Employees Committed for Justice v. Eastman Kodak

407 F.Supp.2d 423

EMPLOYEES COMMITTED FOR JUSTICE, Courtney Davis, Gladys Alston, Cynthia Gayden, Robert Gibson, Jannie Nesmith, Noralean Pringle, Carrie Rice, Maria Scott, Olin Singletary, and Edna Williams, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 04-CV-6098.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

September 29, 2005.

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Clayborne E. Chavers, The Chavers Law Firm, PC, Washington, DC, Judith Ann Biltekoff, Brown & Kelly, LLP, Buffalo, NY, Selim Ablo, Shanon J. Carson, Stephen A. Whinston, William T. Coleman, III, Berger & Montague, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Judith E. Harris, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Michael D. Thomas, Nixon Peabody LLP, San Francisco, CA, Robert B. Calihan, Jill K. Schultz, Eugene D. Ulterino, Nixon Peabody LLP, Rochester, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

FELDMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Preliminary Statement

Currently before the Court is defendant Eastman Kodak Company's (hereinafter Kodak or defendant) motion to dismiss portions of the complaint filed by plaintiffs. (Docket # 33). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court for all further proceedings.

Procedural Background

On November 12, 2003, plaintiff Courtney Davis filed a pro se complaint against Kodak in the Northern District of California alleging race discrimination. On March 10, 2004, the district court in California transferred the case to the Western District of New York. On March 16, 2004, Kodak answered Davis' complaint denying the allegations of discrimination. Thereafter, Davis retained counsel and entered into a stipulation with Kodak's counsel which, inter alia, extended plaintiff's time to file an amended complaint "that contains class allegations." See June 3, 2004 Stipulated Order (Docket # 27). On July 30, 2004, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting class allegations and naming additional plaintiffs. (Docket # 29). In the amended complaint, plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of past, present, and future African American employees of Kodak. One of the additional plaintiffs added in the amended complaint was the "Employees Committed for Justice" (hereinafter "ECJ"), an unincorporated organization comprised of approximately one thousand past and present African American employees of Kodak who have claims of racial discrimination against Kodak.

Relevant Factual Background

In the context of the instant motion to dismiss, the detailed factual allegations set forth in the complaint need not be repeated here. To the extent that the factual allegations are relevant to the legal arguments of the parties, they will be set forth below as necessary to resolve the issue presented. Generally, however, the amended complaint alleges that "Kodak has engaged in an ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination against its African American Employees," including discrimination in compensations, promotions, wage and job classifications, and maintaining a hostile work environment. Plaintiffs also claim that "[w]hen African American employees of Kodak complain[ed] about" the discriminatory practices and policies to Kodak's management, they were "subjected to retaliation."

The amended complaint references and relies upon multiple "Letters of Determination" issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on February 6, 2004 and thereafter, which found, inter alia, that: (1) weekly pay rates for white employees of Kodak were consistently higher than weekly pay rates for black employees; (2) Kodak maintained a hostile work environment with respect to its African American employees; and (3) Kodak retaliated against African American employees who participated in protected activities. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 48.

Discussion

Before turning to the specific issues Kodak has raised in its motion to dismiss, it is important to acknowledge the Court's well settled obligations in evaluating a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. First, the Court must accept the material allegations in the complaint as true. "Dismissal is not appropriate `unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Second, at this stage of the litigation, the issue for the Court "is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail ultimately, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleading that a recovery is very remote and unlikely, but that is not the test." Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 628 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Finally, these evaluative rules apply "with particular force where the plaintiff alleges civil rights violations." Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d at 701. With these established principles in mind, the Court turns to the specific arguments raised by Kodak.

1. Pattern or Practice Claims of Hostile Work Environment: Kodak contends that the "precise issue" to be decided in its 12(b) motion to dismiss is "whether the subjective component of hostile work environment claims renders such claims incompatible with pattern or practice adjudication." See Kodak Reply Memorandum (Docket #65) at page 4, n. 3. Kodak argues that the answer to this question must be that as a matter of law the pattern or practice theory of liability is not available in discrimination cases claiming hostile work environment. "All the discovery in the world," Kodak argues, "will not change the conclusion [that] hostile work environment claims are inherently irreconcilable with pattern or practice adjudication as a matter of law due to their highly individualized and subjective nature." Id. at page 4.

Claims of pattern and practice liability, such as those asserted here, "focus on allegations of widespread acts of intentional discrimination against individuals." Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 951, 122 S.Ct. 1349, 152 L.Ed.2d 251 (2002). To sustain such a claim, plaintiffs must prove more than isolated, accidental or sporadic discriminatory acts. Id. Rather, they must establish that intentional "racial discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure." Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). A prima facie case of discrimination under the pattern and practice approach is established when the evidence supports a finding of a "policy, pattern, or practice of intentional discrimination against the protected group" or protected class. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 158. Class actions are uniquely suitable for litigating discrimination claims under the pattern and practice framework. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir.1998) (class actions can be used "effectively to eradicate widespread or institutional-scale discrimination."). Indeed, some courts have held that the pattern and practice method of proof may never be utilized in private non-class suits. See, e.g., Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir.2001); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760-61 (4th Cir.1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031, 119 S.Ct. 2388, 144 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999). Kodak's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims hinges on its argument that the pattern and practice methodology is legally incompatible and ultimately irreconcilable with the elements required to prove a racially hostile work environment. Relying on Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), Kodak argues that a plaintiff in a hostile work environment case must prove both an objective and subjective element to succeed under Title VII. The required objective element is that the conduct at issue must be so severe or pervasive as to create an "objectively" hostile work environment. The subjective element of proof is that the victim must "subjectively perceive" the work environment to be, in fact, abusive. Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. at 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367).

Kodak does not dispute that the objective element of a hostile work environment claim is consistent with the pattern and practice method of proof. Indeed, proof that a "workplace was permeated with instances of racially discriminatory conduct" (Williams v. County of Westchester, 171 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1999)), would also go a long way in supporting a claim that racial discrimination was the defendant's "standard operating procedure." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843.

Instead, it is the subjective component of the hostile work environment claim that Kodak argues is antagonistic to pattern and practice proof. Kodak asserts that the pattern and practice theory of liability is not "viable" for Title VII harassment claims because unlike pattern and practice, which focuses on procedures, practices, and policies that impact an identifiable class or group of employees, the subjective element of a hostile work environment claim requires each victim to prove that the racial harassment was actually and subjectively unwelcome. See Richardson, 180 F.3d at 436. Because such "highly individualized" and subjective proof is not part of the pattern and practice equation, Kodak reasons that, as a matter of law, proving a hostile work environment by the pattern or practice methodology simply cannot be done. See Kodak's Memorandum of Law ...