Endencia v. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n

1

FRANCES ENDENCIA, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, et al. Defendants.

No. 21-cv-02360

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

January 11, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARY M. ROWLAND United States District Judge.

Frances Endencia, a prolific litigator, owned the Pampered Pet Veterinary Service, which she says experienced multiple break-ins between 1999 and 2007. After one such break-in in 2005, she contacted the Streamwood Police. Apparently at the police department's recommendation, the Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation (“IDFPR”) required her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. As a result of the evaluation, the IDFPR suspended Endencia's veterinary license. Soon after, and seemingly unrelated, Endencia lost custody of her daughter. Endencia has filed numerous lawsuits in this court stemming from the alleged break-ins, losing her professional license and losing custody of her daughter (now an adult). See Endencia v. Am. Psych. Assoc., et. al., No 1:19-cv-03161 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Endencia v. Henry et al., No. 1:18-cv-05477 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Endencia v DCFS of Glen Ellyn et. al., No. 1:18-cv-05476 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Endencia v. IDFPR et. al., No. 1-17-cv-003306 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Endencia v. IDFPR et. al., No. 1:17-cv-02045; Endencia v. ADT, et. al., No. 1:08-cv-04541 (N.D. Ill. 2008).

Endencia brings this suit against over twenty defendants essentially rehashing claims she previously asserted. The defendants who have filed appearances have filed motion to dismiss and some have requested sanctions against Endencia. [8], [15], [19], [24], and [29]. After the motions were fully briefed, Endencia filed two motions to amend her complaint and requested leave to add new defendants. [47], [51] and [68]. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendants' motions to dismiss and denies Endencia's motions for leave to amend.

I. Claims

The Complaint is difficult to follow. Endencia purchased a veterinary practice from PMH Partners in 1999. Dr. Joel Price, Dr. Joel Price Jr. and Dr. John Coyne were apparently the previous owners. She alleges that PMH Partners is in conspiracy with ADT, the security company. PMH and ADT “utilize psychiatrists & police officers to frame their victims … to cause suspension of license and loss of income. [This is what happened to Plaintiff-Frances.].” Dkt. 1 at 11.

In Count I, Endencia alleges that Defendants Knox Box Co. (Knox Box), ADT, PMH Partners and Dr. Stafford Henry conspired to commit fraud against Endencia, the citizens of the United States, and the court under both 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2) and the Civil RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961. Dkt. 1 at 18. The fraud against her occurred when Knox Box sold master keys to Defendant Bartlett Fire and Police Departments. Endencia further alleges a fraud when defendants created local ordinances that required business owners to provide keys (presumably to local authorities). Id. Endencia references “consumer fraud” when she refers to § 1031, (Id. at 9), although that statute governs fraud against the United States in contracting. Endencia alleges ADT stole from her, hired law enforcement, illegally monitored their clients, had an illegal exculpatory clause in its contract, and manually controlled the monitoring devices in their clients' businesses and homes. She also asserts that “courts” are a part of this conspiracy. Id.

Count II asserts a claim of fraud upon the Court. Id. at 17. This claim arises out of the 2008 administrative action where the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) suspended her license to practice veterinary medicine. Id.

Count III also alleges fraud upon the court, this time based on the state court proceedings involving Endencia's daughter in 2009. Endencia brings this claim against the state court judge, the Honorable Lisa Fabiano (Fabiano), the Zeke Legal Clinic at Northern Illinois University^[1] (NIU), and attorney Wendy Vaughn^[2](Vaughn), and Alexian Brothers Behavioral Health and its staff members Mohinder Chadha and Tina Bhargava who prepared reports and/or provided testimony at the 2009 hearing. Endencia claims she was “not allowed to examine witness testimony or interrogate before and during trial.” Id. at 18. Defendants NIU, Mohinder Chadha, Tina Bhargava and Alexian Brothers Behavioral Heath produced improper psychological reports during the hearing. Endencia also asserts that Bill Maffy of DCFS Glen Ellyn, Wheaton Youth Outreach (WYO)^[3] and its staff psychologist, Dan Benyousky (Benyousky) caused “loss of affection of mother and child by informing family members not to allow them to speak to each other since July 2009.” Id. at 18. Endencia asserts these same allegations in support of an “alienation of affection” claim in Count V. Id. at 19-20.

Endencia brings Count IV under a criminal statute, Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1841, asserting that Benyousky “orchestrated the stress” that caused her daughter, Altessia, to have a miscarriage “by surrounding her with people who placed psychological violence to cause the death of her child.” Id. at 19.

In Count VI, Endencia brings a claim for “attempt[] murder by Rockford Police officer.” Id. She does not assert any facts to support this claim but cites a state case: People of State of Ill. V. Endencia, No. 1 2009-cf-000228 (Cir. Ct. 17^th 2009).

Count VII does not name any defendants but criticizes the current practice of psychiatry. According to Endencia, psychiatry dehumanizes patients while psychiatrists corroborate with each other for financial gain, and are strategically located within law enforcement, among other things. Id. at 20. It is potentially aimed at the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”).

All defendants assert Endencia has failed to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ADT and Wheaton Youth Outreach, both of which have been sued several times by Endencia, assert res judicata and statute of limitations. ADT, as it has previously, also relies on an exculpatory provision in its contract. The defendants involved in the child custody action rely on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the Honorable Lisa Fabiano asserts absolute judicial immunity.

II. Standard

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, not the merits of the case. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must provide enough factual information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion accepts plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all permissible inferences in plaintiff's favor. Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual allegations”, but “still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” Bell v. City of Chi., 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007). Deciding the plausibility of the claim is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)). In addition, the Court construes the pro se complaint liberally, holding it to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).

III. Analysis

A. Count I

Endencia's first claim is brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2) (fraud against the United States in contracting) and 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (RICO). It is not clear from Endencia's complaint or her response briefing how any Defendant has legally committed a criminal fraud on the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1031. As ADT notes, that statute does allow for private civil actions to address discrimination in “employment by an employer because of lawful acts done by the employee… in furtherance of a prosecution under [Section 1031].” 18 U.S.C. § 1031(h)(1) (emphasis added). But there are no allegations in the complaint that involve an employment relationship between Plaintiff and any defendant or that allow any inference of a fraud being committed on the United States.

Count I also relies on RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 and § 1962(c), to assert a claim. It is well-settled that a RICO violation under §1962 requires “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). Furthermore, §1961 clarifies that a pattern of racketeering activity consists of at least two predicate acts of racketeering committed within a ten-year period. Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

In addition, the law requires RICO claims to be pled consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). This requires Endencia to allege “1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2)...