Eddy v. Biddle

DEBRA L. EDDY, Plaintiff,

v. SCOTT BIDDLE, an individual, LISA BARR, an individual, and DOLGENCORP, LLC,a foreign Limited Liability Company, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11CV137

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

DATED: January 4, 2013

(Judge Keeley)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[DKT NO. 57]

Pending before the Court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 57). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the defendants' motion.

I.

This action arises from the defendant, Dolgencorp, LLC's ("Dolgencorp"), termination of the plaintiff, Debra L. Eddy ("Eddy" or "the plaintiff"), on May 27, 2011.¹ Dolgencorp, a limited liability company that owns and operates Dollar General stores, maintains that it fired Eddy for violating company policy when she took certain merchandise from a Dollar General store in Blacksville, West Virginia, without first paying for her items. Eddy, in contrast, contends that her termination was the result ofthe unlawful and discriminatory conduct of Dolgencorp and two other employees, the defendant Scott Biddle ("Biddle"), who was Eddy's supervisor, and the defendant Lisa Barr ("Barr"), who replaced her.

Eddy's tenure with Dolgencorp began on either August 25, 2005, or September 25, 2005,² when she was hired as an Assistant Store Manager ("ASM") of the Dollar General store located in Blacksville, West Virginia. She was promoted to the salaried position of Store Manager ("SM") of that store several months later, a position she held until her termination.

As SM, Eddy bore the ultimate responsibility for the operation of the Blacksville store. She was, in short, the one in charge. Her responsibilities included the hiring, training, promotion, and discipline of her subordinate employees, as well as the maintenance of accurate inventory levels within her store. She was also responsible for complying with and ensuring her subordinates' compliance with the corporate policies of Dollar General. Of particular relevance to this case is the Employee Purchase Policy contained in both the Dollar General Employee Handbook as well as Dollar General's Standard Operating Procedures. This policy, in pertinent part, provides that "[a]ll merchandise must be paid forbefore it leaves the store. Failure to ring up all merchandise could result in immediate termination for all involved employees." (Dkt. No. 58 at 7).

On May 1, 2010, Eddy hired Barr as Lead Sales Associate for the Blacksville store. Approximately two months later, on June 28, 2010, Dolgencorp hired Biddle as the Retail District Manager ("DM") of a group of seventeen Dollar General stores known as District No. 245, the district encompassing the Blackville store. As DM, Biddle's job was to supervise each of the SMs who were operating Dollar General stores within his district, including Eddy.

On the evening of May 18, 2011, well after the end of her early morning shift, Eddy went to the Blacksville store to purchase several items. Barr was working as the "manager on duty" that evening, and another employee, Sarah Cross, was working as the cashier. When Eddy brought her items to the sales counter for purchase, Cross advised her that the credit card machines were not working. Eddy set her items aside, went to her car, and then re-entered the store. On her return, she told Barr and Cross that, because she did not have any cash, she was going to take several items, i.e., heating pads and dog treats, and return the following day to pay for them.

The next day, Eddy saw a physician for a pain in her back that she had been experiencing since earlier that month. Her doctor diagnosed a low back sprain and gave her a note that excused her from work through May 23, 2011. That night, Eddy went to the Blacksville store to drop off the note. She also called Biddle and advised him that she had left the doctor's note at the store and would be taking several days off. That day, May 19, 2011, she did not pay for the items she had taken the day before.

Three days after Eddy dropped off the doctor's note, on May 21, 2011, Barr asked Paula Cummins, who was then the ASM of the Blacksville store, if Eddy had paid for the items she had taken on May 18, 2011. From there, the information traveled quickly up the corporate chain. Cummins reported to Biddle that Eddy had taken merchandise from the store without prior payment. Biddle, in turn, reported the incident to the Regional Loss Prevention Manager, Lee Holcomb.

In response to Biddle's report, Holcomb visited the Blacksville store on May 23, 2011. His investigation consisted of meeting with several employees, including Barr, and reviewing the surveillance tapes of the night in question. After confirming that Eddy had indeed left the store without paying for several items, he told Biddle of his findings. At the direction of his Regional HumanResources Manager, from whom he sought advice, Biddle held off on any further action until Eddy returned to the store and could make a statement.

At some point during this time period, another employee told Eddy that it was rumored she was going to be fired when she returned to work. Subsequently, on May 26, 2011, after Holcomb's investigation and while she was still on sick leave, the plaintiff visited the store and paid for her merchandise. She officially returned to work the next day.

When Eddy returned to the Blacksville store on May 27, 2011, Biddle facilitated a phone conversation between her and Holcomb. During that conversation, Holcomb advised Eddy that he had reviewed the store's security footage and had seen her taking certain items from the store without payment. After telling Holcomb she had, in fact, paid for the items in question the day before, Eddy collected her May 26, 2011 receipt and showed it to Biddle. At Holcomb's direction, Biddle then asked Eddy to prepare a written statement, which she completed voluntarily. In that statement, she admitted that she had taken "heat wraps" from the store on May 18, 2011, with the intention of paying for them on a later date. (Dkt. No. 57-8 at 2). Biddle relayed the contents of her statement to Holcomb, who advised him to contact Human Resources. The HumanResources representative, in turn, recommended that Eddy be discharged. Thus, on May 27, 2011, Biddle terminated Eddy's employment with Dolgencorp. She was forty-nine years old.

Approximately one month after he terminated Eddy, Biddle approached two employees, Barr and Cummins, and told them that they could take an on-line test if they were interested in filling the vacant SM position. Cummins declined, but Barr took the test, passed, and was promoted to Eddy's former position. At the time of her promotion, Barr was forty-six years old.

Eddy filed the instant suit on July 29, 2011, in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia, alleging (1) common law wrongful discharge; (2) age discrimination; (3) defamation; (4) conspiracy; (5) outrage; (6) state and federal wage and hour law violations; and (7) West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act violations. The defendants timely removed this civil action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 on August 29, 2011, invoking this Court's federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendants argue that there are no disputed issues of material fact for a jury to decide as to any of Eddy's claims, and they have accordingly moved for summary judgment on all counts. The motion is now fully briefed and ripe for review.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (a). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the evidence "in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining the truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and of establishing the nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the necessary showing, the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" favoring thenonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-52.

III.

Given the overlapping legal issues in several of Eddy's counts, the Court addresses her causes of action in logical order.

A. Wrongful Discharge

Eddy's first cause of action, entitled "Common Law Wrongful Discharge," alleges that she was discharged in violation of "[the defendants'] own Dollar General Handbook" because her termination (1) "was not warranted in [her] particular case," and (2) was in violation of the company policy of providing employees "a positive work environment" premised on "respect and opportunity." (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 6). According to the complaint, the totality of this conduct "was in violation of West Virginia Public Policy." Id. In their memorandum in support of summary judgment, the defendants refute that a purported violation of company policy - the only potential "West Virginia Public Policy" identified by the plaintiff in discovery - can serve as an exception...