Elliott v. QF Circa 37, LLC

NATSUE ELLIOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. QF CIRCA 37, LLC, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-0288-BAS-AGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 14, 2017

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' RULE 12(c) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

[ECF Nos. 46, 47]

Presently before the Court is Defendants QF Circa 37, LLC ("QF"), Versa CIC, LP ("Versa") and ConAm Management Corporation's ("ConAm") (together "Defendants") Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 46, 47.) This case concerns whether the Defendants engaged in discriminatory housing practices on the basis of race, national origin, and disability, in connection with Plaintiff Natsue Elliott's apartment at the Versa at Civita complex ("Civita") in San Diego, California. The sole issue that Defendants raise is whether Plaintiff Linda Brown—the daughter and guardian of Plaintiff Natsue Elliott, who secured her mother's housing and regularly interacted with Defendants to request reasonable accommodations for her mother's disability—lacks standing to assert any claims in this case. Plaintiff Brown has opposed the motion (ECF No. 58) and Defendants have replied. (ECF No. 65.) Defendants further request that this Court take judicial notice of certain records in connection with their motion. (ECF No. 48.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part both Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and request for judicial notice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Linda Brown is the adult daughter and self-appointed guardian of Plaintiff Natsue Elliott, an 87-year old Asian-American who is handicapped and has Alzheimer's disease. (ECF No. 4, First Am. Compl. [hereinafter "FAC"] ¶¶4-6.) Plaintiff Elliott lives by herself in an apartment at Civita, a complex advertised as housing for senior citizens. (Id. ¶¶4, 15.) Plaintiff Brown arranged for Plaintiff Elliott's housing at Civita, and is often at Plaintiff Elliott's apartment to assist with her mother's day-to-day care. (Id. ¶¶5, 15.) Defendant QF owns and operates Civita, while Defendants Versa and ConAm serve as property managers of Civita. (Id. ¶¶8-11.)

The FAC alleges that the Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against disabled persons in the operation of Civita, including Plaintiff Elliott, on account of race, national origin, and handicap or disability. (Id. ¶14.) In April 2015, Defendants allegedly denied Plaintiff Brown's request for a physician-prescribed emotional support animal to reside in Plaintiff Elliott's apartment to assist in coping with her disability. (Id. ¶¶19-20.) During May and early June 2015, Defendants allegedly denied multiple requests for parking accommodations at Civita. (Id. ¶¶21-22, 28-30.) Defendants allegedly caused "no parking" signs to be erected at the curb in front of Plaintiff Elliott's apartment. (Id. ¶30.) During one incident, while Plaintiff Brown tried to park at the curb, an employee of the Defendants allegedly told Plaintiff Brown that she did not care Plaintiff Elliott had a disability and she was unwilling to make any disability accommodations in parking for PlaintiffElliott. (Id. ¶31.)

In July 2015, Plaintiff Brown also made multiple requests to Defendants for her mother to move to a one or two-bedroom apartment to permit a full-time live-in caretaker to assist Plaintiff Elliott with her disability. (Id. ¶¶32-34.) After three weeks with no response, an employee of the Defendants informed Plaintiff Brown that Defendants' legal department had approved her mother's transfer to the next available one-bedroom apartment, but additional paperwork would be necessary for a two-bedroom. (Id. ¶35.) In September 2015, Plaintiff Brown sought to have an employee of the Defendants sign a form needed to obtain a reasonable accommodation from the San Diego Housing Association and release her mother from her lease. (Id. ¶39.) When the employee saw the form, she allegedly claimed that a two-bedroom unit would become available within a month. (Id.) However, no such unit was actually available and Plaintiff Elliott moved into a one-bedroom at Civita, above a tenant who allegedly engaged in disruptive behavior about which Defendants were aware. (Id. ¶¶39-42.)

In mid-October 2015, Plaintiff Elliott filed a housing discrimination complaint with California's Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") against Defendants. (Id. ¶¶43-44.) At the beginning of November 2015, an employee of the Defendants told Plaintiff Brown that her mother would be able to transfer to a two-bedroom unit effective January 4, 2016. (Id. ¶47.) Nearly a month later, however, two other employees of the Defendants allegedly denied the transfer in retaliation for Plaintiff Elliott's DFEH complaint. (Id. ¶¶49-50.) Further, Defendants allegedly served a Notice of Lease Violation on Plaintiff Elliott for noise violations, also in retaliation for her DFEH complaint. (Id. ¶51.) Plaintiffs allege that they have suffered economic loss and emotional distress, including humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish, as a result of Defendants' practices. (Id. ¶52.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs Elliott and Brown brought suit against Defendants on February 3,2016, raising claims under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et seq., California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov. Code §§12927 and 12955 et seq.; the California Unruh Civil Rights Act ("UCRA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§51 et seq.; California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17204; and negligence. (ECF No. 1.) They subsequently filed the First Amended Complaint, with largely identical claims. (ECF No. 4.) On April 21, 2017, Defendants filed their Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF Nos. 46-47) and request for judicial notice (ECF No. 48). The Court now addresses both.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12 (b)(1)

When a defendant challenges the Article III standing of a plaintiff, Rule 12(b)(1) provides the appropriate standard because it is the court's subject-matter jurisdiction which is challenged. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either factual or facial. In a facial attack to the allegations contained in the complaint, a court accepts as true a plaintiff's allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack which disputes the truth of the allegations, a court may look beyond the complaint to matters of public record without converting the motion into one for summary judgment and need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations. Id. Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff carries her burden by putting forth "the manner and degree of evidence required" by the stage of the litigation. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

B. Rule 12(c)

"After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A court ruling ona Rule 12(c) motion applies the same standard used in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 1996). The court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). It is the moving party's burden to demonstrate that both of these requirements are met. Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, a Rule 12(c) motion must be treated as one for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1550.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Judicial Notice

The Court first addresses Defendants' request that this Court take judicial notice of certain documents. (ECF No. 48.) Defendants request judicial notice of: Plaintiff Elliott's DFEH Complaint, the DFEH Notice of Case Closure, a DFEH Closure Determination and Request for Additional Information, the complaints filed in this case, email records in the files of DFEH, and various records in the files of the San Diego Housing Commission ("SDHC"). (ECF No. 48.) As to all documents except the complaints, Defendants argue that the materials are "government documents" in the form of state and city administrative records, which are proper subjects of judicial notice. (Id.) Plaintiff Brown argues that the materials should be excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) because they are matters outside the pleadings. (ECF No. 58 at 10.) She does not challenge the documents' authenticity. The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' request.

The Court grants Defendants' request to take judicial notice of Plaintiff Elliott's DFEH Complaint, the DFEH Notice of Case Closure and a DFEH ClosureDetermination and Request for Additional Information. (ECF No. 48, Exs. 1-3). In ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, a may take judicial notice of matters in the public record without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) in turn allows a court to take judicial notice of "a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known...