review of legal conclusions. Id .

"Both the United States and Florida Constitutions provide that persons shall not be ‘compelled’ to be witnesses against themselves in any criminal matter." Id. (quoting Murdock v. State , 115 So. 3d 1050, 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ). To protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during a custodial interrogation, that person must be informed of his or her Miranda rights, including the "right to remain silent, that any statement [made] may be used as evidence against him [or her], and [the] right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see also Bannister , 132 So. 3d at 275.

Miranda warnings, however, "apply only if an individual is in custody and subject to interrogation." Senser v. State , 243 So. 3d 1003, 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (emphasis added). If the interrogation is non-custodial, an officer does not need to give Miranda warnings. Bannister , 132 So. 3d at 275. Nor is the officer required to provide a lawyer on the individual's request or stop questioning. Caldwell v. State , 41 So. 3d 188, 198 (Fla. 2010).

"A person is in custody if a reasonable person placed in the same position would believe that his or her freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with actual arrest ." Ramirez , 739 So. 2d at 573 (emphasis added). This determination requires the consideration of:

(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; (4) whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to leave the place of questioning.

Id. at 574 (citing State v. Countryman , 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997) ).

1. The Manner in Which Police Summoned the Suspect for Questioning.

The defendant argues that "just because an interrogation occurs in a suspect's home does not mean the interrogation could never be regarded as ‘custodial.’ " Lee v. State , 988 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla 1st DCA 2008). We agree, but "the location of the interview is a factor that supports a trial court's conclusion that the defendant is not in custody." Bannister , 132 So. 3d at 276 (quoting Snead v. State , 913 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) ).

"In those instances where an in-home interrogation was found to have escalated past the level of ‘custodial,’ the interviewing officers typically either exhibited an overwhelming show of authority or confronted the defendant with contraband so indicative of guilt that a suspect would feel there is enough evidence to be arrested." Bannister , 132 So. 3d at 276.

Here, the trial court found:

The first and second factors for consideration under Ramirez are

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