Edwards v. Bogdanoff

1

EDMUND EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. LEE R. BOGDANOFF, et al., Defendants.

No. CV 22-8812 FMO (PLA)

United States District Court, C.D. California, Western Division

February 2, 2023

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

HONORABLE FERNANDO M. OLGUIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On December 5, 2022, Edmund Edwards (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint initiating this pro se action. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also filed a “Request to Proceed In Forma Paupers,” which was blank apart from plaintiff's signature and a date. (ECF No. 2; “IFP Request”). A ruling on plaintiff's IFP Request was postponed for 30 days, and plaintiff was ordered to file the required information. (ECF No. 5). Instead, on January 12 2023, plaintiff paid the filing fee. (ECF No. 6).

On the Civil Cover Sheet that plaintiff filed with his Complaint plaintiff checked “diversity” as the basis for jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1-1). In his Complaint, plaintiff named as defendants Judge Bogdanoff, a “probate judge for the County of Los Angeles”; the County of Los Angeles; and the State of California. (ECF No. 1 at 1-3). Plaintiff states that he resides in Indiana and all of the defendants either work in Los Angeles County or are entities located within the State of California.

On January 17, 2023, the Court issued an Order Dismissing Complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 9; “Court's First Order”). In the Court's First Order, the Court found that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts in his Complaint to support an inference that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as is required to establish that diversity jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the Complaint was dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). However, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action and the Court must hold his pleadings to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys, the Court provided plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his pleading to correct the deficiencies as discussed in the Court's First Order. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Plaintiff was ordered, if he desired to pursue this action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, to allege in a First Amended Complaint specific facts supporting an inference that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as well facts showing that his citizenship is diverse from that of each defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff was admonished that, if he failed to timely file a First Amended Complaint or to remedy the deficiencies as discussed in the Court's First Order, the Court would dismiss this action without further leave to amend. (See ECF No. 9).

On January 24, 2023, plaintiff filed a pleading entitled “Plaintiff's Complaint at Law and in Equity.” (ECF No. 11).^[1] The Court has construed plaintiff's pleading liberally as plaintiff's Amended Complaint. In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff names as defendants Judge Bogdanoff; Judge Lippitt, also a “probate judge for the County of Los Angeles”; the County of Los Angeles; and the State of California. (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff now appears to be raising his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 1-4, 6, 8). It is not clear, however, what civil rights claims plaintiff is purporting to raise in this action. Plaintiff alleges generally that the action is for “deprivation of rights under color of state law for the reasons described and detailed herein” (id. at 3, 6), and that “defendants are engaged in a corruption and racketeering scheme designed to deprive individuals such as the plaintiff ... of the due process of law” or “of their constitutional rights” (id. at 3, 5 (“depriving the plaintiff of their [sic] constitutional rights”)). Plaintiff's only specific claims appear to be for the “deprivation of [unspecified] rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983” (id. at 6); a claim against the “City of Los Angeles,” an entity not named as a defendant in this action and against whom no facts are alleged (id. at 8); and a claim for “fraudulent misrepresentation” arising “[u]nder California law” (id. at 10). Plaintiff's claims all appear to concern a probate matter that appears to be pending in the Superior Court of California in which Superior Court Judge Bogdanoff gave two “individuals numerous opportunities to provide proof of their assertions [of a relationship to plaintiff's deceased father] in the form of a DNA test,” but then granted extensions and failed to issue sanctions when the individuals did not provide test results. (Id. at 3-4, 7). Although Judge Lippitt is named as a defendant in the Amended Complaint (id. at 1-2), no facts are alleged in the pleading against this defendant.

A federal court has an obligation to assure itself of jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of any case. See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439, 127 S.Ct. 1194, 167 L.Ed.2d 29 (2007). “‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,' possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.'” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994)). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Eggert, 953 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Scholastic Entm't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (a court may dismiss sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without violating due process). A “plaintiff bears the burden of proving” the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and “must allege facts, not mere legal conclusions,” to invoke the court's jurisdiction. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).

As an initial matter, plaintiff's claim raised pursuant to California law (ECF No. 11 at 10) does not give rise to a Section 1983 claim in this action. Rather, plaintiff must allege that a named defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). An alleged violation of California law simply cannot give rise to a federal civil rights claim. See, e.g., Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1983 requires [a plaintiff] to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.”). Further, to the extent that plaintiff is purporting to raise a claim directly pursuant to Section 1983 (see ECF No. 11 at 6 (“[t]o assert a claim under section 1983”)), Section 1983 is not itself a source of a substantive right, but, rather, it provides a mechanism for an individual to seek a remedy for violations of specific federal statutory or constitutional rights. See, e.g., Stilwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (if an “Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against [certain] ... physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims”). Accordingly, plaintiff's general references to “due process,” “constitutional rights,” or Section 1983 fail to satisfy his burden of alleging facts, not mere legal conclusions, sufficient to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121.

Further, following plaintiff's opportunity for amendment, the only individual defendants plaintiff names in this action are two “probate judges” for the Superior Court of California. It appears from the factual allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint that the named judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit even in light of plaintiff's unsupported allegations that unspecified defendants are engaging in an “organized criminal scheme” or a “racketeering scheme designed to deprive individuals such as the plaintiff and others similarly situated of their rights and property in various ways” and without due process. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4, 8). Plaintiff alleges, without any supporting facts, that this “criminal racketeering scheme” deprived plaintiff of his “constitutional rights.” (Id. at 5, 7). Specifically, however, plaintiff merely alleges that Judge Bogdanoff continued to grant extensions of time to the two individuals ordered to provide DNA tests in the State Court probate matter, failed to impose sanctions against the individuals when they did not comply with such order, and acted “for the purpose of prolonging the matter.” (Id. at 3-5, 7).

Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from federal civil rights suits for judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts, and “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.” Mireles v Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). A judge does not lose absolute immunity merely because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority. See, e.g., Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Here, plaintiff's factual allegations against the two named judicial defendants pertain only to the granting of extensions of time and a repeated failure to impose sanctions. These factual allegations concern judicial acts taken in a judicial capacity, and plaintiff's speculative allegations of bad faith or maliciousness do not raise a plausible inference that Judge...