Ellerd v. Cnty. of Los Angeles

ARTHUR ELLERD

v.COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Case No. CV 08-4289 CAS (FEMx)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: March 14, 2012

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

CATHERINE JEANG

Deputy Clerk

NOT PRESENT

Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

NOT PRESENT

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

NOT PRESENT

Proceedings: (In Chambers:) CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (filed 2/10/2012)

I. INTRODUCTION

The Court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15.

On June 30, 2008, plaintiff Arthur Ellerd ("plaintiff") filed the instant action against defendant the County of Los Angeles ("County" or "defendant").¹ Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC") on February 9, 2009, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties. Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by the County as an Adult Protective Services ("APS") Social Worker ("social worker") from approximately June 30, 2005, through January 3, 2007 (the "Recovery Period"), and that he was "not regularly paid time and one-half of [his] rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week during one or more work weeks" in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-09 ("FLSA"). FAC ¶ 8.²

Plaintiff and defendant filed cross motions for summary judgment on February 10, 2012. Dkt. Nos. 155, 158. The parties filed their respective oppositions on February 21, 2012, and filed their respective replies on February 27, 2012. Dkt. Nos. 166, 168, 173, 174. After carefully considering the arguments set forth by both parties, the Court finds and concludes as follows.

II. BACKGROUND

APS is a public agency charged with ensuring, among other things, that elderly and dependent adults are safe from emotional, physical, sexual, or financial abuse, neglect, and exploitation. Plaintiff, as an APS social worker, worked on cases involving allegations of abuse or fraud upon the elderly.

APS's official policies require employees to be compensated at one-and-a-half times the regular rate of pay per hour worked more than 40 hours in a given week. Declaration of Lorena Sanchez ("Sanchez Decl.") ¶ 11. The policies prohibit any employee from working overtime without prior approval, but the County maintains that it still pays employees for all overtime hours worked even if an employee should have obtained prior authorization but failed to do so. Id. ¶¶ 10-12, 24-25. When an employee should or could have obtained pre-approval but did not, the employee may be counseled for failing to follow the proscribed process. Id. ¶ 25. To obtain prior approval to work overtime, the social worker must, at least two days prior to commencing the proposed work, (1) state the name of the case for which overtime is requested, (2) describe the tasks that will be completed, (3) indicate where the overtime work will be performed, and (4) provide an estimate of the overtime hours needed to complete the tasks. Pl. Notice of Lodging ("PNOL") Exhs, 8, 16, 20. Overtime is available only for cases that are more than 30 days old. Id. Exh. 20.

According to plaintiff, he worked approximately 27 hours per week of uncompensated overtime during the Recovery Period. Declaration of Arthur Ellerd ("Ellerd Decl.") ¶¶ 8, 9, 12. Plaintiff contends that his immediate supervisor, Michelle Bourret ("Bourret"), instructed plaintiff to report only his scheduled hours on his timesheets and not to record any unapproved overtime. Id. ¶ 15. Accordingly, plaintiff brought the instant action to recoup unpaid overtime.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying relevant portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a fact or facts necessary for one or more essential elements of each claim upon which the moving party seeks judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). The nonmoving party must not simply rely on the pleadings and must do more than make "conclusory allegations [in] an affidavit." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Summary judgment must be granted for the moving party if the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322; see also Abromson v. Am. Pac. Corp., 114 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1997).

In light of the facts presented by the nonmoving party, along with any undisputed facts, the Court must decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. A.E. Rouse & Co., 121 F.3d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment for the moving party is proper when a rational trier of fact would not be able to find for the nonmoving party on the claims at issue. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

IV. DISCUSSION

Congress passed the FLSA to correct and eliminate those "conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). "Under the FLSA, no employershall employ any of its covered employees for a work week that is longer than 40 hours, unless that employee receives as compensation for his employment at least one and a half times the regular rate for all overtime hours." Forrester v. Roth's I.G.A. Foodliner, Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)). "The FLSA is a remedial statute that is 'to be liberally construed to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with Congressional direction.'" Probert v. Family Centered Servs. of Alaska, Inc., 651 F.3d 1007, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dent v. Cox Commc'ns Las Vegas, Inc., 502 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.101.

In this case, the parties do not dispute that plaintiff was an "employee" of the County as defined by the FLSA or that plaintiff worked a non-de minimis amount of overtime during the Recovery Period. Rather, the parties focus on the following three issues: first, whether plaintiff can prove that the County had actual or constructive knowledge that he was working overtime, and if so, whether he can prove the number of overtime hours worked; second, whether plaintiff can prove that the County "willfully" violated the FLSA in order to extend its statute of limitations from two years to three years; and finally, whether plaintiff can prove that he is entitled to liquidated damages. Each issue is discussed in turn.

A. Whether the County Had Actual or Constructive Knowledge of Plaintiff's Overtime Work, and, if so, Whether Plaintiff Is Able to Prove the Amount of Overtime Hours Worked

"[A]n employer who knows or should have known that an employee is or was working overtime is obligated to pay overtime . . . even if the employee does not make a claim for the overtime compensation." Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "However, where an employer has no knowledge that an employee is engaging in overtime work and that employee fails to notify the employer or deliberately prevents the employer from acquiring knowledge of the overtime work, the employer's failure to pay for the overtime hours is not a violation of § 207." Forrester, 646 F.2d at 414.

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary adjudication as to the County's actual or constructive knowledge because he "repeatedly complained to his immediate supervisor, [Bourret], regarding uncompensated overtime." Pl. Mot. at 22. According to plaintiff, Bourret "admitted to being 'concerned' that [p]laintiff was working overtimewithout payment." Id. (quoting Bourret Depo. at 79:11-13). Plaintiff argues that Bourret's actual knowledge should be imputed to the County. Pl. Mot. at 22. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that the County had constructive knowledge because it "knew" its social workers "could not handle the caseloads it was imposing upon them without having to work overtime." Id. Plaintiff bases this assertion on a 1970s "yardstick" study conducted by the County that concluded social workers could handle only 15 new cases per week, yet plaintiff was given upwards of 25 new cases per week. Id. at 23. Moreover, plaintiff argues that the County became aware of the need for overtime in Ellerd I. Id. Finally, plaintiff asserts that the County's alleged "complete failure" to enforce its policy prohibiting unapproved overtime demonstrates constructive knowledge. Id.

The County argues that it is entitled to summary adjudication on the issue of knowledge because plaintiff has "not provide[d] specific facts establishing the amount and extent" of his overtime work; has not reported the hours on his timesheet; and bases his allegations on his "bare and sporadic recollection[]." Def. Mot. at 13 (citing White v. Starbucks Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2007), Newton v. City of Henderson, 41 F.3d 746, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1995), Singh v. City of New York, 418 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), and Seever v. Carrols...