Edward S. v. Raleigh Cnty. Hous. Auth.

248 W.Va. 458

889 S.E.2d 31

EDWARD S., Administrator of the Estates of T.S. and A.K., Edward S. and Rachel K., Individually and as Next Friends of J.K., Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners, v. RALEIGH COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant Below, Respondent.

No. 21-0888

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: May 9, 2023

Filed: June 8, 2023

W. Mark Burnette, Esq., MARK BURNETTE, P.A., Ocala, Florida

Jeffrey S. Rodgers, Esq., Lewisburg, West Virginia, Counsel for Petitioners

Jared C. Underwood, Esq., Chip E. Williams, Esq., Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe, PLLC, Beckley, West Virginia, Counsel for Respondent

WALKER, Chief Justice:

Two children died in a house fire in Summers County in 2019; their father, Edward S., and sibling were seriously injured in the fire. The family had rented the house with assistance from the Raleigh County Housing Authority. After Edward S. ¹ sued for the wrongful deaths of the children and negligence, RCHA claimed immunity from liability under the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, West Virginia Code §§ 29-12A-1 to 18 (Tort Claims Act or Act) and immunity from suit under the common law. The circuit court concluded RCHA was not a "political subdivision," meaning that the Tort Claims Act did not apply to this case; but the court granted summary judgment to RCHA on qualified immunity grounds. To the contrary, we hold that RCHA is a "political subdivision" as defined in the Tort Claims Act. So, the circuit court erred when it concluded otherwise. And, for that reason, we reverse the order granting summary judgment to RCHA and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Edward S. and Rachel K. lived in a rental house with their three children in Hinton, West Virginia. The family's rent was subsidized with a Section 8 housing voucher they obtained through RCHA, and which was funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The house caught fire on May 11, 2019. Two children, T.S. and A.K., died in the fire. A third child, J.K., and Edward S. were seriously injured.

Edward S. sued RCHA and the putative owners of the rental house as administrator of the decedents’ estates, next friend and guardian to J.K., and on his own behalf in July 2019. Rachel K. was also a named plaintiff, on her own behalf and as next friend and guardian to J.K. Edward S. alleged that the owners of the rental house knew that the house's wiring was unsafe and that it lacked sufficient smoke and carbon monoxide detectors. Edward S. also alleged that RCHA inspected the house several times—improperly—and knew of deficiencies but did little to ensure the house was "safe and decent." Edward S. alleged two counts of wrongful death and one count of negligence against all defendants. In its answer, RCHA asserted immunity from suit under the Tort Claims Act, plus any other common law immunities that might otherwise apply.

RCHA moved for summary judgment in April 2020. It argued that it was a "political subdivision" ² shielded from liability for claims arising out of its "inspection powers or functions" under the Tort Claims Act. ³ RCHA also argued that it did not owe a legal duty to the plaintiffs.

In August 2020, Edward S. moved to amend his complaint to include more detailed allegations about RCHA, its employees, and its operations. Edward S. claimed that RCHA did not employ enough inspectors to inspect its Section 8 clients’ units to ensure that they met housing quality standards set by HUD. He claimed that RCHA did not adequately train or supervise the few inspectors that it did employ. He also claimed that his rental house was improperly inspected five times before the 2019 fire. Edward S. restated the wrongful death claims and negligence claim against all defendants and added claims of negligent training and negligent supervision against RCHA. ⁴

Edward S. responded to RCHA's motion for summary judgment in September 2020 and argued that housing authorities like RCHA are not political subdivisions immunized from liability for certain claims and losses under the Tort Claims Act. He argued in the alternative that even if RCHA was a political subdivision, his claims entailed more than flawed inspections, so RCHA was not immunized from liability by the Act. Finally, Edward S. asserted that RCHA owed him, his children, and Rachel K. a duty to provide a safe home.

