Elfers v. Varnau

101 F.Supp.3d 753

Donna ELFERS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Judith A. VARNAU, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:14cv171.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

Filed March 31, 2015.

Adam Gingold Gerhardstein, Alphonse Adam Gerhardstein, Jennifer Lynn Branch, Jacklyn Gonzales Martin, Gerhardstein & Branch Co. LPA, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Kimberly Vanover Riley, Linda L. Woeber, Montgomery Rennie & Jonson, Cincinnati, OH, Thomas G. Eagle, Thomas G. Eagle Co. LPA, Lebanon, OH, Cara Michelle Wright, Solon, OH, Todd M. Raskin, Mazanec, Raskin, Ryder & Keller Co., L.P.A., Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

MICHAEL R. BARRETT, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants Brown County, OH/Brown County Ohio Commissioners' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 27) and Defendants Dennis Varnau and Judith A. Varnau's Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 28, 30). These motions have been fully briefed. (Docs. 29, 31, 32, 33). In addition, Defendants Dennis and Judith Varnau have filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. 34).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are the sister and daughter of Hanson Jones. (Doc. 25, ¶¶ 5, 6). Defendant Dr. Judith Varnau is the Brown County Coroner. Dr. Varnau was called to Jones' home in the early hours of August 8, 2013. (Id.,¶ 13). Dr. Varnau was accompanied her husband, Defendant Dennis Varnau, whom Dr. Varnau had authorized to act on her behalf. (Id.,¶ 14). Dr. Varnau declared Jones' death a suicide and had his body transported to a hospital. Plaintiffs arrived at the house about an hour later. (Id.,¶ 34).

Plaintiffs do not believe Jones committed suicide. (Id.,¶¶ 30–31, 53–55, 58, 76). Plaintiffs claim the Varnaus prevented investigators from the Brown County Sheriff's office from investigating the death in order to fuel their political feud with the Brown County Sheriff. (Id.,¶¶ 18–20, 62–63, 68–71). Dr. Varnau refused to enter into a standing permissive allowing the Sheriff to investigate. (Id.,¶¶ 19–20). Without a permissive order to process a death scene, the Brown County Sheriff has no authority to handle evidence, take custody of bodies, or otherwise process the scenes of suspicious deaths. (Id.,¶ 20). As a result, Dr. Varnau had sole custody of the death scene when she ruled Jones' death a suicide. (Id.,¶¶ 18–20).

According to Plaintiffs, while Dr. Varnau was at the death scene, she instructed EMS personnel to leave pieces of Jones' skull for the family to clean up. (Id.,¶ 27). Dr. Varnau also left behind toe tags, body bag wrappers, and the gun used in Jones' death. (Id.,¶¶ 38–39). Dr. Varnau then intentionally left the door of the house unlocked. (Id.,¶ 35).

Plaintiffs claim that when they requested that Dr. Varnau retrieve pieces of Jones' skull and reunite them with his body, Dr. Varnau refused, telling them to just dig a hole and bury the pieces. (Id.,¶¶ 44–45). Plaintiffs also claim that in a conversation with Mr. Varnau, he told Plaintiffs that “everybody loses someone every day.” (Id.,¶¶ 41–42).

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs bring claims for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983against all the defendants and claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law against the Varnaus.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,

528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008)(quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh,487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.2007)). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain (1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative level.’ ” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

B. Varnau Defendants

1. Abstention

The Varnaus argue that this Court should abstain from deciding Plaintiffs' claims under the Pullmanabstention doctrine. The Varnaus maintain that Plaintiffs' claims hinge on Dr. Varnau's determination that Jones' death was caused by suicide. The Varnaus argue that the proper course to challenge this finding is in a state court proceeding under Ohio Revised Code § 313.19, which provides:

The cause of death and the manner and mode in which the death occurred, as delivered by the coroner and incorporated in the coroner's verdict and in the death certificate filed with the division of vital statistics, shall be the legally accepted manner and mode in which such death occurred, and the legally accepted cause of death, unless the court of common pleas of the county in which the death occurred, after a hearing, directs the coroner to change his decision as to such cause and manner and mode of death.

Ohio Rev.Code § 313.19.

Pullmanabstention is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,312 U.S. 496, 500–501, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). Application of the Pullmanabstention doctrine “is warranted only when a state law is challenged and resolution by the state of certain questions of state law may obviate the federal claims, or when the challenged law is susceptible of a construction by state courts that would eliminate the need to reach the federal question.” GTE N., Inc. v. Strand,209 F.3d 909, 921 (6th Cir.2000).

Plaintiffs do not raise any challenges to Ohio Revised Code § 313.19itself. Plaintiffs also disavow any challenge to the determination of the “legally accepted cause of death.” Instead, Plaintiffs challenge the way in which that determination was reached in this particular instance. Plaintiffs claim the Varnaus abandoned body parts and evidence, left the death scene unsecured, disrespected Jones' body and prevented the sheriff from investigating Jones' death. Certainly there is an implication in Plaintiffs' claims that if Dr. Varnau had performed her responsibilities in a constitutional manner, then the cause of death would have been decided differently, but according to Plaintiffs, their claim is limited to how the cause of death was decided, and not the decision itself. Because there is no question of state law, Pullmanabstention does not apply.

For similar reasons, the Court finds that abstention under the Rooker–Feldmandoctrine is not warranted. Application of the Rooker–Feldmandoctrine “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:

cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Here, Plaintiffs are not complaining of injuries caused by a state-court judgment.

Therefore, the Court finds that it is not necessary to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims.

2. Absolute immunity

The Varnaus argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The Varnaus argue that making a determination regarding the cause of death is a quasi-judicial duty which is shielded by absolute immunity. The Varnaus also argue that one who acts under the direction of an absolutely immune official is likewise protected under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.

“A government officer is entitled to absolute immunity for performing functions ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Adams v. Hanson,656 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir.2011)(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). The Sixth Circuit has explained the general contours of absolute immunity in this context:

Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Codecreates civil liability for public officials who violate a person's constitutional rights while acting under color of law. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized two kinds of immunity which shield some official actions from liability which might otherwise arise under § 1983. The most common type of immunity is qualified immunity, which protects officials from liability when a reasonable official in the defendant's position would not have understood his or her actions to violate a person's constitutional rights. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).... More limited in application, but certainly broader in protection, is absolute immunity, which the Supreme Court has held applies to the performance of certain functions when those functions are integral to the functioning of our adversarial judicial system.See Briscoe v. LaHue,460 U.S. 325, 345, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). The Supreme Court has carefully circumscribed the doctrine, however, because absolute immunity protects an official from liability even when the official acted with knowledge of the constitutional violation. Id.Testimony at adversarial judicial proceedings is the most historically grounded of these functions which merit absolute immunity. See id.

Gregory v. City of Louisville,444 F.3d 725, 738 (6th Cir.2006)(footnote omitted). The Sixth Circuit has explained that under this “functional approach” an official's “acts undertaken in direct preparation of judicial proceedings ... warrant absolute immunity, whereas other acts, such as the preliminary gathering of evidence that may ripen into a prosecution, are too attenuated...