Electricity v. Ill. Workers Comp. Comm'n

986 N.E.2d 107

369 Ill.Dec. 158

WOOD DALE ELECTRIC, Appellant,

v.The ILLINOIS WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Richard Bilson, Appellee).

No. 1–11–3394 WC.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District,

Workers' Compensation Commission Division.

Feb. 11, 2013.

Cassano & Associates, Naperville (Lawrence C. Cassano, of counsel), for Appellant.

Goldberg Weisman Cairo, Chicago (James J. Nawrocki, Kirsten M. Dunne, of counsel), for Appellee.

OPINION

Justice HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[369 Ill.Dec. 160]¶ 1 Wood Dale Electric appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which, among other things, reversed that portion of a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) that awarded it a credit pursuant to section 8(j)(2) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 305/8(j)(2) (West 2008)) against benefits due its injured employee, Richard Bilson (hereinafter referred to as the claimant), and affirming the Commission's award of a weekly wage differential to the claimant for injuries he suffered while working. For the reasons which follow, we vacate a portion of the circuit court's order and affirm the remainder.

¶ 2 The claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2008)), seeking benefits for a left shoulder injury he received while in the employ of Wood Dale. The following factual recitation is taken from the record on appeal, including the record of an arbitration hearing conducted on the claim on April 18, 2008.

¶ 3 The claimant, a journeyman electrician, testified that he fell at work and injured his left shoulder. He stated that he was unable to work as an electrician after the accident, so he sought other work through a vocational specialist. Eventually, with the consent of Wood Dale's insurance carrier, he accepted a job as a school bus driver, and he held that job at the time of the hearing. The job paid him $12.50 per hour for 20 hours per week-substantially less than the $37.80 per hour he would have received as an electrician. The claimant testified that, upon his reaching the age of 62 on May 27, 2008, he would be entitled to pension retirement benefits that are payable regardless of any disability. He testified that he had planned to wait until he was 65 years old to retire, but as a result of his injury, he applied to receive those benefits starting in May 2008.

¶ 4 Wood Dale did not dispute that the claimant is entitled to benefits under the Act as a result of his accident. It did, however, assert a right to a credit for the claimant's pension benefits. On June 23, 2008, following the hearing, the arbitrator found that the claimant's injury was compensable under the Act, and he awarded the claimant a total of 56 6/7 weeks of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, a weekly wage differential of $841.33 for the duration of the claimant's disability, and medical expenses. The arbitrator denied Wood Dale any credit for the claimant's pension benefits.

¶ 5 Wood Dale sought review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission. On January 27, 2009, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision, with two exceptions. First, the Commission modified the claimant's wage differential award to $840.65, per week, the maximum weekly wage differential that could be awarded under the Act. Second, the Commission found that, pursuant to section 8(j)(2) of the Act, Wood Dale should be entitled to a credit for any pension benefits that accrued during the claimant's time working for Wood Dale. Accordingly, the Commission remanded the case to the arbitrator to determine the amount of Wood Dale's pension credit.

¶ 6 On April 6, 2010, the arbitrator issued a decision calculating Wood Dale's pension credit at $432 per week. Both parties sought review before the Commission,which, on March 21, 2011, affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision.

¶ 7 The claimant filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County. On October 25, 2011, the circuit court issued an order finding that section 8(j)(2) of the Act does not allow a credit for pension benefits. The court thus set aside that part of the Commission's decision awarding Wood Dale a credit and confirmed the decision in all other respects. The court also added the following language to the end of its order:

“The parties * * * disagree as to whether and to what extent [the claimant] is entitled to pension payments, given that he apparently has not yet retired. * * * The record before this Court is insufficient to resolve the dispute. Therefore, this case is remanded to the Commission to determine, as a factual matter, the extent to which [the claimant] is entitled to receive pension benefits. Because [the claimant's] pensions are not disability pensions, [he] will be entitled to receive the same amount from his pensions as he would have had his injury never occurred.”

Thereafter, Wood Dale filed this appeal.