RCHA filed a renewed motion for summary judgment in March 2021. There, it reiterated its argument that it was a "political subdivision," as defined in the Tort Claims Act, and shielded from liability for claims arising from its inspection powers or functions. RCHA also made a new argument: that if the circuit court concluded that it was not a political subdivision which the Tort Claims Act immunized from liability for claims arising from its inspection powers or functions, then it was a "governmental agency" and qualifiedly immune from suits for mere negligence. And, according to RCHA, if the circuit court concluded that "certain claims asserted by [Edward S. did] not fall under the [Tort Claims Act], then [RCHA] would be entitled to qualified immunity with regard to those specific claims." ⁵

Edward S. responded and restated his argument that the Tort Claims Act did not apply to RCHA. As to qualified immunity, Edward S. argued that (1) RCHA was not a "State agency" entitled to common law, qualified immunity; (2) RCHA's alleged negligence (and that of its non-party employees) related to ministerial duties, not discretionary functions; and (3) RCHA violated clearly established constitutional and/or statutory rights of which a reasonable official would have known. Finally, Edward S. argued that RCHA did, in fact, owe a legal duty to him, his children, and Rachel K. ⁶

The circuit court granted RCHA's renewed motion for summary judgment in October 2021. To structure its analysis of RCHA's immunity defenses, the court relied on our recent decision in West Virginia Regional Jail & Correctional Facility Authority v. Estate of Grove . ⁷ In Grove , we stated that,

whenever a defendant raises the issue of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss, the circuit court must look to our qualified immunity body of law and follow the steps this Court expressly has outlined to make the determination of whether qualified immunity applies under the specific circumstances of that particular case. Specifically, these steps include whether: (1) a state agency or employee is involved; (2) there is an insurance contract waiving the defense of qualified immunity; (3) the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W. Va. Code § 29-12A-1 et seq. would apply; (4) the matter involves discretionary judgments, decisions, and/or actions; (5) the acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person would have known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive; and (6) the State employee was acting within his/her scope of employment. ^{[8 ]}

In its order, the court first recounted the claims in the amended complaint, then concluded that Edward S. had "presented no evidence ... indicat[ing his] case against RCHA is based upon anything other than negligence." Consequently, the court found "this matter to involve a claim of ‘mere negligence’ as contemplated by the doctrine of qualified immunity." The court next concluded that "RCHA is a governmental agency within the purview of qualified immunity." ⁹ It then concluded that RCHA was not a political subdivision as defined in the Tort Claims Act because it had been established by the West Virginia Legislature, not the Raleigh County Commission. ¹⁰ The court reasoned further that, although RCHA is a public body charged with the performance of a government function, it did not have coextensive jurisdiction with one or more counties, cities, or towns so, again, it did not qualify as a political subdivision and the Tort Claims Act did not apply. ¹¹ The circuit court went on to conclude that Edward S. had alleged negligence by RCHA in the performance of its discretionary functions, and that RCHA's alleged acts and omissions had not violated Edward S.’s clearly established constitutional right or laws of which a reasonable person would have known. ¹²

Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that:

RCHA is not protected by the [Tort Claims Act] because it is not a political subdivision as defined thereby.

Nevertheless, RCHA is entitled to qualified immunity from this lawsuit because the Plaintiffs’ claims are of mere negligence against RCHA, alleging acts or omissions related to discretionary judgments that do not amount to violations of clearly established rights or laws.

Having concluded that RCHA was qualifiedly immune from Edward S.’s suit, the circuit court granted summary judgment to RCHA. Edward S. now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." "A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo ," ¹³ which means

[a]new; afresh; a second time. We have often used the term " de novo " in connection with the term "plenary." Perhaps more instructive for our present purposes is the definition of the term "plenary," which means "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified." We therefore give a new, complete and unqualified review to the parties’ arguments and the record before the circuit court. ^{[14 ]}

Likewise, we review de novo "issue[s] on an appeal from the circuit court" that are "clearly a question of law or involv[e] interpretation of a statute ...." ¹⁵ Finally,

[t]he ultimate

...