Edley-Worford v. Va. Conference of the United Methodist Church

430 F.Supp.3d 132

Cheryl EDLEY-WORFORD, Plaintiff,

v.VIRGINIA CONFERENCE OF the UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Defendant.

Civil No. 3:19cv647 (DJN)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

Signed December 30, 2019

Barbara Allyn Queen, Dominique LaRae Young, Lawrence Queen, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff.

Lindsey Ann Strachan, Steven David Brown, Isler Dare PC, Richmond, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David J. Novak, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Cheryl Edley-Worford ("Plaintiff") brings this action against The Virginia Conference of the United Methodist Church ("Defendant" or the "Conference"), alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq ("Title VII") and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" § 1981"). This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13), moving to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), or in the alternative, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13).

I. BACKGROUND

In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States , 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, when a court considers a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court will accept a plaintiff's allegations as true and view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari , 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). For the purpose of background, the Court considers the following facts that Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint.

A. Facts Alleged.

Plaintiff is a 61-year-old African-American woman residing in Virginia. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 1-1) ¶¶ 6, 12.) Defendant is a sub-organization of the United Methodist Church located in the Commonwealth of Virginia. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) On September 2, 2014, the Conference hired Plaintiff as the Director of Inclusivity and Lay Leadership Excellence. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 13.) The Conference terminated Plaintiff's employment on October 23, 2017. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Conference requires that a lay person fill the position of Director of Inclusivity and Lay Leadership Excellence. (Am. Compl ¶ 14.) Further, she states that the position did not require her to lead a church or congregation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) As director, she contends that she had no ministerial authority to instruct others in their Methodist faith. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff asserts that she was an administrator "charged with coordinating logistics, but [that] she was not responsible for teaching or personifying the beliefs of the Conference." (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.)

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that throughout the course of her employment, she "performed well and was evaluated favorably." (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) However, she states that during the first year of her employment with the Conference, she noticed that she was given more areas of responsibility than her Caucasian co-workers, "relative to the resources with which she was asked to fulfill them." (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff further asserts that nearly all of her co-workers were Caucasian. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff states that the workload disparity became obvious in Summer 2015. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) In the Fall of 2016, Plaintiff approached Reverend Marc Brown ("Brown"), Plaintiff's supervisor and Director of Connectional Ministries, and Shirly Cauffman ("Cauffman"), the Chair of the Conference's Personnel Committee, about her concerns. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) Neither Brown nor Cauffman provided any meaningful response to Plaintiff's concerns about workload disparity. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that after the meeting, both Brown and Cauffman displayed avoidant behavior towards her. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff further asserts that while the Conference failed to provide Plaintiff with any substantial assistance, the Conference provided additional support to other directors. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.)

During Plaintiff's Fall 2016 evaluation meeting, Brown addressed some of Plaintiff's workload concerns and requested that Plaintiff prepare for him a "detailed outline of the allocation of her time." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26.) After reviewing the outline, Brown informed Plaintiff that her job description included the work that she had outlined. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26.)

Plaintiff further alleges that sometime in early 2017, she presented her concerns during a staff meeting in front of Brown, Rowley and Director of Communications, Madeline Pillow ("Pillow"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) During the meeting, Plaintiff explained that she "felt the Conference was not a good place for African-American employees and that at times she felt ‘invisible.’ " (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.)

In September 2017, at a Board of Laity Meeting, Plaintiff again presented her concerns about the disproportionate workload and resources to the Board. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff further asserts that during the meeting, one Board member stated, "[l]et's be honest; the [United Methodist Church] is a white denomination." (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) Following this meeting, Plaintiff states that the Conference again provided support and additional assistance to another director, while continuing to disregard Plaintiff's concerns. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31.)

Plaintiff once again raised her issues with Brown, who reminded Plaintiff that her responsibilities were part of her job description. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) However, in response, Plaintiff asserted that "it would be different if everyone were in the same boat, but ... others are being accommodated and I'm being left to suffer. It seems very unfair. I've been stressed out for three years and no one seems to care." (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.)

On October 17, 2017, Plaintiff met with the Personnel Committee. (Am. Compl. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff alleges that the Personnel Committee attacked her for raising her concerns about her work responsibilities with the Board of Laity. (Am. Compl. ¶ 35.) Two days later, Brown requested a meeting with Plaintiff, during which Brown gave Plaintiff a Performance Improvement Plan (a "PIP"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) The PIP explained that Plaintiff had " ‘complained to members of the Board of Laity about [her] job duties,’ and ‘told the Common Table Personnel Committee that [she] intend[ed] to continue the practice of complaining to Boards and agencies.’ " (Am. Compl. ¶ 36 (alterations in original).) Plaintiff declined to sign the PIP. (Am. Compl. ¶ 37.)

Following the PIP incident, on October 23, 2017, Brown terminated Plaintiff's employment with the Conference, alleging that Plaintiff had acted unprofessionally with the Board of Laity and the Personnel Committee and that, in an act of insubordination, Plaintiff had accused Brown of lying in the PIP. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38.)

B. Plaintiff's Causes of Action

Plaintiff originally filed her Complaint on November 1, 2018, and her Amended Complaint on February 7, 2019, both in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond. Defendant removed the case to federal court on September 5, 2019 (ECF No. 1).

In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Conference subjected her to race-based disparate treatment in violation of Title VII and § 1981. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40-47.) Specifically, she asserts that the "ferocity and speed of the organization's negative and disciplinary responses to [Plaintiff's] complaints regarding her workload and unfair treatment as compared to her Caucasian peers" demonstrate "direct evidence of illegal motivation." (Am. Compl. ¶ 45.) In Count II of the Amended Complaint, she asserts that she suffered unlawful retaliation, in violation of Title VII and § 1981, due to the complaints that she raised regarding race-based disparate treatment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48-56.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she engaged in protected activity when she lodged complaints about her disparate workload, and because of these actions, the Conference retaliated against her by placing her on the PIP and, ultimately, terminating her employment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-53.) Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment finding that the acts and practices alleged constituted intentional and willful violations of her rights; injunctive relief restraining future violations of Title VII and § 1981 ; front pay totaling an amount to be determined at trial; back pay, plus interest; compensatory damages for past and future economic and non-economic losses, emotional distress, pain and suffering, humiliation, mental anguish, impairment of quality of life and consequential losses; punitive damages; attorney's fees; and the costs of this action. (Am. Compl. ¶ 57.)

C. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant filed its Second Motion to Dismiss on October 30, 2019. (ECF No. 13.) Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of the Second Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mem.") (ECF No. 14) at 2.) Specifically, Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), because the First Amendment — namely, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine — prevents the Court from entangling itself in the matters of religious and church governance. (Def.'s Mem. at 12.) In the alternative, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Title VII and § 1981, because Plaintiff was a ministerial employee of the Conference...