Eason v. State

SPENCER MARTIN EASON v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 808-2020

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

October 6, 2021

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 119241013

Graeff, Beachley, Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION ^[*]

Eyler James R., J.

A jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, convicted Spencer Martin Eason, appellant, of robbery, second-degree assault, theft of property valued between $100 and $1, 500, and three counts of conspiracy to commit each of those offenses. The court sentenced appellant to a term of three years' incarceration for robbery and a concurrent term of three years for conspiracy to commit robbery. The court merged the remaining convictions for sentencing purposes. Appellant timely appealed and presents two questions for our review, which we have rephrased slightly, as follows:^[1]

I. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by ruling that if he elected to testify, appellant's prior robbery conviction would be admissible to impeach his credibility?

II. Was the evidence sufficient to support appellant's conspiracy convictions?

We hold that the first issue is not preserved for appellate review. We further conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain appellant's conspiracy convictions, and shall, therefore, affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND^[2]

At or around 12:45 p.m. on April 7, 2019, Albert Thornton, the victim in this case, was riding his purple Huffy bicycle in the 4000 block of Rogers Avenue. When he pulled over to the side of the road to make a telephone call, Mr. Thornton was approached by a group consisting of three men and three women. One of the women requested a cigarette, but Mr. Thornton refused.

Although the group initially passed Mr. Thornton without incident, two members thereof, later identified as Andre Raymond and appellant, made an about-face, walked past Mr. Thornton, and attacked him from behind. Mr. Thornton testified that the hoods of Mr. Raymond's and appellant's jackets were initially "relaxed and hanging down" behind their heads. When Mr. Thornton looked back and saw the men running toward him, however, they had pulled the hoods over their heads in an apparent attempt to obscure their faces. One of the men instructed the other to kick Mr. Thornton's bicycle out from beneath him. They then "shoved," "pushed," and "hit" him. Although Mr. Thornton attempted to defend himself, he was ultimately overpowered. Mr. Thornton fell to the ground, whereupon Mr. Raymond and appellant commenced kicking him. While Mr. Raymond stole Mr. Thornton's bicycle, appellant rifled through his pockets, relieved him of his wallet and a pack of cigarettes, and proclaimed: "[J]ackpot, I got his wallet." Mr. Thornton managed to stand and run to the curb where Mr. Raymond and appellant "jumped on [him] again." Following the fray, Mr. Raymond and appellant fled the scene, the former on Mr. Thornton's bicycle and the latter on foot.

Mr. Thornton began to give chase but was stopped by a nearby resident who dissuaded him from doing so. After calling 911, Mr. Thornton flagged down Baltimore City Police Officer Travis Ryckman, who was on routine patrol nearby. Officer Ryckman observed cuts and abrasions to Mr. Thornton's right cheek, left thigh, and knuckles. Mr. Thornton reported the robbery to Officer Ryckman and provided him with descriptions of the assailants and his stolen bicycle. Officer Ryckman broadcast descriptions of the suspects to other officers who were responding to the scene. While preparing to transport Mr. Thornton to the City Wide Robbery Unit ("the Robbery Unit"), Officer Ryckman learned that fellow patrol officers had apprehended one of the suspects, later identified as Mr. Raymond, riding Mr. Thornton's bicycle in the vicinity of Rogers and Wabash Avenues. En route to the Robbery Unit, Officer Ryckman stopped at that location, where Mr. Thornton positively identified Mr. Raymond as one of his assailants.

Mr. Thornton and Mr. Raymond were interviewed by Detective Evan Zimrin. Based on those interviews, Detective Zimrin developed appellant as a person of interest and generated a photographic array featuring appellant and five other individuals who resembled him. Employing a double-blind procedure, Detective Marvin Gross administered that photo array to Mr. Thornton, who identified appellant as his second assailant.

Mr. Raymond testified that he and appellant had committed the acts that were the subject of the charges.

We will include additional facts as necessary to our resolution of the issues.

