Emma C. v. Eastin, Case No. 96-cv-04179-TEH

EMMA C., et al., Plaintiffs, v. DELAINE EASTIN, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 96-cv-04179-TEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 25, 2015

ORDER DENYING STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE

This matter is before the Court on State Defendants' motion to set aside the Draft Corrective Action Plan ("CAP") developed by the Court's Monitor with the assistance of Court-approved consultants. (Docket No. 2056). Plaintiffs opposed the motion and Defendants timely replied. (Docket Nos. 2062, 2071). The Court heard oral argument on August 3, 2015. After carefully considering the Parties' written and oral arguments, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' motion for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in 1996 against the Ravenswood City School District ("District") for its failure to provide children with disabilities with a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE"), and against the California Department of Education ("CDE") for failing to adequately monitor the District and ensure its compliance with state and federal laws. After conducting a comprehensive investigation into the allegations raised by Plaintiffs, the CDE determined that it had not "fully implemented their Monitoring responsibility to ensure that pupils are provided a [FAPE] and that compliance is maintained." Oct. 4, 2001 Order Re: Contempt at 2 (Docket No. 409) (quoting CDE Compliance Report #S-356-96/97 at 45).

The original Consent Decree, approved on January 18, 2000, required the CDE to implement an effective monitoring system and demonstrate that it was capable of ensuringcontinued compliance with the law to children with disabilities in the District. Ex. A to Consent Decree § A, ¶ 8.0 (Docket No. 232). The Parties thereafter entered into the First Amended Consent Decree ("FACD"), which included the Ravenswood Self Improvement Plan ("RSIP") and repeated the original Consent Decree's requirement that the CDE ensure an effective monitoring system. (Docket No. 832). Specifically, the FACD provided:

CDE is responsible under federal and state law to ensure that children with disabilities who reside in Ravenswood have a [FAPE] provided to them in the least restrictive environment. As part of this responsibility, CDE shall implement an effective monitoring system and complaint resolution procedure.

FACD § 4.1. Moreover, Section 13.0 of the FACD established the standard for determining when the State should be released from Court supervision:

If, after considering the motion(s) of Defendants and any opposition thereto, and after conducting an Evidentiary Hearing, if necessary, the Court determines that . . . (2) the state-level system in place is capable of ensuring continued compliance with the law and the provision of FAPE to children with disabilities in Ravenswood, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that there exists in . . . CDE a system to adequately monitor, supervise and ensure FAPE to Class Members.

On July 25, 2011, the Court recognized that "[u]nder FACD section 13.0, the Court must also eventually determine whether the state-level monitoring system in place is capable of ensuring continued compliance with the law and provision of a [FAPE] to children with disabilities in Ravenswood." July 25, 2011 Order at 1 (Docket No. 1640). In order to prevent the unnecessarily protracted litigation that would have resulted from waiting to address this issue until after the RSIP was fulfilled, the Court instructed the Parties to address "the relevance of [Section 13.0], how [CDE's] compliance with this requirement should be measured, and when such measurement should begin." Id. The Court further clarified that the State's monitoring system must minimally comply with the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). Nov. 26, 2012 Order at 6-7 (Docket No. 1793). The same Order adopted the Monitor's proposed "General Standard"to assist in determining the CDE's compliance with Section 13.0. Id. at 8-9 ("CDE's statewide monitoring system, as applied to Ravenswood, [must be] implemented adequately; [identify] both compliance and noncompliance appropriately based on adequate evidence and reasoning; and [result] in appropriate corrective actions, the implementation of require corrective actions, and the timely correction of identified noncompliance.") (emphasis in original).

The Parties stipulated to a process for "determining whether CDE's state-level [monitoring] system" was "adequate." Fifth Joint Statement Re: CDE Monitoring of the Provision of FAPE in Ravenswood at 1, 9-10 ("Fifth Joint Statement") (Docket No. 1799), adopted as an Order of the Court (Docket No. 1803). The agreed-upon process provided that the CDE was to produce "information necessary to understand the state-level system in place," in accordance with the language of Section 13.0 of the FACD, instead of focusing on a specially designed system for the District. Id. at 7. The stipulation also provided a process for resolving disputes over the design of the state-level monitoring system, any proposed changes, and its implementation in the District. Id. at 9-10.

