Ekaidi v. Bd. of Supervisors of the S. Univ. Sys.

IBRAHIM EKAIDI v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION No. 16-7523 SECTION I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

February 22, 2017

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the defendants' motion¹ for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

I.

Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, the court determines there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment need not produce evidence negating the existence of material fact, but need only point out the absence of evidence supporting the other party's case. Id.; Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1195 (5th Cir. 1986).

Once the party seeking summary judgment carries its burden pursuant to Rule 56, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The showing of a genuine dispute is not satisfied by creating "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Instead, a genuine dispute of material fact exists when the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party responding to the motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine dispute. Id. The nonmoving party's evidence, however, "is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmoving party's] favor." Id. at 255; see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999).

II.

Plaintiff Ibrahim Ekaidi ("Ekaidi") filed this lawsuit accusing the State of Louisiana and certain faculty members of the Southern University at New Orleans ("SUNO") of discriminating against him because of his race, religion, ethnicity, and national origin. He complains that defendants—allegedly a group of Nigerian Christian faculty members and Nigerian Christian sympathizing faculty members at SUNO—took adverse employment actions against him because he is a Syrian Muslim. Specifically, Ekaidi alleges that defendants (1) conspired to discriminateagainst him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (2) discriminated against him by removing him from a SUNO hiring committee in violation of Title VII;² (3) discriminated against him and retaliated against him by denying him a promotion in violation of Title VII; and (4) created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. He also claims that these actions violated "applicable state law." See R. Doc. No. 1, at 12-13.

To the extent Ekaidi suggested during a recent telephone conference that each of the allegations advanced in support of his hostile work environment claim should also be considered as stand-alone claims, see R. Doc. No. 37, the Court rejects that argument for several reasons. First, the complaint—which actually identifies fewer causes of action in the "Claims" section than the Court described above—cannot be reasonably read in such a manner. Second, even if the complaint could be interpreted in that manner, Ekaidi has failed to satisfy the administrative exhaustionrequirement as to any allegation which does not pertain to his removal from the hiring committee. Third, apart from the defendants' alleged failure to promote him, none of the individual acts Ekaidi identifies in support of his hostile work environment claim can be considered actionable "adverse employment actions" under Title VII. Being prevented from attending academic conferences and being denied positions on committees, for example, are not adverse employment actions in this circuit.

III.

The defendants first argue that the claims should be dismissed because Ekaidi failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Before filing a Title VII claim, "complaining employees must exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEO division of their agency." Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claims for which plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies, see Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1990), the Court addresses this issue first.

It is undisputed that Ekaidi filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC prior to initiating this action. Nonetheless, the defendants argue that the claims advanced in the charge are distinct from the claims advanced in this lawsuit and, therefore, the exhaustion requirement has not been satisfied.

The Supreme Court has instructed that "[e]ach incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision" constitutes a separate actionable"unlawful employment practice" for which administrative remedies must be exhausted. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002); see also Freppon v. City of Chandler, 528 F. App'x 892, 899 (10th Cir. 2013). Each discrete act—such as "termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire"—must be timely challenged and exhausted before the Court will consider that act as the basis for an independent claim. See id.

When deciding whether a particular Title VII claim was included in the administrative charge, "the scope of an EEOC complaint should be construed liberally" because most charges are filed pro se. See Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788. The Court's review is defined "not solely by the scope of the administrative charge itself, but by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Id. at 789 (quotations omitted).

Ekaidi's charge stated, in pertinent part:

I was hired by Southern University at New Orleans more recently as a Tenured Associate Professor of Biology. During my employment, I was subjected to harassment in that I was singled out of a nine person hiring committee by a Hindu Department Head, accused of deceit, dishonesty, aiding and abetting mediocrity. I was given a letter of reprimand and warned that discharge might follow. In addition, I was also disciplined.

No reason was given for the action taken against me.

I believe I have been discriminated against because of my National Origin, Arab/Afghani/Mid Eastern and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

R. Doc. No. 19-4, at 2. In an addendum to the charge, Ekaidi wrote:

The administrative reprimands and threats of termination involved the only two Muslims on the nine-person search and evaluation committee. There seems to be no factual dispute that the collaborative procedures followed in theMay 16, 2014 selection process were exactly the same as procedures followed in earlier selection committees. At any rate the selection process had traditionally been a collaborative on both at Southern University at New Orleans (SUNO) and at other institutions of higher education in the New Orleans area. The random accusations leveled at both Ekaidi and Atteia were preposterous, at best, and were the barest fig-leaf for open hostility and intimidation on the part of the SUNO administration against two well-qualified and respected faculty members who happened to profess the Muslim faith.

The evaluations of Ekaidi and Atteia were excluded and the original evaluation scores were altered in such a way as to exclude from the interview process two Muslim candidates whom the committee as a whole had previously highly endorsed for interviews. As a direct result two highly qualified Muslim candidates for faculty positions were excluded from the interview process by administrative measures obviously motivated by impermissible considerations of race, religion and ethnic origin.

This incident comes in the context of ongoing student complaints about Federal grant money being awarded to Nigerian students at the expense of highly qualified native African-American students.

R. Doc. No. 19-4, at 3.

A.

The defendants admit that the charge encompasses Ekaidi's claim that the defendants discriminated against him by removing him from the SUNO hiring committee. See R. Doc. No. 37, at 1. Although neither the charge nor the addendum specifically mentions that Ekaidi was removed from the hiring committee, the Court agrees that the removal claim should be considered exhausted. After all, it is difficult to see how "the scope of the EEOC investigation which [could] reasonably be expected to grow out of" the charge's allegations could not have resulted in the EEOC's review of Ekaidi's claim that his committee membership was terminated. See Pacheco, 448F.3d at 789.³ For the following reasons, however, the Court finds the removal allegation to be the only Title VII violation encompassed by the EEOC charge.

B.

All of the factual allegations in the charge pertain to the defendants' purported decision to remove Ekaidi from the committee on pretextual grounds in order to exclude Muslims from the hiring process. Notably absent from the charge are most of the allegations in Ekaidi's complaint. The charge nowhere mentions that Ekaidi was denied a promotion. It does not describe the alleged pattern of abusive conduct to which Ekaidi was subjected each time he applied for a promotion. It does not mention the incident which Ekaidi alleges occurred when he applied for a...