Edtl v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.

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BEN EDTL, Plaintiff, v. BEST BUY STORES, L.P., CHRIS DAVIS, AND JANE DOE, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-00003-AR

United States District Court, D. Oregon

October 13, 2022

CORRECTED OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY ARMSTEAD, MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Ben Edtl brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants Best Buy Stores, L.P., Chris Davis, and Jane Doe. In December 2021, the Best Buy Tualatin store had a sign posted at its entrance stating that, as a safety measure to address the COVID-19 pandemic, face coverings were required inside the store. Edtl went maskless into the store, and after defendants informed Edtl that he needed to wear a mask they called the police when he refused to do so.

Based on that interaction, Edtl brings two claims against defendants. In Claim 1, Edtl alleges that wearing a mask is a medical treatment and that Best Buy's enforcement of OAR 333019-1025, an Oregon rule mandating face coverings indoors,^[1] was a coercive attempt to have him wear a mask, which violated his substantive due process rights.^[2] Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38-40. In Claim 2 Edtl invokes the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to allege that defendants' conduct violated his “right to informed consent” under the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) statute, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3, which sets out the statutory framework for the Food and Drug Administration's emergency authorization of drugs, devices, and biological products. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41-46, ECF No. 10.^[3] For both claims, Edtl alleges that defendants are state actors on the basis that Oregon's administrative rules requiring face coverings in indoor spaces coerced defendants into coercing Best Buy's customers to wear a mask.

Defendants move to dismiss both of Edtl's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6). Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS defendants' motion.^[4]

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, the court assumes Edtl's factual allegations are true. SeeWeston Family P'ship LLLP v. Twitter, Inc., 29 F.4th 611, 617 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When assessing the adequacy of a complaint, we accept all factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”).

On December 17, 2021, Edtl and his wife went shopping at a Best Buy retail store in Tualatin, Oregon. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. At that time, OAR 333-019-1025-which required masks or face coverings in indoor spaces-was in effect.^[5] The Tualatin store had a sign posted on its door, stating that “face coverings are required inside our store.” Id. ¶ 11. To “serve [customer] needs while keeping health in mind,” the sign also indicated that the store offered free home delivery, free contactless curbside pickup, and virtual consultations. Id.

Soon after Edtl entered the store without a face covering, Jane Doe-a store employee working at the reception desk-told Edtl that he needed to comply with the store's mask policy or “leave the store right now.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. When Edtl refused and proceeded into the store, Jane Doe “aggressively” told Edtl to leave the store immediately. Id. ¶ 14. Jane Doe warned Edtl that she would call the police if he did not leave. Edtl neither left the store nor put on a face covering, and one of defendants called the police. When the police arrived, Edtl was informed that “Best Buy sought to assert a trespass claim against him.” Id. ¶ 16. At Edtl's request, the police escorted him to speak with the store manager, Chris Davis. ¶ 17. After Edtl asked Davis about his familiarity with Oregon's mask regulation and expressed that the efforts to coerce him to wear a mask violated his civil rights, the police escorted Edtl from the store. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include allegations sufficiently detailed “to raise a right to relief above a speculative level” and render each pleaded claim “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).

The complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-PackardCo., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). The court need not, however, credit a plaintiff's legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

DISCUSSION

Both of Edtl's claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute creates a private right of action for a plaintiff alleging that a state actor violated a person's “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct complained of deprived him of an existing “right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States” and (2) the alleged violation was committed by a state actor or person acting under the “color of state law.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). The court turns first to Edtl's substantive due process claim and then to his EUA claim.

A. Claim 1: Substantive Due Process

Edtl's substantive due process claim alleges that he has a “constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that, defendants, acting under color of law, violated that right by enforcing OAR 333-019-1025. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-40. Edtl also alleges that defendants are deemed state actors because they were “willfully participating” in the enforcement of OAR 333-019-1025 and that Oregon coerced defendants to coerce Best Buy's customers to wear masks. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

“Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary deprivation of their liberty by government.” Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir.2006). Heightened protection under substantive due process applies to “those fundamental rights which are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997). When the government infringes a fundamental right, a court applies a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the law passes constitutional muster. Id. at 721. When the government infringes a nonfundamental right, however, the court applies a rational basis analysis. Id. at 722. Rational basis analysis presumes legislation “to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

Defendants advance three arguments concerning Edtl's substantive due process claim. First, defendants assert that Edtl was never coerced into wearing a face mask, for the simple fact that Edtl never put on a face mask. Defendants also point out the choices that were available to Edtl: shopping maskless outside with an associate via iPad or shopping online. Mot. to Dismiss at 4. Second, defendants argue that § 1983 is generally not applicable to private parties and that they are not state actors because “merely attempting to comply with applicable rules does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of state action or acting under color of state law.” Id. at 5. Third, defendants assert that no fundamental right is implicated in this case, and that, therefore, (assuming they are state actors), rational basis review applies to Edtl's claim. Id. at 17.

Edtl responds that the fundamental due process rights he asserts arise from a right to refuse medical treatment recognized in Supreme Court case law. Resp. in Opp'n at 14, ECF No. 12; see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (not recognizing the right to physician-assisted suicide but acknowledging that the substantive due process “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests”); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment);

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (recognizing “a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). In Edtl's view, Best Buy's mask policy did not give him the choice of refusing “medical treatment” that he did not want, and, because Oregon does not have a compelling interest in coercing him to wear a mask in Oregon's Best Buy stores, his constitutional rights were violated. Further, Edtl relies on Ninth Circuit cases to argue that defendants are state actors under the “state compulsion,” “public function,” “joint actor,” and “nexus” factors. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (pointing out factors that can be used to determine whether “something more” is present to determine that a private entity is a state

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