Edenfield v. Gateway Behavioral Health Servs.

CHERYL EDENFIELD, as Mother and Legal Guardian of QUINCY EDENFIELD,an incapacitated adult, Plaintiff, v. GATEWAY BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES, Defendant.

2:16-CV-170

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia Brunswick Division

May 15, 2017

ORDER

Sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff Cheryl Edenfield's ("Cheryl") (as mother and legal guardian of Quincy Edenfield ("Quincy")) state-law tort claims and makes her motion to amend futile. But her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") claim survives, as does her contract-breach claim. Thus, Defendant Gateway Behavioral Services' ("Gateway") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt. no. 14, will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Cheryl's Motion to Amend the Complaint, dkt. no. 15, will be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Quincy Receives Gateway Services

The Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. Quincy has "Severe Autistic Disorder and Unspecified Intellectual Disabilities." Dkt. No. 1-3 ¶ 5. He receives housing, transportation, and behavioral services from Gateway. Id. ¶ 8. Since May 2012, Quincy has lived at a Gateway home. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8a. Quincy goes to a Gateway day center between 8:30 A.M. and 2:30 P.M. Id. ¶ 8b.

Cheryl is Quincy's mother and has been his guardian and conservator since March 23, 2015. Id. ¶ 7. Quincy spends his weekends with her. Id. ¶ 8a. "Prior to February 29, 2016 and on many occasions," Cheryl would notice wounds and bruises on Quincy when picking him up from the Gateway center. Id. ¶ 11. "When [she] would return [him] to Gateway and question staff members concerning Quincy's wounds/bruises and/or ask for a investigation, she would never obtain a straightforward answer." Id. ¶ 12. In particular, no one ever told Cheryl that Quincy was being abused. Id. ¶ 12a. Early investigations did not uncover abuse. Id. ¶ 12b.

Quincy Was Abused by a Gateway Employee

On February 27, 2016, a Gateway staff member told another employee that she had seen Gateway's Errol Wilkins "hitting Quincy as well as another individual." Id. ¶ 15. Cheryl did not learn of this. Id. ¶ 14. On February 29, 2016, she brought Quincy to a doctor for a medical examination. Id. ¶ 13. When she returned to Gateway, "no one . . . would confess . . . that Quincy was being abused." Id. ¶ 14.

However, Gateway launched an investigation that day. Id. ¶ 16. It substantiated the accusations, with employees saying they had seen Wilkins "hit Quincy . . . with his fist and/or open hand on several occasions and that this has been going on for several weeks." Id. ¶ 18 (alteration in original). Employees claimed Wilkins would hit clients "[a]t least 2-3 times a week, sometimes 2x per day," "for about 3 months," sometimes with a broken-off chair handle—and that they feared him because he was "a former gang member." Id. ¶¶ 21(g)-(i), 22(a), 25(a), 26(j)-(k); see also id. ¶ 25(g)-(h) ("Everyone has seen It and I heard Errol had been spoken to about this . . . . a long time ago." (alteration in original)), ¶ 26(h) ("I and the other staff have warned him that he was going to get caught." (alteration in original)). Wilkins was terminated. Dkt. No. 14-1 at 4; Dkt. No. 17 at 16.

Cheryl Sues Gateway

Cheryl filed this lawsuit against Gateway in Glynn County State Court on November 15, 2016. Id. at 2. She alleged three state-law tort claims: failure to train and supervise, negligent retention, and assault and battery. Id. ¶¶ 28-50. She also raised Section 1983. Id. ¶¶ 51-56.

Gateway removed the case on December 22, 2016. Dkt. No. 1. It moved for judgment on the pleadings on January 26, 2017. Dkt. No. 14. That motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. Dkt. Nos. 17, 21. While briefing was ongoing, Cheryl moved to amend her complaint. Dkt. No. 15. She seeks to add Wilkins as a defendant, and to add a fourth state-law tort claim, against Gateway and Wilkins for fraud. Id. ¶¶ 63, 79-87. Gateway responded in opposition, and that motion is also ripe. Dkt. No. 19.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is governed by the same standards as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Flournoy v. CML-GA WB, LLC, No. CV 114-161, 2015 WL 2345594, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 15, 2015). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task," guided by "judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A complaint must be "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Its "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It has to "contain inferential allegations from which [the court] can identify each of the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2001).

