Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp.

NOLEN SCOTT ELY, et al., Plaintiffs v. CABOT OIL & GAS CORP., Defendant

Civil No. 3:09-CV-2284

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 5, 2016

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this memorandum opinion we begin to write the final chapter in this longstanding legal saga, a saga which has consumed the parties for the past eight years. This lawsuit was initiated on November 19, 2009, by a group of 44 plaintiffs who collectively filed suit to recover damages for injuries and property damage allegedly suffered as the result of the defendant's natural gas drilling operations in Dimock Township, Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania. Subsequent to this case being filed, a number of the plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with the defendants, and at this juncture a handful of plaintiffs remain in the case. Those plaintiffs include Nolen Scott Ely and Monica L. Marta-Ely, individually, and as parents and natural guardians of their three minor children (the "Elys" or "Ely Family"); and Ray and Victoria Hubert, individually, and as the parents and natural guardians of one minor child, and a child who has since reached the age of majority, Angel Hubert ("Huberts") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Beyond this protracted civil litigation, the dispute between the parties has been the subject of administrative environmental proceedings conducted by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Those administrative proceedings also concluded through a settlement and the entry of a consent decree. Much of this litigative past now forms the prologue for the trial of this final case, and provides the basis for the parties' competing motions in limine which are now before the court.

This longstanding civil action, relating to alleged groundwater contamination at certain property in Dimock, Pennsylvania, is now scheduled for trial on February 22, 2016. In advance of trial, the parties have endeavored to limit and shape the presentation of evidence to the jury by filing motions in limine that are ripe for resolution.

For its part, in its motion in limine, (Doc. 633.), the defendant, Cabot, invites us to rule, prior to trial and before any evidence has been presented, that presentation of 28 broad categories of testimony is precluded at trial, mostly on thegrounds that the anticipated evidence is irrelevant or unduly prejudicial.¹ The plaintiffs respond to this wide-ranging motion by urging the court to refrain from prejudging the admissibility of much of this testimony; representing that counsel will exercise caution in eliciting testimony in some areas; and otherwise suggesting that the court can take steps at trial to limit the presentation of evidence if necessary or warranted at trial, and may further provide limiting or cautionary instructions, as needed at trial. In other areas, the plaintiffs concede that the motion may be granted because they do not intend in any event to present the evidence that the defendant seeks to exclude.

Having carefully considered this multi-faceted motion, as described below, the defendant's motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The plaintiff has filed a less expansive, though largely unsupported, motion in limine, (Doc. 638.), seeking to restrain the defendant's ability to present evidence regarding the alleged number and efficacy of the water treatment systems that have been implemented in some households in the Dimock and Springville Townships, or about households that may have used such water systems. The plaintiff also seeks to prevent one of the defendant's experts, Brent Brelje, fromtestifying that the opinions set forth in his written reports were made to a reasonable degree of scientific or engineering certainty. Additionally, the plaintiff generally seeks entry of an order that would "limit[] cumulative and redundant presentation of purported water data results obtained by Cabot . . . ." (Doc. 638, p. 3.) In making these requests, the plaintiffs have in many instances failed to identify for the court exactly what evidence they would have the court exclude, have provided little by way of legal support for their request, and sometimes simply overlooked evidence in the record that undermines their motion, which will be DENIED in its entirety at this time, without prejudice to the plaintiff raising timely objections to evidence at trial if warranted.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards-Motions in Limine

The court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its cases, which carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine prior to trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (the court exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues "in appropriate cases"). Courts may exercise this discretion in order to ensure that juries are notexposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant evidence. United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so in order to "narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions." Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). However, courts should exercise caution when ruling on such motions.

In considering motions in limine which call upon the court to engage in preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we begin by recognizing that these "evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine ] are subject to the trial judge's discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of discretion ... Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is 'arbitrary and irrational.' " Abrams v. Lightolier Inc. 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir.1995) (citations omitted); see Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir.1994) (reviewing in limine rulings for abuse of discretion). Yet, while these decisions regarding the exclusion of evidence rest in the sound discretion of the district court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion, the exercise of that discretion is guided by certain basic principles.

One of the key guiding principles is reflected in the philosophy which shapes the rules of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly becharacterized as evidentiary rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit fact-finders to consider pertinent factual information while searching for the truth. The inclusive quality of the rules, and their permissive attitude towards the admission of evidence, is embodied in three cardinal concepts. The first of these concepts is Rule 401's definition of relevant evidence. Rule 401 defines what is relevant in an expansive fashion, stating:

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable *197 or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Adopting this broad view of relevance it has been held that: "Under [Rule] 401, evidence is relevant if it has 'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' [Therefore] 'It follows that evidence is irrelevant only when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.' " Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J.1996) citing Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir.1994) (quotations omitted).

This quality of inclusion embraced by the Federal Rules of Evidence, favoring the admission of potentially probative proof in all of its forms, is further buttressed by Rule 402, which generally defines the admissibility of relevant evidence in sweeping terms, providing that:

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Fed. R. Evid. 402.

Thus, Rule 402 expressly provides that all "[r]elevant evidence will be admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary." United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). While these principles favoring inclusion of evidence are subject to some reasonable limitations, even those limitations are cast in terms that clearly favor admission of relevant evidence over preclusion of proof in federal proceedings. Thus, Rule 403, which provides grounds for exclusion of some evidence, describes these grounds for exclusion as an exception to the general rule favoring admission of relevant evidence, stating that:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added).

By permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence only when its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by other prejudicial factors, Rule 403 underscores the principle that, while evidentiary rulings rest in the sound discretion of the court, that discretion should consistently be exercised in a fashion which resolves all doubts in favor of the admission of relevant proof in a proceeding, unless the relevance of that proof is substantially outweighed by some other factors which caution against admission.

These...