Eaton v. Estabrook

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JERE EATON, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN ESTABROOK and CITY OF STAMFORD, Defendants.

No. 3:21-CV-324 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

January 26, 2023

RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SARALA V. NAGALA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Jere Eaton brought this civil rights action against the City of Stamford (the “City”) and Steven Estabrook, a police officer employed by the City (together with the City “Defendants”), alleging that Estabrook shoved her to the ground when responding to another officer's call for assistance during a protest. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, contending that Estabrook did not violate federal or state law and that, even if he did, he is protected by qualified immunity under federal law and governmental immunity under Connecticut state law. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that there are genuine disputes of fact material to the question of whether Estabrook used excessive force when shoving Plaintiff to the ground. The Court also concludes, however, that federal qualified immunity shields Estabrook from liability, and that Connecticut state law immunities shield both Defendants from liability. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The record contains the following facts, which are undisputed except when noted. On August 8, 2020, there was a protest in Stamford, Connecticut, called “Justice for Steven Barrier,” after an individual who died after being taken into police custody in Stamford in October of 2019 Pl.'s Local Rule (“L. R.”) 56(a)2 Statement (“St.”), ECF No. 25-5, ¶ 2; Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 9; Ans., ECF No. 9, ¶ 9. Captain Diedrich Hohn, employed by the City's police department for twenty-six years, was responsible for “monitoring” the protest and overseeing police units under his command during it. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 1-2, 4. Hohn met with the leaders of the protest before it began and understood that the protest would end at the police headquarters. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff, who is a community leader in Stamford, represents that she had discussions with Hohn about how she would be “assisting law enforcement with the handling of the protesters,” while participating in the protest. Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts, ECF No. 25-5 at 12-13, ¶¶ 1-2. Estabrook, a patrol officer employed by the City's police department for five years, was assigned to cover the protest. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 3.

Throughout the protest, the protesters directed much of their ire at the police officers, yelled insults at them, taunted them, and pushed them. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff herself observed that the protesters employed “horrible” language at “a very loud decibel.” Id. ¶ 18. Although police officers stopped vehicular traffic to allow the protesters to walk on the street, several protesters “were observed knocking on car windows and placing flyers on the windshields of the cars.” Id. ¶ 9. At one point, while the protest passed a restaurant, protesters entered the outside dining area and began “harassing” customers. Id. ¶ 10. Estabrook observed some of this conduct throughout the day. See id. ¶ 40.

When the protest reached the police headquarters, which Hohn understood to be the predesignated endpoint, approximately fifty protesters decided to continue the protest by walking the wrong way down the one-way street past the police station-blocking vehicular traffic on the street in the process. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff was among this group of protesters. Id. ¶ 17.

At this point, the protest became “loud” and “chaotic.” Id. ¶ 31. The police officers asked the protesters to move the protest onto the sidewalk to allow vehicular traffic to pass, but the protesters refused. Id. ¶ 20. Defendants represent that the protesters became “uncontrollable and aggressive” and began to outnumber the police officers at the scene. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St., ECF No. 21-1, ¶¶ 25-27. Although Plaintiff disputes that characterization of the facts, Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 25-27, video footage from the body cameras of several police officers present at the scene demonstrates that the tension between the police officers and the protesters was unmistakably growing. Plaintiff does not dispute that she heard the officers repeatedly telling protesters to “get back” and that they would be arrested if they did not get back on the sidewalk. Id. ¶¶ 30, 32. Plaintiff asserts that she did not back up or move to the sidewalk, however, because she was tasked with assisting law enforcement officers with handling the protestors. Id. ¶ 33; Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶ 2. The video footage from the body camera of a police officer at the scene supports Plaintiff's statement of the facts on this point: she can be seen standing between the agitated protesters and the police officers, stretching one hand toward each group and attempting to appease both. Nevertheless, the protesters did not disperse or move onto the sidewalk as directed by the police officers. See Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 19, 32.

Then, Hohn and another police officer at the scene, Lieutenant Nolo, called a Code 30, the most urgent of three possible police codes. Id. ¶¶ 28, 36. A Code One requires a routine response; a Code Two requires an urgent response; and a Code Three requires an emergency response.^[1] Id. ¶ 34. A Code Three is “rarely called and is a very serious call.” Id. ¶ 35. Hohn called a Code 30 “because he was concerned about officer safety.” Id.

At the time Hohn and Nolo called the Code 30, Estabrook was blocking vehicular traffic at an intersection down the street from the protest. Id. ¶ 38. Upon hearing the Code 30, Estabrook understood that he had to act “immediately” to get to the calling officer and help him. Id. ¶¶ 4142. He represents that, upon exiting his patrol vehicle, he saw “a large group of people yelling and screaming,” and they “appeared to be surrounding” Hohn and the other police officers. Defs.' L. R. 56(a)1 St. ¶ 44. He ran toward the group of protesters and “pressed” through the crowd, but his path to Hohn was blocked by two men, one of whom was six feet, four inches tall. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Estabrook attests that he did not see Plaintiff at this point. Id. ¶ 51. He contends that he “pushed” the two men to gain access to Hohn and that, when those two men fell, he saw Plaintiff fall as well because she had been standing behind one of the men. Id. ¶¶ 47-49. Thus, Estabrook contends that he “may have collided” with Plaintiff as a result of him pushing the two men out of his path, but he did not see Plaintiff prior to that collision. Id. ¶¶ 50-51.

Plaintiff disputes this characterization of the collision. She asserts that, once Estabrook reached the crowd of protesters, he immediately pushed one of the two men and then shoved her, causing her to fall to the ground. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 46-47; Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff also points to Estabrook's body camera video footage, in which she claims she is “visible” to Estabrook before he struck her. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 54. Plaintiff represents that she has sustained injuries to her head and back and experienced pain and emotional distress as a result of Estabrook's actions. Pl.'s St. of Suppl. Facts ¶¶ 41-42. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was never detained or arrested. Pl.'s L. R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 56-57.

In March of 2021, Plaintiff filed the present action against Defendants, alleging six claims: (1) excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Estabrook; (2) common law assault and battery against Estabrook; (3) common law recklessness against Estabrook; (4) common law negligence against Estabrook; (5) municipal liability pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n against the City arising from Estabrook's conduct; and (6) municipal liability pursuant to § 52-577n against the City arising from Hohn's violation of ministerial duties. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, in relevant part, that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” With respect to materiality, a fact is “material” only if a dispute over it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). With respect to genuineness, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court “must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute will be satisfied if the movant can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears an initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. A movant, however, “need not prove a...