The court must assume the truth of a fact alleged in the complaint, but not "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). When "a dispositive issue of law" shows "beyond all reasonable doubt" that "the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief," the court can grant the defendants judgment on the pleadings. Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991).

Motion to Amend Complaint

Given this case's posture, "a party may amend its pleading only with . . . the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court . . . ." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). "[D]enial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the 'complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal.'" Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Sovereign immunity bars Cheryl's state-law tort claims, but her Section 1983 claim survives, as does her contract-breach claim.

I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BARS CHERYL'S STATE-LAW TORT CLAIMS.

Cheryl's state-law tort claims are barred. Cheryl concedes that Gateway is a government body entitled to sovereign immunity under Georgia law. Dkt. No. 17 at 13 (conceding Gateway to be "clothed with immunity"); see also Ga. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 755 S.E.2d 184, 188 (Ga. 2014) (observing Georgia sovereign immunity protects "governments at all levels"); Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Serv. Bd., 545 S.E.2d 875, 877 (Ga. 2001) (holding community-service boards, like Gateway, are "departments or agencies of the State" entitled to sovereign immunity). Courts cannot "abrogate or modify [Georgia's sovereign immunity]"—only the legislature can. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 755 S.E.2d at 189 (citing GA. CONST. art. I § 2 ¶ IX(e)). An applicable legislative waiver of sovereign immunity has to be shown by the party claiming one. Sherin v. Dep't of Human Res., 494 S.E.2d 518, 522 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).

Cheryl relies on O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(a), which waives sovereign immunity "for the torts of state officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment."¹ O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23 (a). But this waiver is subject to limits listed in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24. In particular, the State is immune as to "losses resulting from . . . . [a]ssault[ ] [or] battery." Id. § 50-21-24(7). Cheryl's state-law tort claims fall directly within this exception's shadow. To recall, those claims are for failure to train and supervise, negligent retention, assault and battery, and fraud. Even though most of them are not for assault or battery, they still result from assault or battery. See Dkt. No. 1-3 ¶¶ 28-41, 44-50; Dkt. No. 15-1 ¶¶ 79-87. The Court's "focus is not on which particular state law causes of action a plaintiff has set forth in her complaint, but rather on the underlying conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff's loss." Davis v. Standifer, 621 S.E.2d 852, 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). Cheryl's state-law tort claims all "aris[e] out of conduct that would constitute . . . assault or battery," so they are all barred.² Id. (barring claims for "negligent . . . hiring, instruction, supervision, control, and discipline of" police officer who allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff during traffic stop); see also Pelham v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 743 S.E.2d 469, 471, 474 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (barring claims against overseers for negligent training and supervision of football staff after coach allegedly had player assault another player).

Cheryl contends that O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7) does not apply when the assault or battery "is the negligent implementation of a policy or negligent act not authorized by policy." Dkt. No. 17 at 15. But the authorities Cheryl cites concern other sovereign immunity exceptions.³ See id. at 13-14 (discussing O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2)); Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Davis, 676 S.E.2d 1, 1-2 (Ga. 2009) (analyzing O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(6)); Grant v. Ga. Forestry Comm'n, 789 S.E.2d 343, 346 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (analyzing O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-24(2), (6)). Her objection fails. Cf. Sherin, 494 S.E.2d at 522 (avoiding O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(2), given dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7)).

The Court strongly sympathizes with Cheryl. But "[s]overeign immunity is a harsh doctrine, not an equitable one. Indeed, it is just the opposite of equity—it is the state declaring that it cannot be sued even where it would otherwise be liable." Pak v. Ga. Dep't of Behavioral Health & Dev. Disabilities, 731 S.E.2d 384, 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted). Gateway's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED as to failure to train and supervise, negligent retention, and...