Edwards v. Lindenwold Police Dep't

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RENÉ DALLAS EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. LINDENWOLD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-13076

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

March 3, 2022

RENE DALLAS EDWARDS Plaintiff appearing pro se

OPINION

NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motions for Recusal and Motions to Accept the Special Master Report and for a Settlement Conference. (ECF No. 4, 6, and 8). In addition Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint in response to the Court's Order dated July 22, 2021. (ECF No. 5). Since Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the Court will screen the Amended Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious, or if the Amended Complaint fails to comply with the proper pleading standards.

For the reasons explained below, the Court will (1) dismiss, in part Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without prejudice and afford Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies addressed in this Opinion and (2) deny without prejudice Plaintiff's Motions for Recusal and Motions to Accept the Special Master Report and for a Settlement Conference.

BACKGROUND^[1]

On or about February 8, 2021, at approximately 2:30 AM, Plaintiff was driving his vehicle to take out the trash in his apartment complex. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) At that same time, Chief Lieutenant Heleston (“Heleston”), in a marked Lindenwold police vehicle, pulled up behind Plaintiff as he began to travel through his apartment complex. (Id. at 5 ¶7.) During this time, Heleston did not turn on the flashing lights on his police vehicle. (Id.) At some point after, Heleston entered Plaintiff's apartment by knocking down Plaintiff's door. (Id. at 5 ¶8.A.) Heleston had no warrant to enter Plaintiff's apartment. (Id.) At the time, Plaintiff was not running from Defendant Heleston nor was Plaintiff committing a crime. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that “[a]fter wrongfully battering Plaintiff and causing him to sustain severe and permanent injury” Heleston failed to assure Plaintiff received the appropriate medical treatment. (Id. ¶9.) Around this time, Patrolman McDowell (“McDowell”) and Adam Ericco (“Ericco”) were also present at the scene and failed to assure Plaintiff received a medical evaluation and treatment prior to leaving his apartment. (Id. ¶11.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Heleston, McDowell, and Errico (collectively “Individual Officers”), Michael P. McCarthy, Jr. (“McCarthy”), ^[2] Borough of Lindenwold (“Lindenwold”), and Mayor Richard Roach, Jr. (“Mayor Roach”)(collectively “Defendants) asserting the following five causes of action: (1) Count One - Use of Excessive Force; (2) Count Two - Reckless Indifference to Plaintiff's Serious Medical Needs; (3) Count Three - Monetary Claims against Lindenwold and Mayor Roach; (4) Count Four - Battery; and (5) Count Five - Claim for Gross Negligence or Willful and Wanton Misconduct.

DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court has original federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and has supplemental jurisdiction over the New Jersey state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

B. Legal Standards

a. Motion for Recusal

There are two principal statutes addressing recusal of a federal judge, 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The Third Circuit has held that “[t]he test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Allen v. Parkland Sch. Dist., 230 Fed.Appx. 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2003)).

Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 144, recusal must occur “[w]henever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. A “substantial burden is imposed on the party filing an affidavit of prejudice to demonstrate that the judge is not impartial.” Ali v. United States, No. 14-7723 (NLH), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145360, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2015) (quoting Frolow v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., No. 05-04813, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38098, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2011) (citation omitted); Kilkeary v. United States, No. 12-2781, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78822, at *8 (D.N.J. June 18, 2015)).

b. Screening Complaints Filed IFP Pursuant to Section 1915

Although § 1915 refers to “prisoners, ” federal courts apply § 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications. See Hickson v. Mauro, No. 11-6304, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137260, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011) (citing Lister v. Dept of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005)); Lister, 408 F.3d at 1312 (“Section 1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and not just to prisoners.”). Once IFP status has been granted, a court must follow the screening provisions of the IFP statute. The screening provisions of the IFP statute require a federal court to dismiss an action sua sponte if, among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply with the proper pleading standards. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 17-3129, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140747, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2017) (“Federal law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's Complaint for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit.”).

As indicated, this Court must follow the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in considering a pro se complaint. Pro se complaints must be construed liberally, and all reasonable latitude must be afforded the pro se litigant. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). But, pro se litigants “must still plead the essential elements of [their] claim and [are] not excused from conforming to the standard rules of civil procedure.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Sykes v. Blockbuster Video, 205 Fed.Appx. 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that pro se plaintiffs are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

When screening a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005). It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do ....” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions' ....”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal ... provides the final nail in the coffin for the ‘no set of facts' standard that applied to federal complaints before Twombly.”). “A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

C. Plaintiff's Motions

Plaintiff's fails to cite the bases for his Motions for Recusal. For this reason, the Court will consider both 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(a).

The Court first finds Plaintiff's Motions for Recusal, to the extent based on 28 U.S.C. § 144, procedurally defective. Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, Plaintiff bears the burden of filing a “sufficient affidavit” demonstrating that this Court has a “personal bias or prejudice against him or in favor of any adverse party.” Plaintiff failed to file any affidavit as required by § 144.

The Court further finds neither § 144 nor § 455 would warrant the Court to grant Plaintiff's Motions for Recusal anyway. Plaintiff explains recusal is warranted due to “discrimination and refusual [sic] to see me or speak to me due to my race, last appointed attorney said he dislike [sic] African/Spanish people on his own personal reason.” (ECF No. 4 at 1). Plaintiff's more recent filings echo these claims, arguing that recusal is warranted because the Court has not afforded him oral arguments in prior cases, and he is being discriminated against here on the basis of his race, sexual orientation, age, and religion. See, e.g.,...