Echavarria v. Roach

ANGEL ECHAVARRIA, Plaintiff, v. J. MICHAEL ROACH et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16-cv-11118-ADB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

September 7, 2017

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

BURROUGHS, D.J.

Plaintiff Angel Echavarria brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I, and Massachusetts state common law, alleging that Defendants, current and former officers of the Lynn Police Department and the Massachusetts State Police, and the City of Lynn, violated his civil rights by engaging in unlawful conduct during an investigation that led to his wrongful conviction for murder. Currently pending before the Court are seven motions to dismiss filed by Defendants John Hollow and the City of Lynn; Joseph Rowe; Michael Cooney; John Garvin; Norman Zuk; Russell Gokas, Raymond Guillermo, Charles Luise, and John Scannell; and J. Michael Roach [ECF Nos. 44, 51, 54, 56, 58, 71, 78]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motions in part and denies them in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint, the allegations of which are taken as true for purposes of evaluating the motions to dismiss. See Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014).

In January 1994, Daniel Rodriguez was shot and killed in an apartment in Lynn, Massachusetts. Daniel¹ was a drug dealer, and the apartment where he was killed was known as a place where people could buy drugs. On the night of the murder, Daniel and his brother, Isidoro Rodriguez, arrived at the apartment where they discovered two armed men holding several people hostage inside the apartment. The men tied Isidoro up with a phone cord and put him in a bedroom; Isidoro was not harmed during the incident. The men took Daniel to the bathroom, where he was shot in the head.

Later that night, Defendants² presented Isidoro with two photo arrays, and both times, Isidoro identified Mariano Bonifacio as one of the killers. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not record this identification in their reports and instead sought to discredit the identification. Plaintiff claims that Defendants were aware that Bonifacio could have been one of the perpetrators because, a few weeks before Daniel's murder, he was arrested for an attempted murder with a similar modus operandi that occurred within half a mile of the apartment where Daniel was murdered. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants withheld information about Bonifacio from Plaintiff which he could have used in his defense.

More than a week after Daniel's murder, Plaintiff was at a barbershop in Lynn with his friend Juan Rodriguez when Isidoro approached Plaintiff and asked his name. Plaintiff did not know Isidoro, but the two exchanged pleasantries, and Isidoro then left the barbershop. Later that day, Plaintiff and Rodriguez were eating dinner at a restaurant in Lynn when they were approached by Defendants, who asked Plaintiff and Rodriguez to step outside. Once outside, Defendants asked Plaintiff and Rodriguez if they had been involved in Daniel's murder. They both denied any involvement in or knowledge of the crime. Defendants took down Plaintiff andRodriguez's personal information and allowed them to leave. The next morning, Defendants arrested Plaintiff for Daniel's murder. They informed Plaintiff that Isidoro had identified him as one of Daniel's killers. Rodriguez was also accused of the crime.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants manufactured a false identification from Isidoro, and that they wrote false police reports intentionally misrepresenting the identification. Plaintiff also claims that the photo array and live lineup where Isidoro identified Plaintiff were unduly suggestive. Plaintiff asserts that Isidoro had previously provided a description of the perpetrator that did not match Plaintiff, and furthermore, that Isidoro had cognitive limitations, a language barrier, and was intoxicated by drugs. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants ignored evidence that Plaintiff was not involved in the crime, including that there was no evidence found at the crime scene or at Plaintiff's house that would connect Plaintiff to the murder and that Plaintiff had an alibi and multiple witnesses could verify that he was at home with family and friends in Lynn.

A year after the murder, Defendants visited Gary Sevinor in prison. Sevinor was allegedly present in the apartment at the time of Daniel's murder, but the police reports drafted near the time of the crime did not identify him as a witness. Defendants presented Sevinor with a photo array and he identified Plaintiff as one of Daniel's killers. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used unduly suggestive techniques to convince Sevinor to falsely implicate Plaintiff. Sevinor's identification was introduced as evidence in Plaintiff's trial.

In 1996, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to life in prison; Rodriguez was acquitted. Plaintiff spent more than 21 years in prison. In April 2015, a Massachusetts Superior Court ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.³ In June 2015, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts entered anolle prosequi, dropping all charges against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his right to due process (Count I); malicious prosecution (Count II); conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights (Count III); and failure to intervene (Count IV), and under Massachusetts state common law for malicious prosecution (Count V); negligence (Count VI); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII); negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VIII); civil conspiracy (Count X); respondeat superior (Count XI); and indemnification (Count XII). In addition, he brings a claim for a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11I (Count IX).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

To evaluate a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must "accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the pleader's favor." A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 2011)). The complaint must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and should "contain 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "To cross the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable, but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability." Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A determination of plausibility is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewingcourt to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Id. at 44 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). "[T]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible." Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011)).

"The plausibility standard invites a two-step pavane." Maddox, 732 F.3d at 80. First, the Court "must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited)." Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). Secondly, the Court "must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a 'reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz, 676 F.3d at 224).

B. Sufficiency of the Allegations

1. Individual Defendants

The individual defendants argue that the complaint is insufficient because it fails to state which particular defendant is alleged to have committed which specific act. Plaintiff concedes that he has not identified the role of each defendant, but argues that he has sufficiently alleged the conspiracy as a whole. Further, he contends that Defendants had an incentive to conceal their misdeeds, that they are in sole possession of relevant factual information, and that the complaint adequately puts Defendants on notice as to what misconduct is alleged.

In a § 1983 case, "each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; see also Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Personal liability 'under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.'" (citation omitted)). "Each defendant musthave personally participated in, encouraged, condoned, or acquiesced in rights-violating conduct." Remus-Milan v. Irizarry-Pagan, 81 F. Supp. 3d 174, 178 (D.P.R. 2015). While supervisory liability is available, it "lies only where an 'affirmative link between the behavior of a subordinate and the action or inaction of his supervisor' exists such that 'the supervisor's conduct led inexorably to the constitutional violation.'" Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 275 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008)).

In this case, Plaintiff is not attempting to claim that all Defendants are liable for the actions of a few; rather, Plaintiff asserts he is unable to know, without further discovery, which Defendant committed or participated in which particular act. In similar circumstances, other courts have allowed comparable allegations to proceed to discovery. See Cuadrado v. Wall, No. CA 08-305 ML, 2010 WL 1499589, at *2 (D.R.I. Mar. 9, 2010) (holding that although "it is not clear from the Complaint which two officers allegedly gouged ...