DISCUSSION

I.

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the State permission to impeach his credibility with a 2019 robbery conviction, thereby purportedly preventing him from testifying in his own defense. The State responds that appellant's claim is unpreserved because he did not testify at trial. Alternatively, the State maintains that the court properly weighed the probative value of appellant's prior conviction against the danger of unfair prejudice.

A. The Relevant Record

At the close of the State's case-in-chief, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal. After denying that motion, the court asked whether appellant wished to testify. Defense counsel answered, "Well, if I could advise him, Your Honor. I don't think he does, but …." He then advised appellant of his right to testify as well as the risks and benefits of doing so. As is pertinent here, defense counsel cautioned him:

[I]f you do testify, if you have a conviction in your prior record that may be raised as questions about whether you're able to tell the truth. The judge could decide whether to allow that conviction in or not. Now in your case, the only conviction that you have is one that is exactly like the charge that you're facing today. So I don't know that the [c]ourt would allow that in[.]

The court then asked whether it was the prosecution's position that appellant's 2019 robbery conviction constituted an impeachable offense. The State answered in the affirmative. Defense counsel argued that because the prior conviction was identical to an offense for which appellant was on trial, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of that conviction. The State responded that a curative instruction could mitigate any such danger. When ruling on the admissibility of appellant's prior conviction, the court expressly addressed each of the requirements set forth in Maryland Rule 5-609(a)^[3] and considered each of the factors enumerated in Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705 (1995).^[4] The court reasoned:

All right. The question before the [c]ourt is whether [appellant], if he chooses to testify[, ] can be cross-examined, impeached based on a prior robbery conviction from January 4, 2019. Maryland rules, Md. Rule 5-609 5-609(b). This conviction is within the last 15 years. So it is within the expressed provisions of the rule. Hasn't been reversed or anything along those lines. It certainly is for a crime that is relevant to the witness'[s] credibility. Robbery certainly is th[at] type of offense because of the theft nature of it that would go directly to a witness'[s] credibility. So the final step would be … to determine whether the probative value [of] the prior conviction outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party. As part of weighing the probative value versus the danger of unfair prejudice, the [c]ourt has to consider four factors. The first is the impeachment value [of] the prior crime. Second, the period between the prior conviction and the impeachment. The similarity between the prior crime and the conduct at issue in the instant case. And the importance of the witness'[s] testimony and credibility.

As to factor one is the impeachment value of the prior crime. The impeachment value here is extremely high. This is a robbery conviction and again, that is the type of offense in which impeachment, the impeachment value of a prior robbery conviction is very high[. A]s to the period between a prior conviction and the impeachment [taking] just a little over a year. So that also would weigh heavily in the State's favor. Again, the rule allows anything within the past 15 years. It might be a different story if we're talking about this conviction being ten, twelve years ago. But this conviction is just a little over a year old.

As to the similarity between a prior crime and [the] conduct at issue in the instant case, it's the exact same charge. [Appellant] is facing a robbery charge in the current trial and this is a robbery conviction from just over a year ago. So there is a substantial similarity.

Now, [defense counsel] has argued that the similarity goes to the unfair prejudice to [appellant], but the [c]ourt respectfully disagrees and I think that weighs in favor of the State because of the similarities between that and certainly as [the State] has argued, an instruction to the jury as to what they can take this prior conviction into account for would address any prejudice.

Finally, the importance of the witness'[s] testimony and credibility. This is basically because as [defense counsel] has argued throughout the course of this trial, there is no physical evidence here. There's no video of what happened. No CCT footage. This is basically the statement of the victim and the [c]o-[d]efendant against [appellant]'s testimony. So the importance of his testimony and his credibility is extremely high. For all of those reasons, the [c]ourt exercises its discretion and finds that a prior robbery conviction from January 4, 2019[, ] would be the subject of impeachment if [appellant] were to testify. Obviously, it would simply be the name of the crime and the date of the

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