Edrington v. Sheridan

1

William Christopher Edrington, Respondent, v. Julianna Lynn Sheridan, et al., Appellants.

No. A23-1782

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

August 12, 2024

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-FA-23-492

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis Minnesota; and Susan M. Gallagher, Gallagher Law Office L.L.C., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Erica A. Holzer, Jevon C. Bindman, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis Minnesota; and Mary Pat Byrn, Viitala Byrn & Ives PC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, Saul Ewing LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Heather Kemp, Krystal Bordoni-Cowley, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Shannon Minter, National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, California (for amicus curiae National Center for Lesbian Rights) Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge. ^[*]

CONNOLLY, Judge

Appellants challenge the district court's order denying their motion to dismiss respondent's paternity action, arguing that the district court erred in determining that respondent alleged sufficient facts to (1) compel genetic testing, and (2) obtain standing as a presumed father. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Appellants Julianna Lynn Sheridan and Catherine Kish Sheridan, a same sexcouple, married in August 2017. During that summer, appellants asked respondent William Christopher Edrington, their mutual friend, if he would provide them with his sperm^[1] so that they could "have a child in their home." The parties agreed that respondent would not be an anonymous donor and that he would take part in the child's life. No contracts were signed concerning this arrangement.

Appellants chose to use an at-home method of assisted reproduction known as intravaginal insemination. To conduct this process, respondent provided appellants with a sample of his sperm in a sterile collection cup. Appellants then entered a private room, in either their home or respondent's home, where Catherine used an insemination syringe to insert respondent's sperm into Julianna's vagina. Respondent was not present for the insemination process and "had no sexual contact to effectuate the transfer of [his sperm] to Julianna." And no medical technology or medical personnel were used to inseminate Julianna.

The at-home insemination process was successful and Julianna gave birth to A.J.S., now six-years old, in July 2018. Because appellants were married at the time of A.J.S.'s birth, Catherine is A.J.S.'s presumed non-gestational mother and legal parent. See Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(a) (2022). Based on her status as A.J.S.'s legal parent, Catherine was joined to this matter as an interested party. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. Appellants are the only two individuals listed on A.J.S.'s birth certificate, and together raised A.J.S. in their home. None of the parties signed a recognition of parentage. And neither Catherine nor respondent have moved to adopt A.J.S.

In June 2022, appellants requested that respondent not refer to A.J.S. as his daughter. At first, respondent abided by appellants' directive. But respondent alleged that this grew difficult when A.J.S. asked him whether he was her father. Following this incident, appellants limited respondent's contact with A.J.S.

In September 2023, respondent filed his fourth amended paternity petition requesting an order compelling Julianna and A.J.S. to submit to genetic testing, an adjudication establishing that he is A.J.S.'s biological father, and joint legal and physical custody of A.J.S.^[2] In his amended petition, respondent alleged that he is A.J.S.'s biological father because, although there was "no sexual intercourse involved in the conception of [A.J.S.,]" it was his sperm used to conceive A.J.S. On that basis, respondent requested that the district court compel Julianna and A.J.S. to submit to genetic testing under Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 1(a) (2022).

Respondent also alleged that, since A.J.S. was born, he has received her into his home and openly held her out as his daughter. As support for this allegation, respondent states that he was notified when Julianna became pregnant, received sometimes daily phone calls regarding the pregnancy, met A.J.S. at the hospital the day that she was born, and immediately notified his family and close friends that he was "the father of a healthy baby girl." And after her birth, respondent alleged that he purchased child-care items for his home, including diapers, wipes, a crib, bedding, toys, food, and clothing. Relatedly, respondent alleged that he has cared for A.J.S. on a weekly, and sometimes daily, basis by feeding A.J.S., changing her diapers, bathing her, and putting her down for naps. Finally, respondent alleged that he has posted many pictures of A.J.S. on his social media accounts and that his friends and family-some of whom have met A.J.S.-are "aware that [he is] very proud to be [her] father."

In March 2023, appellants moved to dismiss respondent's paternity action for two reasons. First, that respondent, as a sperm donor, is precluded from compelling genetic testing to assert that he is A.J.S.'s biological or legal father. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c). Second, that respondent failed to allege sufficient facts to obtain standing to bring his paternity action. See Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d) (2022).

The district court denied appellants' motion. In doing so, the district court ordered that Julianna and A.J.S. submit to genetic testing because respondent claimed to be A.J.S.'s biological father and alleged the requisite level of sexual contact to conceive A.J.S. through assisted reproduction. See Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 1(a). The district court also determined that Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(c), which generally precludes donors of genetic material from using genetic testing to claim parental rights to a child conceived through assisted reproduction, did not preclude respondent, as a sperm donor, from asserting parentage over A.J.S. Finally, the district court determined that respondent has standing to bring his paternity action under Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. 1(d), because he alleged sufficient facts to show that he received A.J.S. into his home and held her out as his biological child.

This appeal follows.^[3]

DECISION

In Minnesota, paternity actions are governed by the Minnesota Parentage Act (MPA), which is modeled after the Uniform Law Commission's Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Minn. 1985); see also Minn. Stat. § 257.51 (2022) (providing that the MPA includes Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51-.74). The statutory provisions under the MPA create "the exclusive bases for standing to bring an action to determine paternity." Witso v. Overby, 627 N.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Minn. 2001). Paternity actions are also governed by the rules of civil procedure. Minn. Stat. § 257.65 (2022). Consequently, when determining whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true and all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019).

The MPA provides standing to bring a paternity action based on a myriad of paternity presumptions. See Minn. Stat. § 257.57, subds. 1-3 (2022); see also Minn. Stat. § 517.201, subd. 2 (2022) (providing that statutes with gendered language are to be construed "in a neutral manner to refer to a person of either gender"). Two paternity presumptions are relevant here. First, a putative father is presumed to be the biological father of a child "[i]f the results of blood or genetic tests . . . indicate that the likelihood of the alleged father's paternity . . . is 99 percent or greater[.]" See Minn. Stat. §§ 257.57, subd. 2(1) (conferring standing for actions brought under Minn. Stat. § 257.62, subd. 5(b)), .62, subd. 5(b) (2022) (providing paternity presumption based on genetic testing).

Second, a putative father is presumed to be the biological father of a child if, "while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his biological child[.]" See Minn. Stat. §§ 257.55, subd. 1(d) (providing holding-out paternity presumption), .57, subd. 2(1) (conferring standing for actions brought under the holding-out presumption). If a party cannot allege facts sufficient to show that a presumption applies, they lack standing to assert paternity. Witso, 627 N.W.2d at 65-66.

Interpretation of the MPA is a question of law that we review de novo. Ramsey County v. X.L., 853 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Minn.App. 2014). The goal of statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022). We read and construe statutes as a whole and within the context of the surrounding sections. In re Welfare of Child. of A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn.App. 2019). Generally, words and phrases are construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). We "look to the dictionary definitions of [undefined] words and apply them in the context of the statute." Anoka County v. Law Enf't Lab. Servs., Inc., 3 N.W.3d 586, 594 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). And we presume that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2022).

The first step of statutory interpretation is determining whether the statute is ambiguous. A.M.F., 934 N.W.2d at 122. Statutes are ambiguous "if, as applied to the facts of the particular case, the...