Earls v. Forga Contracting, Inc.

ANGELA EARLS, Plaintiff, v. FORGA CONTRACTING, INC. andWILLIAM SCOTT FORGA, Defendants.

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:19-cv-00190-MR-WCM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA ASHEVILLE DIVISION

June 8, 2020

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees [Doc. 14].

I. BACKGROUND

On June 6, 2019, the Plaintiff Angela Earls (the "Plaintiff") brought this action against Forga Contracting, Inc. ("FCI") and its sole owner, William Forga ("Forga" and collectively the "Defendants"), asserting claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act ("NCWHA"), N.C. Gen. Stat. §§95.25.1 et seq.; the North Carolina Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act ("REDA"), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-241 et seq.; and North Carolina Public Policy. [Doc. 1].

The Defendants were served on July 22, 2019, and the Plaintiff filed affidavits of service with the Court on July 30, 2019. [Docs. 3, 4]. On September 24, 2019, the Plaintiff moved for Entry of Default against the Defendants for failing to plead or otherwise defend this action. [Doc. 5]. On the same date, the Clerk entered a default against the Defendants. [Doc. 6]. On December 12, 2019, the Court entered an Order instructing the Plaintiff to file an appropriate motion or otherwise take further action with respect to the Defendants. [Doc. 7]. On December 26, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment [Doc. 8]. The Court held a hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion on March 12, 2020.

On March 30, 2020, the Court entered a default judgment against FCI in the amount of $150,571.56 under the REDA and jointly and severally against FCI and Forga in the amount of $3,168.14 under the NCWHA and the FLSA. [Doc. 11 at 28-29]. The Court denied the Plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees without prejudice because she provided no evidence to support her request. [Id. at 29]. On April 16, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees. [Doc. 14].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The starting point for establishing the proper amount of an award is the number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourlyrate." Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1994). The burden is on the fee applicant to justify the reasonableness of the requested fee. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984).

In exercising its discretion in the application of this lodestar method, the Court is guided by the following factors:

(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.

Grissom v. The Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 321 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1402 n.18 (4th Cir. 1987)).

"Although the Court considers all of the factors, they need not be strictly applied in every case inasmuch as all of the factors are not always applicable." Firehouse Restaurant Group, Inc. v. Scurmont, LLC, No. 4:09-cv-00618-RBH, 2011 WL 4943889, at *12 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2011) (citing EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs under the REDA, the NCWHA, and the FLSA. [Doc. 14 at 1]. The Plaintiff asserts that she incurred 83.5 hours on this case. [Doc. 14 at 4]. Of those hours, the Plaintiff claims that attorney Jason Chestnut incurred 75.20 hours at $295 per hour and 12.20 hours at $275 per hour and attorney Craig L. Leis incurred 7.1 hours at $450 per hour and 1.2 hours at $425 per hour. [Id.; Doc. 14-1 at ¶¶ 16, 19]. As such, the Plaintiff requests $25,705 in fees. [Doc. 14 at 2]. Of those fees, the Plaintiff estimates that $2,410 fees were incurred exclusively in pursuit of the REDA claim, which the Court found was violated by FCI, not Forga. [Id. at 4 n.1]. The balance of the fees arises from the pursuit of all of the claims, which are interrelated.

A. Attorneys' Fees

The Plaintiff is entitled attorneys' fees under the FLSA, which provides that when a plaintiff prevails a court "shall . . . allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Plaintiff also can obtain attorneys' fees under the NCWHA, which provides that when a plaintiff prevails a court "may, in addition to any judgment awarded plaintiff, order costs and fees of the action and reasonable attorneys' fees to be paid by the defendant." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.22. The Plaintiff also can get attorneys'fees under REDA, which provides that when a plaintiff prevails a "court may award to the plaintiff and assess against the defendant the reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-243. As such, an award of attorneys' fees is warranted here. Accordingly, the lone remaining question is whether the fees requested by the Plaintiff are reasonable. To make that determination, the Court applies the factors laid out by the Fourth Circuit. See Grissom, 549 F.3d at 321.

1. Time and Labor Expended

The Plaintiff's attorneys incurred 83.5 hours on this case. [Doc. 14 at 4]. That time was expended effectuating service of process on the Defendants, securing entry of default against the Defendants, seeking default judgment against the Defendants, and attending the hearing held by the Court on the Motion for Default Judgment. [See Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 7]. The Court has carefully reviewed the billing records submitted by the Plaintiff and finds that the time expended by her attorneys attempting service of process on the Defendants, seeking an entry of default against the Defendants, and securing a default judgment against the Defendants was necessary and reasonable. [Id. at 9-34]. As such, this factor weighs in favor of the reasonableness of the requested fee.

2. Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Raised

This case required the Plaintiff's attorneys to establish the Plaintiff's entitlement to a default judgment on three separate claims with three separate bodies of relevant case law. The questions presented by those claims, however, should not have been particularly difficult for the Plaintiff's attorneys, who attest that they regularly handle employment cases. [Doc. 14-1 at ¶¶ 2-6]. As such, this factor neither weighs in favor or against the reasonableness of the requested fee award.

3. Skill Required to Properly Perform the Legal Services

As discussed above, the questions presented by this case should not have been particularly challenging for attorneys experienced in employment cases. Nevertheless, the Defendants' unwillingness to waive service or enter an appearance in this matter forced the Plaintiff's attorneys to spend time and effort exhausting avenues for service of process and documenting those efforts to secure entry of default. While performing those actions does not take significant skill, properly documenting those actions to ensure that default will be entered does require some skill. As such, this factor neither weighs in favor or against the reasonableness of the requested fee award.

4. Opportunity Costs of Litigation

The Plaintiff's attorneys contend that the demands of this litigation prevented them from devoting time to other matters. [Doc. 14 at 8; Dog. 14-1 at ¶ 12]. Under the relevant factors, an "attorneys' opportunity costs include the higher rates they would have otherwise charged in other cases and projects." Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Worthington Cylinders Wis., LLC, 747 F. Supp. 2d 568, 596 (W.D.N.C. 2010). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the reasonableness of the requested award.

5. Customary Fee for Similar Work

The Plaintiff requests rates of $275 and $290 per hour for Jason Chestnut and $425 and $450 per hour for Craig L. Leis. [Doc. 4 at 14]. To support that request, the Plaintiff submits declarations from several employment-law attorneys who practice in this District. [Doc. 14-1 at 36-69; Doc. 14-2]. According to those declarations, rates for senior employment-law attorneys in this District are between $325 and $800 per hour and rates for associate employment-law attorneys are between $200 and $400 per hour. [Id.].

As the Fourth Circuit has recognized:

Determination of the hourly rate will generally be the critical inquiry in setting the reasonable fee, and the burden rests with the fee applicant to establish the reasonableness of a requested rate. In addition to theattorney's own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award. Although the determination of a market rate in the legal profession is inherently problematic, as wide variations in skill and reputation render the usual laws of supply and demand largely inapplicable, the Court has nonetheless emphasized that market rate should guide the fee inquiry.

Robinson v. Equifax Info. Svcs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990)). In addition to consideration of specific evidence regarding the prevailing market rate, the Court may rely upon its own knowledge and experience of the relevant market in determining a reasonable rate. See ...