Edwards v. Billmeier, Civil Action No. 18-1857 (AET-LHG)

MACK EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT BILLMEIER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-1857 (AET-LHG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

October 19, 2018

HONORABLE ANNE E. THOMPSON

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Mack Edwards, Plaintiff Pro Se

243036E

Northern State Prison

PO BOX 2300

168 Frontage Road

Newark, NJ 07114

THOMPSON, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Mack Edwards' ("Plaintiff") civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint, Docket Entry 1. At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the complaint will be dismissed. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to file an amended complaint.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against New Jersey Superior Court Judge Robert Billmeier, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor Michael Grillo, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor Michelle Gasparian, Detective Mercello Masseroni, Mercer County Correctional Center ("MCCC") Warden Charles Ellis, and MCCC Deputy Warden Phyllis Oliver. The following factual allegations are taken from the complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the truth of Plaintiff's allegations.

Plaintiff states he was arrested by the Trenton Police on murder charges in January 2011. Complaint ¶ 18. He was placed in the MCCC in approximately March 2011. Id. According to Plaintiff, Judge Billmeier ordered Plaintiff to be removed from general population on October 4, 2016 as the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office had charged him with witness tampering. Id. Plaintiff alleges Judge Billmeier ordered him to be placed in solitary confinement and for his phone communications, visits, and incoming and outgoing mail to be suspended. Id. ¶ 19.

Plaintiff's cell was searched by a Mercer County Prosecutor's Office detective pursuant to a warrant on October 6 and 16, 2016. Id. ¶ 20. The detective seized discovery material from Plaintiff's criminal case in addition to all of Plaintiff's personal effects. Id. Plaintiff complained to Judge Billmeier, and the judge ordered the return of the discovery material. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff states he never received any of the material back from the prosecutor's office or the MCCC. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Billmeier's order only permitted visits from Plaintiff's daughter. The order did not permit any other family member to accompany her. Id. ¶ 22. He further alleges he was only afforded limited access to his attorney and all phone calls and visits had to be conducted in Deputy Warden Oliver's presence. Id. ¶¶ 24-25.

He also makes various allegations about being denied access to the courts due to insufficient legal supplies, access to his attorney, and interference with his legal mail. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. He asserts Warden Ellis and Deputy Warden Oliver confiscated his mail and did not comply with prison procedures regarding confiscated mail. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. He further claims personal items were seized from his cell and were used as evidence in his trial. Id. ¶¶ 30-32.

Plaintiff raises claims of malicious prosecution, unlawful search and seizure, interference with his access to the courts, perjury, and negligent failure to protect. In addition to monetary damages, he asks the Court to order the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office to "[r]emove all perjured testimony from the records of the Grand Jury Proceeding in the Tampering with a Witness case" and "[r]emove tampered evidence and all derivative evidence that was recovered for the violation involving defendants Grillo, and Gasparian." Id. at 13(B)(2) & (4)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim,¹ the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiffs "still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to thedeprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff's claims against Judge Billmeier are clearly barred by judicial immunity.² "It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally 'immune from a suit for money damages.'" Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at 11, 9, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991)). "A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); see also Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[I]mmunity will not be lost merely because the judge's action is 'unfair' or controversial."). "A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." Stump, 435 U.S. at 359.

"[Judicial] immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. "First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Id. In determining whether an act qualifies as a "judicial act," courts look to "the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his [or her] judicial capacity." Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. "Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.

Judge Billmeier's order was issued in the context of Plaintiff's criminal trial and in response to charges of witness tampering. This order "was a judicial act not undertaken in the complete absence of jurisdiction." Gallas, 211 F.3d at 772. All claims against Judge Billmeier are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff asserts claims of malicious prosecution against Assistant Prosecutors Grillo and Gasparian as well as Detective Mercello Masseroni for "falsifying a claim of tampering with [a] witness . . . ." Complaint ¶ 46.

Assistant Prosecutors Grillo and Gasparian are immune from suit under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court has held that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under s 1983." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). "This is true even where a prosecutor has acted maliciously or dishonestly." Mujaddid v. Wehling, 663 F. App'x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2016). Although prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their administrative or investigatory roles, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims against Assistant Prosecutors Grillo and Gasparian are clearly for actions taken in their ...