Edwards v. State

JEREMIAH EZEKIEL EDWARDS v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 411

No. 707

No. 708

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2018

August 13, 2019

Circuit Court for Baltimore County

Case No. 03-K-17-003357, 03-K-17-003419, 03-K-17-004041

UNREPORTED

Meredith, Shaw Geter, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Shaw Geter, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This is a consolidated appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County from Jeremiah Edwards' convictions and denial of motion for specific performance to enforce the plea agreement. Following failed plea negotiations, Edwards elected a jury trial and was found guilty of first and second-degree assault and carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure. He was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment for first-degree assault, and a concurrent three-year sentence for carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure.¹ Edwards presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's motion for specific performance of the plea deal where the essential terms of the deal were proposed by the prosecutor, the sentence was slightly restricted by the court, and the deal was accepted by the defense?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defense counsel's motion for mistrial after Officer Sheckells told jurors that appellant's photo array picture was a "booking photograph" and Officer Roche told them police responded to appellant's house after he "confronted" his girlfriend?

3. Whether the evidence used to convict appellant of carrying a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure was legally sufficient where there was no evidence the "little pocket knife" was not a pen knife?

We discuss issues one and two only as the State has conceded error as to issue three. For the reasons below, we shall reverse in part and affirm in part.

BACKGROUND

On March 26, 2018, the parties participated in an off-the-record chambers conference to discuss a plea agreement. Edwards had three active cases, but if he pledguilty to first-degree assault in the first case, and an amended charge of second degree assault in the second case, the third case would be dismissed. In exchange the State offered Edwards a "flat 12-year sentence." Defense counsel rejected this offer and countered that Edwards might be willing to accept an eight to nine-year sentence. The judge then stated he would be willing to impose a 15-year sentence with all but five years suspended. Defense counsel left chambers to convey this offer to Edwards. Shortly after, the judge sent his law clerk to notify the parties that he had made an error. The State was notified first, and then defense counsel was made aware of the error as he returned to chambers to relay Edwards' acceptance of the plea. The judge had intended to suspend five years and impose ten years of incarceration. Edwards then rejected the offer and defense counsel filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement. Following a denial of the motion, Edwards proceeded to trial on one of the cases that was a part of the proposed plea agreement.

The case involved a stabbing incident that occurred on June 11, 2017. On the day in question, the victim, Silas Hilliard, was in the vicinity of Jaydee Avenue to visit a woman named Krista Malczewski. He stated Edwards came from behind him asking "Do you know Krista?" Hilliard responded no, and he was then assaulted and stabbed. Jamie Bryant testified that she was sitting in her parked vehicle on Mildred Avenue when she witnessed the assault. She observed the suspect was a "black male, maybe about 5-6, 5-7 . . . [t]hin . . . [with] dreads in his hair and they were bleached blond[e] on the tips." Bryant also testified that when she attempted to intervene, the assailant took off.

At the police station, Bryant was shown a photo array that included a photograph of Edwards. She lingered on his photo but was ultimately unable to identify him as theassailant. Hilliard identified Edwards as his assailant on two occasions, once when he was in the hospital from a photo array and, again, while testifying in court. During trial, Officer Sheckells, the responding police officer, testified that he identified Edwards as a suspect from the information he was given by Hilliard. Based on this information, Officer Sheckells "crossed [Krista's name] with the address."² He found an individual named Krista in the area with prior "incidents at that address." After reviewing the reports of known associates of Krista, Officer Sheckells determined Edwards was a suspect.

During Officer Sheckells' testimony, the prosecutor inquired about the photo array Officer Sheckells had shown to Hilliard and Bryant. The prosecutor asked, "do you know or have any idea when that photograph may have been taken?" To which Officer Sheckells responded, "we compile these photo shows from the MVA or arrests, booking pictures. To my recollection, this was a booking photograph." Defense counsel then objected and moved for a mistrial. The judge sustained the objection, but denied the motion for a mistrial and issued a curative instruction.

The State called Officer Roche to testify regarding his encounter with Edwards and Krista on June 9, 2017, at Jaydee Avenue. When asked, over objection, what Edwards said to him while he was at the home, Officer Roche responded, "there was a phone call to Malczewski's cell phone and he had answered the phone and heard a male's voice and then went to the shower where Ms. Malczewski was and confronted her about a male calling her cell phone." Officer Roche further testified that Officer Sheckells contacted him toobtain a description of Edwards.

Following deliberations, the jury found Edwards guilty of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and carrying a dangerous weapon openly with the intent to injure. This timely appeal followed.

Additional facts will be incorporated in our discussion of the issues as they become necessary.

Discussion

I. The trial court did not err in denying defense counsel's motion for specific performance of the plea deal.

Edwards argues he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement because he communicated his acceptance of the judge's initial offer. Edwards contends that while the plea agreement proposed by the judge is slightly different from the one offered by the prosecutor, it nevertheless should be upheld. The State argues that no agreement was formed between Edwards and the State because the State did not agree to the offer proposed by the judge. The State also argues that the trial judge did not state he would be bound by a particular sentence.

Maryland Rule 4-243 sets out plea agreement parameters as follows:

(a) Conditions for Agreement.

(1) Terms. The defendant may enter into an agreement with the State's Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on any proper condition, including one or more of the following:

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(F) That the parties will submit a plea agreement proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to section (c) of this Rule.

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(c) Agreements of Sentence, Disposition, or Other Judicial Action.

(1) Presentation to the Court. If a plea agreement has been reached pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(F) of this Rule for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which contemplates a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action, the defense counsel and the State's Attorney shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge may then accept or reject the plea and, if accepted, may approve the agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs.

In Rios we stated:

There are two steps in the implementation of a plea agreement. First, the State and defendant must reach an agreement. Md. Rule 4-243(a) (l ) (2008). Second, the parties must then present the agreement to the court, which has the discretion to accept or reject the plea. Md. Rules 4-242(c), (d).

Rios v. State, 186 Md. App. 354, 362-63 (2009). The court can state charge(s) or sentence(s) it finds acceptable, "but the parties must then decide among themselves, outside of the presence of the court, whether to accept or reject the plea agreement tendered by the court." Barnes v. State, 70 Md. App. 694, 706 (1987) (internal quotations omitted).

Creating a plea agreement is similar to a contract. Hartman v. State, 452 Md. 279, 289 (2017). The plea negotiation standard "is one of fair play and equity under the facts and circumstances of the case, which, although entailing certain contract concepts, is to be distinguished from what the State appears to advocate[.]" State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697 (1976). Proper contract formation requires an acceptance "and common to all manifestations of acceptance is a demonstration that the parties had an actual meeting of the minds regarding contract formation." Cochran v. Norkunas, 398 Md. 1, 23 (2007).

An offer must be definite and certain. Peoples Drug Stores v. Fenton, 191 Md. 489, 494, 62 A.2d 273 (1948). . . . Accordingly, a mere expression of intention to do an act is not an offer to do it, and a general willingness to do something on the happening of a particular event or in return for something to be received does not amount to an offer.

Rios v. State, 186 Md. App. 354, 367-68 (2009) (citing Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 539 (1977)). "An 'offer' that requires a third party's approval before it becomes effective is no offer at all." Id. at 368.

In determining whether the court committed error, we must first determine if a valid plea offer was made and accepted. On review,...