EcKert v. Atl. Cnty. Justice Facility

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JAMES ECKERT, Plaintiff, v. ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-5244 (KMW) (MJS)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 23, 2024

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Karen M. Williams, 'United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 74.) Plaintiff filed a response to the motion (ECF No. 81), to which Defendants replied. (ECF No. 84.) For the following reasons Defendants motion for summary judgment shall be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time that the incidents which gave rise to Plaintiffs complaint, he was detained in the Atlantic County Justice Facility for, inter alia, failing to appear for Drug Court. (ECF No. 74 at 10; ECF No. 81-1 at 1.) On July 31,2020, while incarcerated in the jail, Plaintiff was moved to the admissions area of the jail for medical observation for suspected seizures. (ECF No. 74 at 11; ECF No. 81-1 at 3.) While on the phone in the admissions area of the jail that day, Plaintiff saw his then girlfriend, Tara Lynn Wilson, enter the jail to be booked on unrelated charges. (ECF No. 74-4 at 9.) Plaintiff saw her, but was not permitted by staff to speak with her, (Id. at 10.) While being admitted into the jail, Wilson used the restroom. (ECF No 74-5 at 5.) Sometime later, while in the admissions area, Plaintiff also used the restroom. (Id) Officer Dear reported seeing Plaintiff in the restroom acting strangely and seeming to place something in his clothes. (Id.) Dear suspected Plaintiff had contraband and told him he needed to be strip searched. (Id.; ECF No. 744 at 10.) It is undisputed that, during that search, money was found in Plaintiffs sock during the strip search. (ECF No. 74-4 at 10; ECF No. 74-5 at 5.) Plaintiff contends that the money had been in his possession the entire time he was in the jail, while Defendants contend it was left for him in the bathroom by Wilson. (ECF No. 74-4 at 10; ECF No. 74-5 at 5.)

Dear and Plaintiff dispute exactly what occurred at the end of the search, with Dear asserting that Plaintiff was attempting to dispose of or hide the money while removing his socks, while Plaintiff instead asserts that the money merely fell out while removing his sock. (ECF No. 74-4 at 10; ECF No. 74-5 at 5.) During the resulting scuffle over the money, Dear contends that Plaintiff struck him in the chest with his elbow. (ECF No. 74-5 at 5.) Eckert then struck Plaintiff in the face with a closed fist, and Plaintiff fell to the ground. (Id.) Plaintiff testified at his deposition that Dear thereafter punched and kicked him multiple times, rendering him unconscious. (ECF No. 74-4 at 10-12.) Dear instead testified that he struck Plaintiff only once, that Plaintiff fell but was not unconscious, and that was the end of the incident, (ECF No. 74-6 at 12.) Dear then called for help, and Plaintiff was taken to a secure area and seen by medical staff. (Id.) Plaintiff was charged with multiple disciplinary infractions, including assaulting Dear, possession of contraband, refusing to obey a staff order, and disruptive conduct. (ECF No. 74-5 at 5.) Plaintiff was ultimately adjudicated guilty of those infractions. (ECF No. 74-8.) Plaintiffs medical examination indicated that the blow had caused a “complex continued left maxillofacial fracture involving the anterior maxillary sinus wall, posterior maxillary sinus wall, orbital floor, and lateral orbital wall and zygomatic arch,” which required surgery and the implanting of titanium plates to repair. (ECF No. 74-11 at 5-6; ECF No. 74-12 at 1.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment where the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of “identifying those portions of the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is material “if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiff s claim,” and is genuine if “a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Blunt v. Lower Merlon Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). In deciding a motion for summary judgment a district court must “view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” id., but must not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, [however,] there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party who must provide evidence sufficient to establish that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party's favor to warrant the denial of a summary judgment motion. Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Serodio v. Rutgers, 27 F.Supp.3d 546, 550 (D.N.J. 2014).

“A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial. However, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations, instead it must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial.”

Serodio, 27 F.Supp.3d at 550.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff s excessive force claims as the force used was “de minimis” and not in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment excessive force standard, however, applies only to uses of force against convicted prisoners, see, e.g., Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021), a point Defendants realized in their reply, wherein they instead argue that the use of force was reasonable and thus not violative of Plaintiffs rights under the Fourth Amendment, which Defendants contend applies because the in-jail strip search Plaintiff underwent was akin to an arrest. The Fourth Amendment's objective standard, however, applies only to uses of force in the context of arrests, investigatory stops, or other seizures against non-prisoners. Id. As the Supreme Court has clearly established, the use of force against a pre-trial detainee or other non-convict detained prisoner is instead evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment's protections. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389,400 (2015); Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 194. As Plaintiff clearly fell into this category at the time of the incidents at question as he had been placed in jail for a drug court violation but was not serving a sentence for a conviction or violation of probation or parole at the time in question, Plaintiff's excessive force claim arises out of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Defendants' arguments must be evaluated under that rubric.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the central question is whether the force which the defendant applied to the plaintiff purposely or knowingly was “objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. Courts “cannot apply this standard mechanically” and the determination of objective reasonableness must turn on the “facts and circumstances of each particular case,” with reasonableness being determined from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene taking into account what was known to the defendants at the time rather than what may be apparent in hindsight. Id. at 397; see also Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 194-95. A determination as to reasonableness will therefore require consideration of “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiffs injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 194-95 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).

While it is certainly true that not every push or shove of an inmate will warrant consideration by a court of law and truly de minimis uses of force will not give rise to liability, see Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)), the force used in this instance can hardly be characterized as de minimis. Even if a jury were to credit the officer's version of events in this matter over that of Plaintiff, the record is still clear that the officer shuck Plaintiff with a closed fist in the eye with sufficient force to cause a significant fracture of the bones of Plaintiff s eye socket, requiring surgery and titanium implants to repair, That is no minor contact and Defendants' contention that such was de minimis is not a reasonable interpretation of the facts of this matter. Indeed, were a jury instead to credit Plaintiffs version of events and find that Dear struck Plaintiff a number of times even after he hit the ground and was in and out of consciousness, clearly the jury could find the force used was objectively unreasonable and therefore excessive. As this Court must look at the facts of this matter in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for the purposes of this motion, this Court must conclude that, giving the Plaintiff the benefit of reasonable inferences, a jury could find that Dear's actions involved a use of force beyond that which was...