Edwards v. State

1

Armon D. Edwards, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 23A-CR-536

Court of Appeals of Indiana

January 16, 2024

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court Trial Court Cause No 18C05-1810-MR-3 The Honorable Thomas A. Cannon, Jr., Judge

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Ronald K. Smith Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Nicole D. Wiggins Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Robb Senior Judge

Statement of the Case

[¶1] Armon D. Edwards ambushed Jordan Rowe at a gas station and fatally shot him after telling him to surrender his gun. Edwards appeals his convictions of felony murder and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, challenging the admissibility of his statements to police officers and the sufficiency of the evidence. Concluding Edwards has not shown reversible error, we affirm.

Issues

[¶2] Edwards raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Edwards' statements to the police.

II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Edwards' claim of self-defense.

III. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Edwards' conviction of felony murder.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶3] Edwards and Rowe had a history of conflicts in the months preceding Rowe's death. Edwards lived with his grandmother, and he believed Rowe and others had fired shots at her house. Edwards acquired a firearm.

[¶4] On October 7, 2018, at 3 a.m., Tanisha Watkins and Edwards left a Muncie bar at closing time. Watkins drove Edwards to a nearby convenience store and gas station, where she parked on the side of the store. The store was open, and several people, including Rowe, had gathered between the front door and the gas pumps.

[¶5] Watkins and Edwards left her vehicle and separated. Edwards walked up to Rowe with the hood of his jacket pulled up. While Rowe was looking in the opposite direction, Edwards pulled out a handgun and grabbed Rowe by his shirt. He pointed his gun at Rowe's head as they struggled. Edwards shoved Rowe onto the hood of a car and hit him with the handgun. Rowe drew a handgun and shot Edwards in the right side of his torso, under his arm. Next, Edwards knocked Rowe to the ground near the gas pumps and repeatedly shot him at close range. An autopsy later revealed Rowe had been shot six times and died from his gunshot wounds.

[¶6] Edwards ran back to Watkins' vehicle, holding his hood over his head as he ran, and got behind the wheel. Watkins entered the vehicle, and Edwards drove away. He drove to his grandmother's house, rejecting Watkins' suggestions that he immediately go to the hospital. Watkins heard Edwards tell his family, "he just shot somebody - he think [sic] he killed 'em and that -yeah. And he had got [sic] shot too." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 244. Edwards changed clothes and had a friend drive him to a hospital.

[¶7] In the meantime, Detective Brent Brown of the Muncie Police Department was the primary investigator for Rowe's death. He learned that Edwards, who had been identified as a suspect, had arrived at a hospital with a gunshot wound. A police evidence technician visited Edwards at the hospital later on Oct. 7 to collect a DNA sample, and Edwards said he would speak with a detective.

[¶8] On October 8, the hospital discharged Edwards at around 3 p.m. Officer Ryan McCorkle met Edwards in his hospital room to take him to Detective Brown. Officer McCorkle was wearing a body camera, which recorded audio and video of his conversation with Edwards. The officer did not ask Edwards any questions about the October 7 shooting. To the contrary, as they conversed, Officer McCorkle told Edwards he could not ask him any questions about the incident. But Edwards described his history of disputes with Rowe. Edwards further said he saw Rowe first at the gas station and approached him, grabbing him "aggressively." Tr. Vol. 6, State's Ex. 85, at 4:13. Edwards told the officer, "I knew I had to get him before he got me." Id. at 2:56. He admitted Rowe "didn't see [him] coming." Id. at 8:30. Edwards described hitting Rowe in the head with his own gun at the outset of the struggle and ordering Rowe to turn over his gun. He then claimed Rowe shot him, causing him to shoot Rowe "once." Id. at 5:11.

[¶9] At the police station, Detective Brown advised Edwards of his Miranda rights, and Edwards signed a Miranda waiver form. During a recorded interview with Detective Brown, Edwards admitted he was armed with a forty-caliber handgun on the night of the shooting. He again described his history of disputes with Rowe. Edwards also said he saw Rowe first and he approached him with a handgun, intending to confront him. Edwards explained he had intended to take Rowe's gun, and he grabbed Rowe first. Finally, Edwards admitted he hit Rowe on the head, knocking him to the ground, before shooting him. Edwards told the detective, "I was wrong for approaching him with that firearm ...." Tr. Vol. 6, Ex. 75, at 19:50.

[¶10] Officers searched Edwards' home, Watkins' vehicle, and the vehicle in which Edwards' friend transported him to the hospital, but they never found the handgun Edwards used or the clothes Edwards wore during the shooting.

[¶11] The State charged Edwards with Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter; murder, a felony; felony murder; Level 3 felony attempted armed robbery; and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. Edwards raised a claim of self-defense. The jury determined Edwards was not guilty of murder but was guilty of all other charges. The trial court ruled the manslaughter and attempted armed robbery convictions merged into the felony murder conviction. For his felony murder and criminal recklessness convictions, the trial court sentenced Edwards to an aggregate term of fifty years. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Edwards' Statements to Police

[¶12] Edwards claims the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see the recordings of his discussions with Officer McCorkle at the hospital and with Detective Brown at the police station.^[1] "The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Crocker v. State, 989 N.E.2d 812, 818 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013), trans. denied. "An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law." Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id.

[¶13] Edwards argues his statements to Officer McCorkle were inadmissible because the officer did not provide Miranda advisements before speaking with him. When police officers take a person into custody, the person must be advised of the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney before being subjected to interrogation. See Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995) (discussing Miranda advisements). The person must also be warned that any statement they make may later be used as evidence against them. Id. But "[a]n officer is only required to give Miranda warnings when a defendant is both (1) in custody and (2) subject to interrogation." Scanlandv. State, 139 N.E.3d 237, 242 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).

[¶14] The State does not dispute Edwards was in custody when Officer McCorkle met him at the hospital. But the State claims Officer McCorkle did not interrogate Edwards and did not need to advise Edwards of his rights. We agree. "Under Miranda, 'interrogation' refers to 'either express questioning or its functional equivalent.'" Hartman v. State, 988 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). "The Court has defined the functional equivalent of express questioning as 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'" Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297).

[¶15] In Edwards' case, McCorkle met him at his hospital room. McCorkle told Edwards he could not ask any questions about the incident and said Edwards should speak with the detective about the case. But Edwards voluntarily explained his history of disputes with Rowe and described his assault on Rowe at the gas station, including the fatal shooting. Officer McCorkle did not put handcuffs on Edwards until after he had finished talking about the incident and they were leaving the hospital room. Nothing about Officer McCorkle's statements or conduct amounted to the functional equivalent of interrogation. See Scanland, 139 N.E.3d at 244 (trial court did not err in admitting Scanland's incriminating statements to an officer; Scanland was in custody, but his statements were volunteered, with no prompting from the officer, and did not stem from interrogation).

[¶16] Next, Edwards argues his statements to both Officer McCorkle and Detective Brown are inadmissible because he was injured and under the effects of medication at the time, and he could not legitimately consent to speak with them. "The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights, and that the defendant's confession was voluntarily given." Schmitt v. State, 730 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. 2000). On appeal, we ...