Easter v. State

LEAH RENEA EASTER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 05-19-00398-CR

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

June 23, 2020

On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court Kaufman County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 18-10653-86-F

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Osborne, Partida-Kipness, and Pedersen, III

Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III

Appellant Leah Renea Easter was charged with the offense of evading arrest or detention while using a vehicle. A jury found her guilty and sentenced her to two years in prison. Appellant raises four issues on appeal. She complains that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. She asserts the trial court erred by not conducting a formal competency hearing and by denying her request for a jury charge instruction on spoliation of evidence. She also asserts that Kaufman County law enforcement erred by failing to properly record and preserve a dash cam video. We affirm.

Background

Kaufman County Sheriff's Deputy Danny Howard stopped at a gas station to use the restroom. As he walked out of the station, he noticed a car without a registration sticker. He got into his patrol vehicle, called dispatch to run the license plate number, and followed the car out of the parking lot. Upon learning that the car's license plates were expired, he activated the lights and siren on his patrol SUV to perform a traffic stop. However, appellant (the driver) did not stop her car.

Deputy Howard followed appellant for five to seven miles. He was directly behind her vehicle, in broad daylight, on a clear day. He could tell that she was aware that he was behind her with his lights and siren on. There were several places where she could have safely pulled off the road. Deputy Howard noted three or four church parking lots and another gas station. Nevertheless, appellant continued driving. She did not speed or drive recklessly. She maintained a speed at or below the posted speed limit at all times. However, because appellant did not pull over and stop her car, and because they were approaching the county line, Deputy Howard called dispatch to report a pursuit.

After about ten minutes, appellant turned into a driveway, drove through an automatic gate, stopped her car, and got out. As Deputy Howard followed her car, the gate began closing. He instructed appellant to get back in her car and pull up so he could drive through the gate. Appellant followed his instructions. She then got out of her car holding a bag and other items in her hands. Deputy Howard pulled hisgun and approached appellant, demanding that she drop what was in her hands. When he asked why she refused to stop, appellant told him she feared for her life. She also refused to identify herself. Perceiving there was no danger, Deputy Howard holstered his weapon, handcuffed appellant, and placed her in his vehicle. Sergeant Maynard and another patrol deputy arrived shortly thereafter to assist Deputy Howard.

During the investigation, a gentleman walked up to talk to officers. He refused to identify himself, but he told officers that appellant had psychiatric problems. While searching appellant's car, officers found a Wyoming identification card that identified appellant as Leah Renea Easter. When dispatch confirmed that appellant had four outstanding traffic warrants, she was arrested and taken to jail.

Appellant was indicted for the offense of evading arrest or detention while using a vehicle. A jury found appellant guilty and assessed a punishment of two years in prison. This appeal followed.

Discussion

A. Evading Arrest or Detention While Using a Vehicle

Appellant first contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction for evading arrest or detention while using a vehicle. Appellant argues that the primary policy consideration of the evading arrest statute is to encourage suspects to yield to a show of authority by law enforcement. She contends that by stopping immediately upon getting to her residence, she yielded to the show ofauthority by the officer in this case. Therefore, according to appellant, she did not commit the offense of evading arrest or detention while using a vehicle. And she further contends there is no evidence that she did so.

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Johnson v. State, 560 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We defer to the trier of fact to "fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if she intentionally flees from a person she knows is a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain her and uses a vehicle while she is in flight. TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04. Thus, the State was required to prove that appellant was: (1) intentionally, (2) fleeing, (3) from a person, (4) she knew was a peace officer, (5) attempting to lawfully arrest or detain her, and (6) she used a vehicle while in flight. See Jackson v. State, Nos. 05-15-00414-CR, 05-15-00415-CR, 2016 WL 4010067, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A person "flees" by giving anything less than prompt compliance with an officer's direction to stop. Lopez v. State, 415 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—San Antonio2013, no pet.) (quoting Horne v. State, 228 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)). The fact that a defendant caused only a slow-speed chase does not free that defendant from culpability. Perry v. State, No. 02-19-00262-CR, 2020 WL 479590, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2020, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Speed, distance, and duration are all factors in determining whether a defendant intentionally fled. However, "no particular speed, distance, or duration is required to show the requisite intent if other evidence establishes such intent." Griego v. State, 345 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) "The statute does not require high-speed fleeing, or even effectual fleeing." Mayfield v. State, 219 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). "[F]leeing slowly is still fleeing." Lopez, 415 S.W.3d at 497.

In this case, the evidence established that Deputy Howard followed appellant for five to seven miles with his lights and siren activated. Evidence that a peace officer is asserting authority and attempting to arrest or detain an individual includes the use of emergency lights and sirens. King v. State, No. 01-18-00335-CR, 2019 WL 5432053, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 24, 2019, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Deputy Howard testified that he could tell from the way appellant kept looking in her rear view mirror that she knew he was behind her and she knew he had activated his lights and siren. Appellant does not argue that she did not know that Deputy Howard was following her. Nevertheless, she continued driving past several locations where she could have safely pulled over andstopped her car. Appellant suggests that because she was not speeding or driving recklessly, she was not evading arrest. However, she did not promptly comply with Deputy Howard's direction to stop her car, and "fleeing slowly is still fleeing." Lopez, 415 S.W.3d at 497.

When Deputy Howard asked appellant why she did not stop her car, she said she feared for her life. However, the fact that appellant provided an explanation for fleeing does not negate or supersede her intent to evade the authority of a peace officer. See Perry, 2020 WL 479590, at *5. Deputy Howard testified that she did not appear to be afraid. He also confirmed that appellant did not call 911 to report that she was being followed and was afraid to pull over.

We conclude that the jury could rationally infer from the evidence that appellant was intentionally fleeing from Deputy Howard because she knew that Deputy Howard was a peace officer who was attempting to lawfully arrest or detain her. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Therefore, the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction, and her first issue is overruled.

B. Trial to Determine Incompetency

In her second issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred by not conducting a formal competency exam hearing after defense counsel notified the trial court that he had questions about appellant's competency. She also argues the trial court erred by not ensuring that she understood the full nature of the State's last-minute pleaoffer. The State challenges appellant's second issue as multifarious, inadequately briefed, and not preserved for appeal.

Appellant's competency and her understanding of the State's plea offer were topics of much discussion by the trial court and defense counsel. However, the record reveals that appellant failed to specifically object to the trial court's failure (1) to hold a trial to determine whether appellant was incompetent to stand trial, and (2) to ensure appellant understood the State's plea offer. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (To preserve error, appellant must present to the trial court a timely, specific objection and obtain an adverse ruling.). Even if appellant had raised these specific objections to the trial court, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

We review the facts surrounding the trial court's implied decision not to hold a competency hearing for an abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Gray v. State, 257 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref'd). "A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with...