Edwards v. State

Johnathan Bernard Edwards, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

A18-2123

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

July 15, 2019

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Schellhas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CR-13-9489

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Tracy M. Smith, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.^*

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SCHELLHAS, Judge

Appellant argues that a postconviction court erred by denying him relief after an evidentiary hearing because his trial counsel provided him ineffective assistance and his sentence is based on an erroneous criminal-history score. Appellant also raises pro se claims. We affirm.

FACTS

After a jury found appellant Jonathan Edwards guilty of one count of first-degree sex trafficking of a 15-year-old victim, the district court sentenced Edwards to 240 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal to this court, Edwards argued that the court erroneously admitted: objected-to and unobjected-to hearsay statements, a statement by a nontestifying codefendant, and improper bad-acts evidence; and that the cumulative effects of the alleged errors denied him a fair trial. In a pro se supplemental brief, Edwards also argued that: he did not knowingly waive a challenge to probable cause; the court erroneously joined his trial with a codefendant; the court erroneously failed to strike a juror; the prosecutor committed misconduct; he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; the court erroneously calculated his criminal-history points; and the court erroneously assigned to him a custody-status point. This court affirmed but preserved for a postconviction proceeding Edwards's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. State v. Edwards, No. A15-0836 (Minn. App. May 23, 2016) (Edwards I), review denied (Minn. Aug. 9, 2016), cert. denied 137 S. Ct. 484 (2016).

Edwards petitioned for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and an improper sentence due to an erroneous calculation of his criminal-history score. In a pro se petition, Edwards also asserted arguments about ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the calculation of his criminal-history score. Following two evidentiary hearings, the postconviction court denied Edwards's petition.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellate courts "review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief . . . for an abuse of discretion." Reed v. State, 925 N.W.2d 11, 18 (Minn. 2019). A postconviction court "abuses its discretion if it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Id. (quotation omitted). "The postconviction court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo." Fox v. State, 913 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn. 2018). We address each of Edwards's postconviction claims, counseled and uncounseled.

I. Ineffective assistance of counsel: failure to object to hearsay

"The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel." Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 14 (Minn. 2019).

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [an] appellant must show both that (1) his trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id.; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). "The objective standard of reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances." Crow, 923 N.W.2d at 14 (quotation omitted). A reviewing court "considers the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury in making a determination of prejudice." Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). "In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and this court does not review matters of trial strategy or the particular tactics used by counsel." Crow, 923 N.W.2d at 14. Appellate courts review a postconviction court's application of the Strickland test "de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017). Edwards argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed "to object to inadmissible, highly damaging hearsay evidence."

Respondent State of Minnesota argues that this claim is Knaffla barred. See Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007) ("When a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be adjudicated on the basis of the trial record, it must be brought on direct appeal or it is barred by the Knaffla rule if raised in a postconviction petition."); see also State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (barring postconviction review of all claims raised "and all claims known but not raised" on direct appeal). Because Edwards's claim lacks merit, we decide this case on other grounds and need not address the state's argument. See Wayne v. State, 866 N.W.2d 917, 920 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (refusing to address argument where case decided on other grounds).

In his postconviction petition, Edwards claimed that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of his counsel's failure to object to testimony from victim T.S.'s mother, T.S.'s "auntie," T.S.'s father's girlfriend, and two investigating officers who testified about T.S.'s description about various aspects of Edwards's involvement in facilitating T.S. having sex with men for money ("7 to 20 men a day"), and T.S.'s written statement in a notebook that she kept. On direct appeal, Edwards challenged the district court's failure to strike these alleged hearsay statements sua sponte. This court concluded that admission of the alleged hearsay was not plain error because it was "not clear or obvious" as to whether the statements would have been admissible under the residual exception to hearsay. Edwards I, 2016 WL 2945947, at *6.¹

At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Edwards's trial counsel testified that after T.S. testified at trial that "everything [she had reported] was a lie," he was "not going to hammer and object to what she's already said [were] lies. If I object to it, I'm bringing attention to it"; and he further explained that "the strategy at that point was not to belabor what the lies were. . . . I wasn't going to draw what would be unnecessary attention to something she said she already lied about." The postconviction court concluded that Edwards's counseled ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim failed because he presented "no evidence" that his trial counsel's performance was not reasonable and his decisions not to object amounted to unreviewable "tactical" trial decisions.

The state argues that this court's conclusion in Edwards I, that the district court did not plainly err by not sua sponte striking the alleged hearsay, shows that the statements were not obviously inadmissible and that Edwards therefore did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the basis that his counsel did not object to admission of the statements. We agree.

In Leake, the supreme court concluded that a defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on his counsel's failure to object to hearsay "despite the judge's observation that 'extensive hearsay of very questionable admissibility' had been elicited," was not unreasonable because the decisions not to object "were sound strategic decisions." 737 N.W.2d at 542. Similarly here, Edwards's counsel's decision not to object to the alleged hearsay in order not "to bring attention to" T.S.'s admitted lies was a sound strategic trial decision. See id. at 536 (stating that "[m]atters of trial strategy lie within the discretion of trial counsel and will not be second guessed by appellate courts," and that "[d]ecisions about objections at trial are matters of trial strategy"); see also Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at 591-92 (concluding that postconviction court did not err in denying ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on failure to object because it "is well established that we give an attorney's trial-strategy decision particular deference," and that "decisions about objections at trial are matters of trial strategy, which we will not review" (quotations omitted)); State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 818 n.3 (Minn. 2013) (stating that appellate courts "do not second-guess trial counsel's decisions about trial strategy," and declining to address claim involving counsel's trial strategy to not have client testify).

Citing State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 507 (Minn. 2013), Edwards argues that even though appellate courts generally do not review trial strategy, this court should "reject" this approach. But Nicks is inapposite because it involves a postconviction court that did not grant an evidentiary hearing, and the petitioner's trial counsel allegedly failed to investigate facts "directly related to the defendant's theory of that case." Id. at 508. The Nicks court emphasized that "trial counsel's choices made after conducting a thorough investigation of the law and the facts are virtually unchallengeable." Id. (quotation and emphasis omitted).

In this case, Edwards has not overcome the "strong presumption" that his trial counsel acted reasonably; he relies on caselaw from foreign and federal courts, and...