¶ 8 Before addressing the issues raised by Wood Dale, we find need to address the question of our own jurisdiction. Although neither party raises a jurisdictional issue, we have a duty to consider our jurisdiction and to dismiss this appeal if our jurisdiction is lacking. St. Elizabeth's Hospital v. Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 371 Ill.App.3d 882, 883, 309 Ill.Dec. 400, 864 N.E.2d 266 (2007). It is well settled that our jurisdiction is limited to the review of final judgments, unless an exception is provided by statute or supreme court rule. Trunek v. Industrial Comm'n, 345 Ill.App.3d 126, 127, 280 Ill.Dec. 747, 802 N.E.2d 1268 (2003). An order of the circuit court which reverses a decision of the Commission and remands the matter to the Commission is interlocutory and not appealable. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Ill.2d 52, 54, 92 Ill.Dec. 524, 485 N.E.2d 335 (1985); Stockton v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ill.2d 120, 124, 12 Ill.Dec. 744, 370 N.E.2d 548 (1977). Under normal circumstances, then, the circuit court's order, which purports to remand this matter to the Commission for further findings, would be nonfinal, and we would lack jurisdiction over this appeal.

¶ 9 However, there lies an important distinction between the typical remand order and the circuit court's remand order in this case: here, the remand order was entered in excess of the circuit court's jurisdiction. “Although the circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and enjoy a presumption of subject matter jurisdiction, that presumption does not apply in workers' compensation proceedings where the court exercises special statutory jurisdiction.” Rojas v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 406 Ill.App.3d 965, 971, 347 Ill.Dec. 465, 942 N.E.2d 668 (2010). See also Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9 (“Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters,” but “Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.”). In workers' compensation cases, “[t]he circuit court's jurisdiction to review a decision of the Commission is a special statutory power.” Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Industrial Comm'n, 305 Ill.App.3d 657, 660, 238 Ill.Dec. 752, 712 N.E.2d 856 (1999). Courts exercising this special statutory jurisdiction “may exercise their powers within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute” that empowers them, but “the jurisdiction depends upon the grant of the statute.” Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370, 379–80, 166 N.E. 85 (1929). When a court acting under special statutory jurisdiction enters a judgment that “transcends the statute conferring jurisdiction on the court,” the court “exceed[s] its jurisdiction.” Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill. 334, 339, 16 N.E.2d 717 (1938)disapproved of on other grounds inJames v. Frantz, 21 Ill.2d 377, 383, 172 N.E.2d 795 (1961). We have that situation here.

¶ 10 Just as with our obligation to examine our own jurisdiction, we are also obligated to examine the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Reichert v. Court of Claims, 203 Ill.2d 257, 261, 271 Ill.Dec. 916, 786 N.E.2d 174 (2003); Baldwin v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 409 Ill.App.3d 472, 476, 351 Ill.Dec. 56, 949 N.E.2d 1151 (2011). The Act confers upon the Commission the authority to settle disputed questions of law or fact pertaining to claims brought under the Act (see 820 ILCS 305/19 (West 2008)), and, in turn, it confers upon the circuit court special statutory jurisdiction to review Commission rulings (see 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2008)). Thus, the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction extends only to review of the Commission's determinations of parties' rights under the Act. Here, the Commission determined that Wood Dale was obligated to pay benefits under the Act, but it determined that Wood Dale was entitled to a credit for nondisability pension benefits the claimant had earned. The circuit court had jurisdiction to review that conclusion, because it affects the parties' rights under the Act. The circuit court did not, however, enjoy jurisdiction over any issues relating to the claimant's right to the pension benefits themselves, as such matters are not governed by the Act.

¶ 11 For a court exercising statutory jurisdiction, “ ‘[a]ny action the trial court takes that is outside the statute's stricture is void.’ ” Cushing v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 100768, ¶ 103, 358 Ill.Dec. 736, 965 N.E.2d 1215 (quoting In re Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 92, 355 Ill.Dec. 375, 959 N.E.2d 1108). “A void order is a complete nullity from its inception and has no legal effect.” Cushing, 2012 IL App (1st) 100768, ¶ 103, 358 Ill.Dec. 736, 965 N.E.2d 1215. When a court acts beyond its limited jurisdiction, the portion of the judgment that exceeds the court's jurisdiction must be considered void and must be vacated. See People v. Sweeney, ...