The Court, its Monitor, and the Parties followed this process over the ensuing months. Plaintiffs submitted objections to the design of the state-level monitoring system, the State responded, the Parties engaged in an unsuccessful meet-and-confer, and the Monitor issued his Determinations (Docket No. 1890), which recommended the development of a CAP. Pursuant to the process adopted in the Fifth Joint Statement, State Defendants filed a motion objecting to and seeking to set aside the Determinations. (Docket No. 1911). On July 2, 2014, the Court denied the State's motion and approved the Determinations in full, ordering the following:

The parties are to proceed with the corrective action steps as outlined in the Monitor's January 9, 2014 determinations report. The Monitor is directed to hire consultants as necessary to ensure the timely development and effective implementation of a corrective action plan in order to achieve the outcomes set forth in the determinations.

July 2, 2014 Order at 13 (Docket No. 1958). State Defendants appealed the July 2, 2014 Order, and were denied a stay by this Court and the Ninth Circuit. (Docket Nos. 1968, 1971, 1982).

On January 15, 2015, the Court issued an Order directing the process for developing a Draft CAP that would allow the Parties ample opportunity to provide input to the Monitor and be heard on any objections. (Docket No. 2013). However, the Court specifically instructed the parties not to re-argue the "substance of the Determinations" when making objections to the Draft CAP. Id. at 1.

The Monitor submitted the Draft CAP on February 12, 2015. To provide State Defendants ample opportunity to express their concerns with the Draft CAP, the Court extended the deadline for objections until April 10, on which date State Defendants submitted a 28-page, single-spaced letter articulating their objections. Meet-and-confer sessions were held on April 27 and May 4, but the Parties were unable to resolve their differences. The Monitor addressed the State's objections in a May 14, 2015 memorandum. (Docket No. 2043). State Defendants thereafter filed the present motion to set aside the Draft CAP. (Docket No. 2056).

DISCUSSION

Despite the Court's clear instruction that Defendants not use this process as an opportunity to re-argue the "substance of the [Monitor's January 2014] Determinations," much of the present motion does just that. As previously explained, the Court has adopted the Monitor's Determinations and rejected Defendants' objections, which were fully briefed and considered last year. The Court's July 2, 2014 Order on this matter is currently on appeal; the Ninth Circuit is now the appropriate forum for Defendants to address their concerns. Despite the State's apparent disregard for the Court's instruction, the Court will address the arguments presented, but will hereafter consider the matter closed, absent an adverse decision from the appellate court.

I. State Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted in part and denied in part.

The Court will first address State Defendants' request for judicial notice. (Docket No. 2056-1). The State seeks judicial notice of four documents: (1) a letter from Acting Assistant Secretary Sue Swenson regarding the United States Department of Education's (USDOE) revision of California's 2014 determination from "Needs Intervention" to "Needs Assistance"; (2) another letter from Swenson regarding compliance data to be provided to the USDOE by the New York State Education Department; (3) a document regarding Indicator 17 of the State Performance Plan and Annual Performance Report for Special Education: State Systemic Improvement Plan for Program year 2013-2014; and (4) a report from California's Statewide Task Force on Special education entitled "Our System: Reforming Education to Serve All Students."

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), judicial notice may be taken of an adjudicative fact that is "not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." "The contents of records and reports of administrative bodies are proper subjects for judicial notice under Rule 201(2)." Jimenez v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 238 F.R.D. 241, 246 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953)). However, while a court may take notice of matters of public record, they should not take notice "of facts that may be subject to reasonable dispute." United States ex rel. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

All the documents for which the State seeks judicial notice are official records of the USDOE or the CDE,...