Edwards v. CSX Transp., Inc.

684 F.Supp.3d 443

Jimmy EDWARDS, Robert Hunt, Dolores Hunt, Clifford McKellar, Jr., andEmma McKellar, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant.

West Lumberton Baptist Church, Currie Chain Saw, Inc., C.J.M. Ventures, Inc.,William Locklear d/b/a Strickland's Barbershop, TBL Environmental Laboratory, Inc., Sammy's Auto Sales, Inc., andEric Chavis, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CSX Transportation, Inc., Defendant.

No. 7:18-CV-169-BO

No. 7:18-CV-178-BO

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division

Filed July 31, 2023

Signed July 27, 2023

Matthew D. Schultz, William F. Cash, III, Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell Rafferty & Proctor, P.A., Pensacola, FL, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, Gregory F. Coleman, William A. Ladnier, Greg Coleman Law PC, Knoxville, TN, Jeremy R. Williams, Scott C. Harris, Daniel K. Bryson, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Matthew E. Lee, Whitfield Bryson LLP, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiffs Jimmy Edwards, Robert Hunt, Dolores Hunt, Clifford McKellar, Jr., Emma McKellar in No. 7:18-CV-169.

Daniel K. Bryson, Martha A. Geer, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Matthew E. Lee, Whitfield Bryson LLP, Raleigh, NC, Jay J. Chaudhuri, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Leslie M. Kroeger, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, Adam J. Langino, Langino Law PLLC, Chapel Hill, NC, Gregory F. Coleman, William A. Ladnier, Greg Coleman Law PC, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiffs West Lumberton Baptist Church, Currie Chain Saw, Inc., C.J.M. Ventures, Inc., William Locklear, TBL Environmental Laboratory, Inc., Sammy's Auto Sales, Inc., Eric Chavis in No. 7:18-CV-169.

Henry L. Kitchin, Jr., McGuireWoods, LLP, Raleigh, NC, April N. Ross, Matthew A. Cohen, Rachel P. Raphael, Ruben Reyna, Scott L. Winkelman, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant in No. 7:18-CV-169.

Gary K. Shipman, Shipman & Associates, LLP, Wilmington, NC, Theodore J. Leopold, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, Adam J. Langino, Langino Law PLLC, Chapel Hill, NC, Daniel K. Bryson, Martha A. Geer, Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Jay J. Chaudhuri, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, Raleigh, NC, Douglas J. McNamara, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs in No. 7:18-CV-178.

Henry L. Kitchin, Jr., McGuireWoods, LLP, Raleigh, NC, April N. Ross, Scott L. Winkelman, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant in No. 7:18-CV-178.

ORDER

TERRENCE W. BOYLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This consolidated action is before the Court on defendant CSX Transportation's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiffs have responded, defendant has replied, and the motion is ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

The parties are well-familiar with the factual and procedural background of this consolidated action, and the Court provides only a summary here. In January 2019, the Court consolidated three putative class actions which alleged claims against CSX Transportation ("CSX") arising from flooding in and around the City of Lumberton, North Carolina as a result of Hurricanes Matthew and Florence. This Court dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint on CSX's motion. Plaintiffs appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed this Court's dismissal of plaintiffs' tort claims but reversed its dismissal of plaintiffs' single breach of contract claim. [DE 58].

Following remand, CSX answered the amended complaint and the parties engaged in a period of discovery.¹ CSX then filed the instant motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' remaining breach of contract claim and plaintiffs moved to certify the Rule 23 class. The Court subsequently granted CSX's motion to stay or postpone class certification proceedings pending its resolution of CSX's motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If that burden has been met, the non-moving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, a trial court views the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . . and [a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Speculative or conclusory allegations will not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002).

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. [DE 138, 142]. The Lumber River flows through the City of Lumberton, North Carolina ("the City" or "Lumberton"), from northwest to southeast. Neighborhoods on the north and east side of Lumberton are on somewhat elevated terrain, while neighborhoods on the south and west sides are in low-lying areas. A levee system was constructed from approximately 1975 to 1977 to address flooding caused by the Lumber River in the southern part of Lumberton.

A rail line operated by CSX and its predecessors runs parallel to the Lumber River, with Interstate 95 crossing over both the rail line and the river at a particular point. In June 1978, CSX's predecessor, the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company ("Seaboard"), the City, and the Robeson County Drainage District No. 1 ("Drainage District") entered into an agreement which has been referred to as the Tri-Party Agreement ("TPA"). The TPA states that, for consideration of one dollar, Seaboard granted the City and the Drainage District a license to construct and maintain an earthen dike, according to specifications, at or near Lumberton, specifically 760 feet southeastwardly from Milepost SE-295, and adjacent to Seaboard's railroad tracks. [DE 127-1]. The TPA gave the City the "right and privilege" to close "said dike across said track" only in the event of imminent danger of flooding. TPA ¶ 8(a). Seaboard was required to be given a minimum of twelve hours' notice prior to the City closing the dike. Id. The City agreed that it would open the dike once the flooding had receded and that all expenses incident to the closing of the dike would be borne by the City. Id. ¶.8(b). None of the plaintiffs is a party to the TPA nor were they involved in the formation, negotiation, or execution of the TPA. Plaintiffs were not consulted regarding the terms or existence of the TPA. No plaintiff in a residential home owned their property at the time of the execution of the TPA.

CSX's rail line through Lumberton is part of the U.S. Military's Strategic Rail Corridor Network, which allows the Department of Defense to access rail infrastructure in the event of military and national defense emergencies. The U.S. Military thus monitors CSX's rail line through Lumberton and has influence over CSX's decisions to close the line.

Hurricanes Matthew and Florence struck in 2016 and 2018, respectively, and caused the Lumber River, which divides the City, to overflow its banks and flood portions of Lumberton. At the times of these hurricanes, the City had not constructed the dike contemplated by the TPA.

1. Implied preemption bars plaintiffs' contract claim.

CSX argues first that plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is impliedly preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101, et seq. ("ICCTA"). The court of appeals has determined that plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is not expressly preempted by ICCTA, but that it "might still be impliedly preempted," leaving the issue open for CSX to raise on remand. Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 983 F.3d 112, 121 n.11 (4th Cir. 2020).

"[T]he generally accepted test for ICCTA implied or conflict preemption [asks]: does the enforcement action unreasonably interfere with rail transportation?" PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 220-21 (4th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up, citation omitted). In examining whether plaintiffs' tort claims were expressly preempted by ICCTA, the Fourth Circuit held that it was "hard to view [plaintiffs'] claims as anything other than direct attempts to 'regulate' railroading." Edwards, 983 F.3d at 122. This holding applies equally to plaintiffs' TPA contract claim and is further supported by the undisputed record evidence.

First, the plain language of the TPA expressly confers on the City "the right and privilege of closing" the dike which the City was permitted to build adjacent to CSX's rail track with proper notice to the railroad, resulting in the closure of the rail line and any rail activities. The City is further provided with the unfettered discretion to determine when the rail tracks can be reopened and CSX can thus resume its business. The TPA permits the City to interfere with rail...